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ABSTRACT

PARTISAN POLICYMAKING: RESEARCH AND
ADVOCACY IN AN ERA OF POLARIZATION
MAY 2019
ZACHARY ALBERT
B.A., FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Raymond J. La Raja

In recent decades, partisan polarization has not only grown but also extended to a
wide variety of political processes. Despite this fact, we lack a strong understanding
of the policy process under conditions of relatively extreme polarization. The roles
of interest groups and think tanks in this environment are particularly understudied.
How have research producing institutions changed in response to partisan polarization? And which types of organizations are most influential under the current system?
Existing theories often lack an appreciation of the role of partisanship and assume
relatively unstructured pluralistic competition in the development and debate of public policy. To help rectify this limitation, I view actors in the policy process as part
of a system structured mainly by partisan dynamics. This changing “marketplace
for ideas” has incentivized some interest groups and think tanks to invest in a single
political party to enhance their influence and accomplish their goals. The result is a
ix

policy system defined by two competing extended party networks, or loose coalitions
of formal party members and outside research institutions. Under such conditions,
influence accrues to those organizations that engage in relatively partisan research
and advocacy efforts.
In the first empirical chapter, I use interview results to show that members of
Congress require information, ideas, and talking points from outside actors. These
politicians seek out resources that will help further their individual and partisan
goals (which are increasingly distant from the opposing party). This decision-making
calculus has downstream effects on research institutions, incentivizing many to become party allies across a range of issue areas. Not all groups have responded this
way, though. There still exists a cohort of academic and/or politically moderate
organizations that have changed more slowly in response to increased polarization.
Problematically, groups that are both partisan (in terms of their preferences and
behavior) and political (in terms of their direct advocacy strategies) are growing in
number and influence. In the second empirical chapter, I levy a wide range of evidence to show that these “Partisan-Political” groups are designed to produce research
that consistently supports a particular ideological or partisan vision. These types of
groups also develop reputations as key party allies and thick ties to members from
their preferred party. In the final empirical chapter, I use a case study of the debate
surrounding cap-and-trade regulations to show that these partisan advocacy strategies pay off, as Partisan-Political groups have significant influence over the discourses
of their preferred party. In general, the textual and network analyses in this chapter

x

demonstrate that ideas and talking points flow mostly along party lines, prohibiting
compromise and allowing extended party actors to institutionalize their preferences.
Thus, there is significant evidence for “polarized policymaking”, with two relatively distinct extended party networks developing alternative ideas and discourses in
policy debates. These findings have implications for the presence and continuation of
partisan polarization, the legislative process, and democratic representation.
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PREFACE

The initial idea for this project arose during research for an edited book chapter
on the role US political parties play in conducting policy analysis. The book was part
of a larger series studying policy analysis in a number of countries, and indeed the
topic of “party policy analysis” is an important one in nations where the parties have
formalized procedures for assessing and developing public policies. It did not take
long, however, to realize that American parties do not engage in anything remotely
close to this type of rigorous policy analysis. Rather, in the pluralistic American
political system, the two main parties are highly reliant on outside actors who perform
the intellectual heavy-lifting required for policy development. These policy experts
occupy a wide range of institutions, from governmental organizations to universities
to interest groups, think tanks, and high-brow media outlets. What is clear from both
observation and empirical analysis (e.g. Webb and Kolodny, 2006; Drutman and Teles,
2015), however, is that few (and fewer) experts are in the employ of American political
parties. Formal party organizations, in short, have not invested in the incentives and
institutions needed to craft responsible public policy.
One could envision a scenario where the separation of political parties and intellectual experts is a boon to democracy. Indeed, writing in 1861, John Stuart Mill
argued that elected representative bodies and the parties that control them are not fit
to create and administer public policies. This critique – which might resonate with
xii

observers of the modern American Congress – derives from the facts that, firstly,
elected representatives are not selected for their expertise and, secondly, they carry
with them biases and predispositions that prohibit objective reasoning. When it
comes to understanding and designing laws, Mill wrote, “There is hardly any kind
of intellectual work which so much needs to be done, not only by experienced and
exercised minds, but by minds trained to the task through long and laborious study”
(Mill, 1861, 109). Given a legislature’s unfitness for this task, “its proper province
is not to do it, but to take means for having it well done by others.” Mill, in short,
wanted legislation to be crafted and administered by qualified, unelected experts.
Early 20th century Progressives echoed this call. The backlash against party machines and patronage politics led to calls for more efficient, rational, and dispassionate
administration (March and Olson, 1983). At the same time, a number of prominent
think tanks emerged to provide empirical guidance to policymakers (Rich, 2004).
Congress, it seemed, was finally delegating responsibility for policymaking to qualified experts. Political science research in the middle-to-late 20th century generally
supported this view. In his incredibly influential Agendas, Alternatives, and Public
Policies, John Kingdon argued that policies result from the intersection of three independent “streams”: problems, solutions, and political will (Kingdon, 1984). While
political will relied on parties and politicians, it was widely assumed that solutions
(and problem definition, to some extent) were the purview of experts. At any given
time, these experts created a “policy primeval soup” of ideas and solutions just waiting for a problem and a political moment to make them possible. Concepts like “iron
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triangles” (Adams, 1981), “issue networks” (Heclo, 1978), and “advocacy coalitions”
(Sabatier, 1988) all flowed from this model of policymaking.
These inquiries typically focused on the abnormally bipartisan era of the middle 20th century. With Democratic dominance of Congress, it may well have been
true that experts peddling policy solutions were simply waiting for the right political moment to advance their ideas, with both parties respecting moderate policies
advanced by prominent outside actors. Indeed, Matt Grossmann (2014) finds that
policymaking in the 20th century (especially the “uniquely activist period” from 1961
to 1976) was sustained by a stable group of core actors who built coalitions, negotiated compromises, and operated across different governing configurations. This focus
on “governing networks” – or the constellation of ties amongst policy entrepreneurs
and political actors that lead to policy change – is an important improvement in our
understanding of modern policymaking. Still, Grossmann’s timeframe provides limited insight into our current polarized era, when party networks are strongly divided
and governing networks often seem to follow this same polarized pattern. Today,
parties are much more competitive (Lee, 2016), meaning that policy battles often
boil down to predefined either/or choices between Democratic and Republican alternatives. Furthermore, the ideological distance between the two parties has grown
substantially across a range of issues (Layman et al., 2010). What happens when
outside experts exist within – and get caught up in – an environment defined first
and foremost by partisan polarization?
Existing theories of the policy process have not paid sufficient attention to the
ways in which increased partisanship and polarization have changed policymaking.
xiv

In ideologically coherent parties, policy problems and solutions are not independent,
but rather highly dependent on one another and the goals of the political parties and
their allies. Similarly, the political will to implement a particular policy solution is
highly contingent on intra-party dynamics, including the preferences of key outside
actors. In short, existing theories tend to underemphasize the importance of power
politics – intertwined with party politics – in structuring the evolution and spread
of policy ideas within particular parties. Rather than a “primeval soup” of solutions
floating about, policy research and ideas are structured by the main interpretive
framework of modern American politics: partisanship.
This fact can be seen in any number of recent, salient policy debates. On minimum
wage increases, gun control, and upper class tax cuts, for example, the two parties
arrive at the bargaining table – if at all – with entirely contradictory ideas about
the efficacy of alternative courses of action. In such debates, the value of moderate,
nuanced, or objective research is limited, and certainly less valuable compared to past
eras. Research production is not a matter of matching expertise with policy problems,
but rather matching political demand for particular actions with the supply of expert
ideas and information (and vice versa). In short, modern members of Congress are
demanders of information that supports their partisan goals. Recent scholarship
brings us closer to an understanding of policymaking under such conditions. Frances
Lee’s (2016) important work has shown that parties seek ideas and take actions that
make them distinctive from their opponents, thereby granting them a competitive
advantage in elections. In the process, Bawn et al.’s (2012) theory of extended party
networks (EPN’s) suggests, parties seek to pass policies that benefit their supporters,
xv

including interest groups, think tanks, party activists, and partisan media outlets.
(Surprisingly, given that EPN theory emphasizes the importance of outside groups as
policy demanders, to date I have been unable to find any systematic analysis of the
impact these groups have outside elections.)
Surely the realities of growing partisan polarization and teamsmanship – not to
mention the increasingly competitive universe of outside experts – has changed how
outside research producing organizations operate, the emergence of new groups, and
the success they enjoy in the policy process. Dan Drezner’s (2017) recent work on
The Ideas Industry highlights some of these dynamics. He focuses, in part, on how
political polarization and ideologically-driven think tanks have led to the advent of
“thought leaders”, or individuals who spread a “big idea” to wide audiences. His focus on individuals, though, largely brackets the fact that the main drivers of ideas are
the stable institutions that engage in policy advocacy across a range of issues. These
are the actors that are processing big ideas, conducting policy research and advocacy,
and spreading them throughout their partisan networks. As I note throughout this
work, however, engaging with the party system (or, more accurately, a single political
party) is not the only option available to outside groups. Progressive-style research
institutions still exist, with influential groups like the Brookings Institution continuing to occupy prominent positions in the hierarchy of research production. What
has changed is that such groups cannot ignore the reality of partisan polarization and
the ways it has changed the production of policy research, with increasing prominence accruing to organizations that use partisan polarization to their competitive
advantage.
xvi

Thus, while recent research has started to triangulate an answer to the question
of how partisan polarization has impacted the production and spread of research by
outside actors, no systematic study has comprehensively addressed this topic. We
still need to investigate how partisan polarization might provide structure in the
policymaking process, even as it makes the actual passage of policy more difficult.
In short, we need a theory of how party actors relate to outside research-producing
institutions in the modern era. This is the main task of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 1
POLICY RESEARCH IN A POLARIZED ERA

The story of modern American politics is one of political disagreement. The
two parties – and their supporters, to a growing degree – are completely at odds
across a wide range of issues. These disputes are not simply matters of philosophical
differences, though they tend to be couched in such terms. Oftentimes, the two parties
wage policy battle using entirely different and ostensibly rational facts, information,
and research. On the topic of the Affordable Care Act, for instance, Democratic
lawmakers assured citizens that the healthcare reform bill would lower insurance
costs, increase coverage, and improve the overall insurance marketplace. Republican
politicians, on the other hand, were certain that the bill would raise costs and amount
to an inefficient government takeover of the healthcare system. Politicians from both
parties pointed to empirical “proof” of their viewpoints. Similar dynamics define most
prominent legislative attempts since at least the 2000’s, including Democratic efforts
to introduce cap-and-trade environmental regulations, raise the minimum wage, and
institute stricter gun control measures, and Republican attempts to lower taxes on
the rich and build a border wall along the Mexican border.
The fact that these debates saw the two parties “talking past” one another (while
referencing empirical research with very different conclusions) suggests that the process of modern policymaking might be subject to the same polarizing forces that
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have affected other aspects of American politics. More specifically, it seems that the
two parties operate within distinct informational environments, precluding compromise even before official legislative action is taken. Indeed, the number of research
producing institutions with fairly overt partisan preferences has grown substantially
over time. These include think tanks (like the Heritage Foundation or the Center for
American Progress) as well as interest groups (like the National Rifle Association or
Emily’s List) who oftentimes produce policy research that supports the political goals
of a particular party. Given the recent hollowing out of the political middle, these organizations rightly perceive strong incentives to work through a single political party
to accomplish their mutual objectives. In other words, it seems that polarization has
impacted not only the broader policymaking process, but also the actual processes of
research production and advocacy.
At the same time, prominent organizations in the Progressive mold – groups that
value objectivity and appear uninvolved in power politics – can still be found in the
modern era. The Brookings Institution is a well-known example. Even though Brookings is perceived by many as “left-leaning”, most observers consider their research to
be far less political and partisan than the products created by certain newer organizations. Thus, while the impact of partisan polarization on politicians has been fairly
pervasive, it seems that its impact on outside research producing organizations has
been uneven. This realization raises a host of questions about the role of such institutions in the modern era, the translation of outside research in the political process,
and the differential responses to increased polarization. How have research producing
institutions reacted in the face of increased partisan polarization? What research and
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advocacy strategies are most successful in the modern era? And do those who engage
with the polarized partisan system enjoy greater policy influence?
These are important questions for reformers concerned with growing Congressional
gridlock, partisan animosity, and biased public policy. Parties do not produce and
advocate particular policies in isolation, but rather are highly reliant on outside groups
who provide ideas, research, and talking points to support particular courses of action.
Still, politicians set the parameters within which outside organizations produce and
disseminate policy ideas. If politicians are in the “driver’s seat” but lack directions,
then outside research organizations can be thought of as the “co-pilots” providing
road maps to guide them to their mutual destination.
With highly polarized parties, politicians incentivize research that supports particular polarized views, raising concerns that partisanship has replaced credibility in
determining which ideas are drawn on in policy debates. This fact implies that the
quality of policy research and policy designs has declined over time, with important
implications for the long term viability of key public policies. Furthermore, if many
research producing organizations exist to advance rather than resist partisan polarization, it seems unlikely that the intensity of policy debates will subside in the near
term. As these organizations promote particular partisan visions, they may be able
to move public policy in particular directions that reflect their narrow or ideological
interests, perhaps at the expense of the average citizen.
Despite the importance of this topic for questions of policymaking, polarization,
and systemic bias, extant scholarship has not adequately addressed the impact of
partisan polarization on public policymaking. Scholars studying the policy process,
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for example, tend to underestimate the importance of power politics in structuring
the development and acceptance of particular policy solutions. Scholars of American
politics, similarly, have framed policymaking in terms of pluralistic competition and
compromise, failing to understand how increased polarization hardens policy battle
lines and often precludes compromise. By and large, then, we lack an understanding
of policy research, advocacy, and development under conditions of extreme partisan
polarization.
This dissertation hopes to rectify these limitations. It understands members of
Congress as demanders of policy information and outside groups as suppliers of these
resources. These formal party members do not demand information of the highest
quality, but rather information that supports their partisan goals. Many interest
groups and think tanks have recognized this fact and produce research and ideas that
mainly align with the goals of a single political party. This is not, however, always
a case of calculated strategy. As the ideological distance between the two parties
grows, the increasingly clear choices they provide mean that the independent goals
of certain outside groups fit most naturally within a single party. Thus, much like
citizens, it seems that outside research producing organizations have both polarized
and sorted into the appropriate polarized party. A key difference is that groups that
have actually become more partisan also tend to engage in advocacy strategies that
help further their policy ideas and political goals.
In the aggregate, the polarization of key outside groups results in what appear to
be two competing partisan networks of formal party members, think tanks, interest
groups, and the party activists who peddle their ideas. These extended party networks
4

share overlapping goals and coordinate their efforts to accomplish them (Bawn et al.,
2012). And, importantly, policy research and ideas developed and spread throughout
these networks are often influential, as they have the support of a range of party actors.
Thus, the groups producing and advocating ideas within these partisan networks are
in a privileged position to influence public policy debates. By playing the game of
partisan politics, they increase the odds that their ideas are drawn upon by their
preferred party.
It is easy to see how such an arrangement could prohibit compromise. Especially
on highly salient issues, members of the two parties are often enmeshed in very different informational environments. They receive signals that frame ideas and findings in
different and sometimes contradictory ways. It is important, though, to not overstate
the prevalence of partisanship amongst outside research organizations. Prominent
organizations still engage in what could be described as “academic” and politically
disengaged research production, and these organizations – including the Brookings
Institution, RAND Corporation, and Urban Institute – still have reputations, perhaps somewhat diminished, as key players in federal policymaking. Unfortunately,
the number and prominence of groups outside this academic mold has increased in
recent decades. In other words, groups today are, on average, more partisan and
more political. This general trend is certainly worrying, but the continued viability
of groups like Brookings mean that there is hope that policymaking can be improved.
The first step in this endeavor is to understand how groups have reacted in the face
of increased polarization and how these decisions impact the broader policymaking
process.
5

1.1

Beyond Garbage Cans and Unstructured Competition
Our current understanding of Congressional policymaking is largely informed by

two literatures with, until recently, little overlap. First, scholars studying the full
policy process draw attention to the range of actors – inside and outside government
– who impact policymaking. Many of the theories in this mold assume that political
actors are boundedly rational, with limited attention and information, who must
adopt information processing strategies to focus their attention. These are important
insights that I borrow from in the next chapter. Beyond their shared focus on bounded
rationality, policy process theories also tend to draw on Cohen, March and Olsen’s
(1972) garbage can model of choice, which says that various policy problems and
solutions are “dumped” into the garbage can as they are generated by participants.
Decisions are then made, when they are called for, by selecting amongst the various
alternatives available at the time.
Kingdon (1984) provides perhaps the most prominent extension of this model to
the policy process in his Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. In this work,
Kingdon argues that policy change occurs when three independent streams – problems, solutions, and politics – are coupled at key moments by policy entrepreneurs.
In this view, problems are identified and solutions are developed in relative isolation,
with policy action potentially occurring when political conditions are ripe for change.
The strongest parallel between this research and Kingdon’s model occurs in the solutions stream. Kingdon describes available solutions as a chaotic mass of choices –
a “policy primeval soup” – that evolves over time through the natural selection of
policy ideas. These ideas are developed – mostly outside of government – without
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much thought given to the types of problems that would captivate the public and lead
to calls for a solution, and without much concern for the political will to implement
them. Only when a “policy window” is opened do these three streams join together
and (potentially) lead to policy change.
This framework seems far too unstructured to make sense of modern policymaking, when political ideologies and partisanship carry far greater weight in decisionmaking. Most simply, problems and solutions are not now – if they ever have been
– developed in isolation from one another (Zahariadis, 2014). Specific ideologies and
partisan affiliations foreclose certain solutions from serious consideration, and the
definition of problems themselves might stem from the desire for specific solutions.
As I outline below, many research producing organizations are policy demanders, not
problem identifiers, and they work to promote problem definitions and frames that
support their particular solutions. And, both problem definition and the development of solutions are conditioned by political dynamics. Parties determine which
ideas are accepted, and – given the ideological coherence that accompanies increased
polarization – the criteria for these decisions are potentially more public than they
have ever been. Thus, researchers working on policy solutions might have political
and especially partisan dynamics at the front of their minds. Though they operate in
the realm of ideas, their impact is contingent upon dynamics of power politics outside
their control, providing some external and partisan structure to research production.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) adds some of this structure in its
account of policy change. Importantly, the ACF adopts a longer-term perspective
and focuses less on the type of chance alignments that Kingdon emphasizes. In
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this framework, policymaking is a contentious process with purposive actors forming
coalitions, outside of formal political institutions, that advocate for policy change
in geographically and substantively defined “policy subsystems” (Pierce and Weible,
2016). Most often, ACF scholars attempt to map out the various stakeholders in an
issue area and the connections amongst them, typically using surveys of policy actors
(e.g. Elgin and Weible, 2013; Pierce, 2016; Weible and Heikkila, 2016). This research
typically focuses on policy outcomes as a result of coalition formation, strength, and
framing.
One of the main findings in this literature is that coalitions form based on shared
“belief systems” and “coordinate their behavior... partly in response to a shared
threat” (Pierce and Weible, 2016, 22). While ACF scholars tend to focus on shared
threats to policy regimes, it seems increasingly likely that coalitions form on the
basis of shared partisan belief systems and in response to the common threat posed
by the opposing party’s policy platform. Indeed, the ACF concept of the “devil shift”
– whereby actors tend to exaggerate the power and maliciousness of their political
opponents (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014) – will sound familiar to scholars of affective
polarization (e.g. Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012). Still, the ACF would benefit from
a more explicit consideration of the ways in which political parties and partisanship
structure coalition formation, behavior, and influence.1
1

In one of the only direct tests of these dynamics, Henry (2011) finds that shared ideology is
the primary driver behind policy subsystem collaboration. He shows that, in regional planning
subsystems in California, policy elites largely form ties with those with similar ideologies and avoid
forming connections with actors who hold opposing beliefs.

8

The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) takes steps in this direction. Drawing
on E.E. Schattschneider’s (1960) notion of parties as the vehicles through which social
conflict is organized, PET assumes that societal battles over “policy images” can
expand the scope of conflicts, draw in new actors, and possibly result in policy change
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). PET scholars argue that policy regimes are typically
defined by a structurally-induced equilibrium supported by institutions designed to
privilege certain approaches to policy problems. These “policy monopolies” can stay
in place for decades, especially if the “winners” under this system are able to restrict
agenda access. This equilibrium, however, can be disrupted when other actors – the
“losers” under the current regime – are able to change policy images and shop their
ideas in alternative institutional venues, disrupting the underlying policy monopoly.
Oftentimes this venue shopping involves attracting the attention and support of
one of the two parties, but political parties are only one of many institutional options
available within the PET framework. I argue here that political parties are essential
actors in the policy process, providing the main structure within which policy debates
and change occur. Indeed, in a study of Belgian policymaking, Walgrave and Varone
(2008) find that image and venue change are important predictors of policy change,
but also that political parties are the actors responsible for determining whether or
not this change occurs. Few other PET theorists have adopted this approach to policy
change.
Much like the ACF, then, PET does not do enough to incorporate political parties – especially polarized ones – in the policy process. Given increased polarization,
policy images are not only frequently contested but also increasingly uniform within
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each party. These images might be said to comprise a “belief system”, though PET
does not use such language. Importantly, greater ideological coherence within the two
parties means that altered policy images and venue shopping might not be sufficient
for policy change if there has not been a change in the composition of government.
Even if the out-party (including its extended network) is able to mobilize new supporters through innovative framing of an issue, they are left with few institutional
options for policy change if the majority party opposes these ideas. Rather, their best
hope is to win the next election and take control of government (Lee, 2016), at which
point they are likely to draw on the ideas and images advocated by affiliated groups.
Furthermore, when policy images are contested within each partisan network it is true
that outside groups often lead these battles, but these same groups are responding
to incentives and constraints provided by formal party members. In terms of both
aggregate policy change and particular issue images, then, it seems that increased
polarization provides partisan-induced equilibrium in the policy process.
In sum, existing policy process theories are, to varying degrees, apolitical or at
least apartisan in their approach to policy change. They often lack a grounded understanding of raw power politics and the role of information in such an environment. In
this dissertation I argue that the two major parties provide the main structure within
which policy research is conducted, change is advocated, and legislation is voted on.
In the aggregate, the effect of this increasingly partisan structure is a policy system
in which outside research producing organizations often align quite strongly with a
single party across issues and time. Some of these groups advocate their ideological
visions across many separate issues areas – a fact policy process theorists have been
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slow to recognize2 – and as such are essential actors in the two extended party networks. This state of affairs does not describe all research producing organizations in
the modern era. Still, it seems that an increasing number of actors have reacted to
the realities of partisan polarization and competition by becoming, for all intents and
purposes, an extension of their preferred party in the policy process.

1.2

From Pluralism to Structured Party Warfare
While policy process theorists have generally under-emphasized the political side

of policymaking, theories deriving from the American politics tradition have been
acutely aware of how competition and power drive policy outcomes. Indeed, in the
early days of the nation James Madison (1787) advocated institutional arrangements
that would result in numerous competing factions so that “ambition [could] be made
to counteract ambition.” Mid-20th century scholarship on this topic generally found
that pluralism – the participation of many groups, representing competing interests, in
political processes – was a beneficial hallmark of American democracy (e.g. Truman,
1951; Dahl, 1961). Multiple streams theorists, the Advocacy Coalition Framework,
and the theory of Punctuated Equilibrium all draw, to varying degrees, on this notion
of pluralistic competition in the policy process.
Critics were quick to point out, however, that the universe of interest groups and
policy activists was (at best) a distorted image of broader American society. Instead,

2

Many policy process scholars utilize substantively-defined policy subsystems as their unit of
analysis, and as such much of this work focuses on single-issue case studies to understand policymaking dynamics. In this dissertation I take a broader approach, focusing on how actors and ideas
predictably interact, based on partisanship, across issue areas (though I do use a case study as one
part of this analysis).
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they argued that interest groups and public policies were biased towards corporate
interests and professional associations (e.g. Schattschneider, 1960; Lowi, 1979). E.E.
Schattschneider (1960, 35), for example, wrote that “the flaw in the pluralist heaven
is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class accent.” More recent
empirical evaluations have generally supported this notion of biased pluralism, with
public policy responding to the preferences of economic elites and organized business
interests rather than average citizens and even mass-based interest groups (Gilens
and Page, 2014). Still, public policies were said to represent compromise and bargaining amongst this biased group of actors. In a slightly different formulation, Matt
Grossmann (2012) argues that the political advocacy sector is defined by behavioral
pluralism – where the most politically active citizens are best represented by interest
groups – and institutionalized pluralism – where certain groups become the “taken
for granted... surrogates for public groups and perspectives” in policy debates (8).
These theories add somewhat more structure to policy competition – conflict occurs between elites and average citizens, or amongst various insiders representing
different constituencies. Still, much like the policy process theories discussed above,
even concepts of biased or institutionalized pluralism understate the importance of
political parties. To give just one example, in later work Matt Grossmann (2014)
draws on his theories of behavioral and institutionalized pluralism to argue that policy outcomes are the result of fairly stable “governing networks”, or arrangements
amongst “policymakers and activists, the artists of the possible” (6–8). Importantly,
these configurations often arise independent of changes in government, include a relatively diverse set of actors, and typically result in bipartisan compromise. However,
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Grossmann studies an era of unusual bipartisanship (1945 to 2004), and a contemporary observer can point to numerous examples of major policies – the Affordable
Care Act or the 2018 tax cuts are but two – that were entirely partisan affairs that
resulted from a change in control of government. On issues like these, increasing
partisan polarization results in significant partisan competition, and even less salient
issues often lead to partisanship based in “teamsmanship” rather than actual ideological disagreement (Lee, 2009).
Part of the reason that pluralistic theories are ill-equipped to explain polarized
policy processes is because they tend to view political parties as endogenous institutions created to benefit the politicians in them (Schattschneider, 1942; Downs, 1957;
Aldrich, 1995). In this candidate-centered view of parties, the main objective is to
win elections and control government. As such, parties are thought to “formulate
policies in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957, 28). Thus, parties lack principled platforms and instead identify
policies to pursue based on their perceived electoral value (Schlesinger, 1984). Under
such conditions, parties are thought to converge on the preferences of the median
voter (Downs, 1957) and, as such, are far more open to bargaining and compromise
when crafting public policy. Outside groups can take advantage of this calculus by
themselves bargaining, collaborating, and compromising to achieve their desired ends,
with some form of biased or institutionalized pluralism as the result.
The concept of relatively unprincipled parties fits uneasily with modern polarization. It is for this reason that scholars have begun to revive elements of party theory
that view political parties as coalitions of formal members and outside groups who,
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importantly, seek specific public policy outcomes. If we view parties not as endogenous and candidate-centered but rather as networks of interests or group-centered, we
must also adjust our assumptions about pluralism in the modern era. Rather than
multiple interests ‘cancelling out’ the potentially undue influence of others, many
groups now align with a single political party and structure their advocacy and influence efforts along party lines (e.g. Sinclair, 2006). Thus, battles outside government
might come to resemble the types of polarized and partisan disagreements we see in
Congress. This is because, as the parties drift further and further apart, many outside actors see a single party as their best bet for accomplishing the policy ends they
seek. The National Rifle Association, Chamber of Commerce, and Susan B. Anthony
List, for example, all work (mostly) through the Republican Party to accomplish
their diverse goals, resulting in a loose network of actors with overlapping of at least
non-contradictory policy preferences. In this way, political parties provide structure,
across a range of issues, to the otherwise unstructured pluralism that might define
policy research and advocacy.

1.3

A Theory of Party Policy Networks
The critique of pluralist theory outlined above stems in part from the relatively

new theory of extended party networks (EPNs). EPN theory diverges from candidatecentered accounts of political parties by focusing instead on the coalitions of policy
demanding groups that make up each party. Thus, in the EPN framework parties
are viewed as networks of formal party actors (e.g. members of Congress and formal
party organizations) connected to ideologically affiliated interest groups, think tanks,
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media outlets, and political activists (Bawn et al., 2012). The informal groups within
the EPN seek policy outcomes that benefit their members or their ideological base,
and they find that banding together with like-minded groups and investing in a single
party over time increases their policy returns in the long run.
Most EPN scholarship has focused on the efforts of extended party groups in
elections, particularly nominating contests. Recent studies have shown that partisan
coalitions work to screen and nominate candidates that are acceptable to the EPN
and who will help implement a mutually supported agenda once in office (e.g. Cohen
et al., 2008). Because primaries have relatively low rates of participation (Hirano
et al., 2010), these networks have been able to exert considerable control over party
nominations (Masket, 2009) and even general election outcomes (Dominguez, 2011;
Desmarais, La Raja and Kowal, 2015). And because there exists an “electoral blind
spot”, or a “policy region over which aggregate electorates do not enforce their preferences” (Bawn et al., 2012, 577), these networks are also said to have considerable
control over party policy decisions. In fact, the core network of group supporters is
likely more influential than the average citizen and even the average party supporter
in determining the direction of the two parties. Nevertheless, despite EPN theory’s
emphasis on outside groups as policy demanders, I have been unable to find any research on how these groups influence policy outcomes outside of elections and whether
or not these efforts are successful.
Conceiving of parties in the policy process as extended networks is a valuable
framework, as it accounts for the fact that outside groups must operate within a political environment defined by partisan polarization. On the one hand, outside group
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activity can be considered a cause of this polarization, as their non-representative
policy demands and candidate screening efforts push the parties further away from
the median voter. On the other hand, more moderate groups have had to adjust their
tactics to fit with contemporary political conditions. Even groups that might have
been described as bipartisan access-seekers in past decades – the Chamber of Commerce or AARP, for example – have increasingly aligned with a single party on major
policy issues. This is because the polarization of the two parties across a range of
policy issues has increasingly presented a black and white choice for groups choosing
allies to further their policy goals (Sinclair, 2006).
The effect of this polarization should be the creation of a policy system in which
stable partisan loyalties and demonstrated commitments are an important prerequisite for policy influence. This is because politicians – and policy researchers, to
a lesser extent – are time-constrained actors who face an oversupply of information
and must prioritize these inputs (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Much in the way
that voters use heuristics to make decisions based on limited information, members
of Congress must also find informational shortcuts to manage this oversupply. This
does not mean that members seek out the most accurate information, but rather the
most useful information in terms of furthering their individual and partisan goals. In
an era of extreme partisan competition and polarization, one likely heuristic members
might use to identify useful information is the ‘partisan fit’ of the group providing
it, or the degree to which the group is invested in the success of the member’s party.
Thus, groups that have consistently provided a party with useful information in the
past might be in a privileged position to provide information as new issues arise.
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From the policy researcher’s perspective, then, formal party members seem to
demand information and ideas that support their partisan goals. This fact should
have downstream effects on the supply of policy research – the groups producing this
research recognize that, due to polarization, not only do their own preferences align
more strongly with a single party, but the actors within that party will be more likely
to accept their ideas if they consistently support their mutual goals. Thus, partisan
polarization has altered the entire marketplace for policy research. I discuss these
dynamics in greater detail in Chapter 2.
As I note throughout the following chapters, however, groups have responded
differently to this changing marketplace for ideas. This appears to be due to two
competing incentives that research producing organizations face: a norm of scholarly credibility and a desire to be influential (and thus partisan) in modern policy
debates. These two incentives combine in unique ways at different organizations,
resulting in four ideal type organizations. At one extreme, some groups can be described as Moderate-Academic – they adhere to fairly rigorous scholarly norms and
do not seek to directly influence political outcomes. At the other extreme, however, are Partisan-Political organizations, or groups that have quite clear partisan
preferences and engage in direct advocacy efforts to advance them. Between these
two extremes are Moderate-Political groups (i.e. access-seeking interest groups) and
Partisan-Academic organizations (i.e. fairly disciplined research institutes with preexisting ideological viewpoints). Importantly, Partisan-Political groups should be most
influential in the modern era, as they not only fulfill the needs of party members, but
have also invested significantly in direct political advocacy. In a town where “thick”
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social ties are important, Partisan-Political groups have invested in developing these
connections in a variety of ways. I explore these organizational characteristics in
greater detail in Chapter 3.
A policy system defined by EPN dynamics, then, would be one in which the two
major parties draw on relatively distinct ideas and discourses developed by long-term
allies. Cognizant of this fact, many outside groups are likely to produce research with
party elites in mind, collaborate with other co-partisan organizations, and develop
ideas and talking points that support mutual partisan goals. Due to the realities of
modern politics, influence should accrue to those groups that engage with the party
system in this way.

1.4

Studying Policy Research and Advocacy
This theory is inherently difficult to test. Groups and politicians are rarely trans-

parent about their true motives and decision-making processes. Connections between
policy actors are often informal and fleeting. And the notion of “influence” over policy discourse and design is difficult to observe, with influence sometimes overt and
other times quite opaque. For these reasons, I take an expansive approach to the
study of policy research and public policymaking. I focus on a wide range of actors
that produce or disseminate original research, including interest groups and think
tanks from several issue areas and various ideological backgrounds. At times I engage
in an in-depth exploration of prominent organizations, but I also take a systematic
approach that focuses on groups of varying notoriety. I employ a number of different methods to triangulate answers to my research questions, including interviews,
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case studies, textual analysis, and network analysis. I discuss these methodological
decisions in the following sections.

1.4.1

The Main Players

This is a study of policy researchers and research institutions, their reactions to
increased polarization, and their impact on public policy in the modern era. It is
also a story, though, of political parties and changing policymaking dynamics within
Congress. Thus, the sample of actors studied here includes not only research producing institutions – namely interest groups and think tanks – but also politicians and
party leaders. Together, these actors might comprise the policy research arm of the
extended party network.3
To systematically define this sample – and thereby avoid biasing the findings of
this study – I rely on existing lists of well-known and active interest groups and think
tanks. For interest groups, I turn to Project Vote Smart’s National Special Interest
Groups database, which lists all organizations that publish issue positions or endorse
candidates during elections. This selection criterion provides an initial indication that
these groups are active in the political process beyond simply donating to candidates.
For think tanks, I use the University of Pennsylvania Think Tank and Civil Societies
Program’s annual Think Tank Index Reports to identify influential American think
3

The extended party network framework outlined by Bawn et al. (2012) does include additional
actors as members of the two EPNs, with partisan media outlets and party activists notably absent
from this study. I choose here to focus on organizations and actors that would potentially be involved
in actual policy research and design, bracketing the admittedly important role that media and
activists play in spreading these ideas once they are developed. For theoretical and methodological
simplicity I also exclude universities and academics from the sample, unless they are publishing
through an interest group or think tank (including university-affiliated think tanks).
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tanks. These reports rank think tanks according to 28 criteria measured by international surveys of roughly 7,500 scholars, public and private donors, policymakers, and
journalists. I include all groups that are listed amongst the most influential American
think tanks in these reports from 2008 to 2014. For both interest groups and think
tanks, I exclude any organizations that focus primarily on international or foreign
policy issues, limiting attention to domestic policy research institutions. The full
sample – and more detail on the sampling process – can be found in Appendix A.
I study this sample in two distinct ways. First, I analyze prominent organizations that receive frequent media attention, high levels of institutional funding, and
repeated mentions amongst my interview subjects. These groups are likely the dominant players in policy debates, and their dynamics provide insight into broader trends
in the policymaking process. In the next two chapters, I study these prominent groups
in detail to identify ideal type organizations, highlight divergent trends in how they
have reacted to polarization, and develop hypotheses about the influence of different
organizational types. In the final chapter, I take a more expansive approach to the
study of research producing institutions, examining the policy discourse of the full
sample of groups to understand how influence operates within partisan networks.
Because this is a study of partisan polarization and its impact on research producing organizations, it is important to accurately operationalize the ideology and
partisanship of these outside groups. Unlike politicians, the partisan preferences of
outside groups are difficult to pin down. First, think tanks are required by law to be
non-partisan actors, in name if not in practice. This does not mean that these groups
lack partisan preferences, but only that they are not upfront about them. Second,
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partisanship is a relative term in the world of think tanks and interest groups. While
it is true that certain groups align with a single party on most issues, there are few
groups that agree with the same party across every political issue. Even the Heritage
Foundation, for instance, has been critical of President Trump’s approach to trade
policy while supporting most other aspects of his agenda.
For these reasons, I rely on a number of indicators to triangulate the ideology and
policy positions – as a proxy for partisanship – of particular organizations. First,
when possible, I rely on Project Vote Smart’s categorization of interest groups into
ideological clusters. For those without ideological classifications, I examine groups’
campaign contributions in Federal Election Commission (FEC) records, classifying
groups that consistently contribute more than 60 percent of their funds to candidates
from a single party as informal members of that party (and all others as centrists).
Finally, for groups without data on campaign contributions, I examine group mission
statements and assess their ideological content. I also examine mission statements to
determine the ideology of think tanks. More information on this coding can be found
in Appendix A.
I classify groups with Republican preferences or conservative ideologies as Republican affiliates, those with Democratic or liberal preferences as Democratic affiliates,
and all others as centrists or non-partisan organizations. I mostly use these terms interchangeably, though ideological language (i.e. liberal, conservative, and moderate)
suggests that group preferences generally align with the corresponding party, while
partisan terms (i.e. Democrat, Republican, centrist) suggest a more explicit preference for a particular party. Operationalizing partisan preference in this way brings
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us closer to an EPN definition of partisanship, where actors are considered to be
embedded within the same party if they have overlapping or non-contradictory goals
and they typically work through the same party to accomplish them. In a highly
polarized era, groups with conservative (liberal) policy preferences are likely to find
that the Republican (Democratic) Party is often their best avenue for policy success,
leading them to frequently align with that party across a range of issues.

1.4.2

Data and Methods

I rely on a range of data sources and methodological approaches to study how these
organizations have reacted to and operated under polarized politics. Each source
and approach helps illuminate particular aspects of group behavior and influence,
though no single perspective highlights the full range of trends examined here. These
analyses focus on both micro and macro dynamics, providing insights into individual
and organizational decision-making as well as broader trends that define research
production in the modern era.
First, to study the incentives and constraints faced by groups, their internal
decision-making processes and behaviors, and their reaction to partisan polarization, I rely on interviews with policy researchers and institutional managers. These
interviews provide an insider’s view of research production in the modern era – a view
that is otherwise difficult to obtain. Between June and July of 2017 I interviewed
fourteen actors involved in research production in Washington, D.C. (see Appendix B
for more detail). These subjects were employed at a variety of institutions – in terms
of prominence, ideology, partisanship, and issue focus – and in a variety of roles, in-
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cluding policy researchers, research directors, and executive officers. Many subjects
had lengthy experience producing research, and five had been previously employed at
at least one other research institution. These actors in particular were able to provide
insight into organizational differences that impact research production in the modern
era.
Because the worldview of interview subjects might be limited by their own experiences – and because they tended to paint a rather positive picture of their own
research production – I also attempt to validate these findings with a variety of publicly available data sources. For example, I utilize 990 tax documents to understand
how groups are financed and which activities they prioritize. I also use groups’ annual reports to understand how they position themselves within the broader research
world and which topics and activities they emphasize. And, to study whether groups
engage in conversations with ideologically diverse actors, I use publicized lists of event
participants at key organizations. Taken together, these data sources provide crucial
insights into the incentives, behaviors, and decisions of interest groups and think
tanks under conditions of heightened partisan polarization.
For the most part, the data sources and analyses described above focus on microlevel decisions and dynamics. To gain a more systematic understanding of relationships and influence in the policy process, however, I also employ textual and network
analysis techniques to study the influence of organizations over the policy discourse
of other groups and members of Congress. With the help of undergraduate research
assistants, I have collected a large corpus of “policy statements” made by interest
groups, think tanks, and members of Congress on the topic of cap-and-trade envi23

ronmental regulations. This case – which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4 –
was chosen because it is difficult to interpret with existing theories and frameworks.
The final cap-and-trade policy design represented a relatively moderate proposal that
would conceivably attract bipartisan support. Nevertheless, the discourse and votes
on this issue were quite partisan. What explains the presence and continuation of
polarization on this issue? I attempt to answer this question by tracking the spread of
policy discourse across actors, identifying persistent informational pathways amongst
outside groups and between these organizations and formal party members. I assess
whether common partisan commitments condition the spread of ideas and qualitatively analyze policy narratives to ground this analysis in real-world debates. I also
focus on the influence of Partisan-Political groups relative to more moderate or academic organizations to test the theory that partisan groups gain special prominence
in modern policy debates.
Taken together, these analyses provide a nuanced view of the different ways in
which research producing organizations have responded to increased partisan polarization. By focusing on both the micro-level, internal decision-making processes of
individual groups and the aggregate effects of these decisions on policy debates, I
hope to paint a comprehensive picture of policymaking in a polarized era.

1.5

Research and Influence in the Modern Era
The results from these analyses provide reason for both hope and pessimism for

reformers fed up with the state of contemporary policymaking. In the next chapter, I
explore the changing marketplace for policy ideas and find that members of Congress
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face an informational paradox: despite a tremendous increase in the amount of available policy information, members lack the resources and desire to process it. For this
reason, they use simplifying heuristics – namely, the degree to which inputs (and the
groups providing them) align with their partisan goals – to sort through the mass
of policy information. In this way, the demand for policy research has changed over
time, with members increasingly likely to accept ideas that support their party’s goals
even if it is of lower quality than alternative ideas.
The consequences of this changing marketplace for information are nuanced. In
general, all research producing organizations have sought to remain (or become) relevant by improving their “public face” amongst policymakers and average citizens.
When it comes to research production and political advocacy, however, groups have
responded quite differently. In the next chapter I develop a typology of research producing organizations and show that some have embraced a more aggressive advocacy
style of research production and dissemination, while others have resisted (to a greater
degree) these tendencies and still pursue what could be called a Progressive style of
research production. In Chapter 3, I explore how these differential responses to polarization lead to (or are reflective of) particular internal organizational decisions. I
show that the most partisan and activist organizations have internal decision-making
processes that lead to greater institutional oversight, more coherent communications,
and fewer ties with opposing organizations. As a result, these types of organizations
tend to produce research that consistently supports a particular ideological or partisan
perspective, potentially granting them greater influence over the policy process.
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Indeed, in Chapter 4 I find that common partisan commitments are important
predictors of the diffusion of policy ideas and discourse from one actor to another.
Using textual and network analysis techniques, I create a diffusion network that identifies persistent informational pathways between actors. While there are bipartisan
informational ties in this network, membership in the same EPN explains many of
the ties that form, suggesting that groups who invest in a single political party over
time are best able to influence members of their preferred party. Furthermore, the
most influential groups within these party networks tend to be Partisan-Political or,
to a lesser degree, Partisan-Academic in their approach to policy research and advocacy. Thus, it seems that influence does accrue to actors who engage with the modern
system of politics, defined first and foremost by partisan polarization. Importantly,
the aggregate effect of this discursive influence is the development of two competing
but internally consistent partisan narratives about the issue of cap-and-trade. As a
result, members of Congress were “talking past” one another in these debates.
Taken together, the findings presented here indicate profound limitations and biases in the modern policy process. They speak to several important topics in American politics, including partisan polarization, institutionalized bias, policy outcomes,
and democratic representation. First, the results suggest that the process of policy
research and development – just as much as roll call voting – is subject to partisan
polarization. As members of the two parties receive divergent ideas and information,
it is no wonder that they struggle to find common ground. Formal party members,
though, are not passive players in this game – they have encouraged the development
of partisan policy ideas to further their goals. The outside groups that have recog26

nized and taken advantage of this fact gain special prominence in the modern policy
process. They have, on the basis of party lines, become institutionalized actors in
the development of party policy. To the degree that these extended party actors are
unrepresentative of the broader public (and there is reason to believe they are), yet
another form of bias has been introduced to American democracy.
Because of this polarization and bias, the policy process has been subjected to
greater gridlock. When policy does pass, it is typically supported by a partisan
coalition and subject to assault when control of government changes. Republican
attempts to overturn the Affordable Care Act are perhaps the best example of this
fact. Furthermore, as policy ideas are increasingly developed with partisanship rather
than accuracy in mind, the informational basis for public policy is degraded. As
a result, the policies that are enacted might be ill-informed and poorly designed,
though I do not investigate this here. Taken together, these three developments –
increased polarization, institutional bias, and poorly designed policy – suggest that
outside groups and formal party members have short-circuited represented democracy
in America. When outside actors are able to institutionalize their preferences through
their research and advocacy efforts, the preferences of the average voter are, to some
degree, circumvented.
On the more hopeful side, however, is the fact that prominent think tanks in
the Progressive mold still exist and are, for the most part, surviving the onslaught
of more partisan and political research organizations. It is true that the balance of
power has shifted towards the latter type, but these trends result from rational responses to a changing marketplace reflecting (and contributing to) increased partisan
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polarization. This means that they can be reversed. As I discuss in the concluding
chapter, one answer to the problem of polarized policymaking would be to increase
the capacity of Congressional staff and institutions to address policy problems. This
would most likely decrease members’ reliance on outside research institutions, but it
would probably not alter their decision-making when it comes to the acceptance and
utilization of research itself. Perhaps a better answer would be to provide incentives
– in the style of certain European democracies – that privilege the work of academic
organizations and encourage members of Congress to draw on this information. I
discuss some of these reforms in the final chapter.
Regardless of the solution, it is clear that there is a problem with the way policy is created. A variety of developments have led to a system in which motivated
research is not only accepted but actually incentivized, and ideologically extreme or
narrowly focused organizations have been eager to take advantage of these developments. Scholars and reformers need a better understanding of these trends if they
hope to reverse the tide of polarized policymaking.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLVING MARKETPLACE FOR IDEAS

“Barack Obama signaled the kind of change liberals had in mind... It
was change, indeed. But not the kind of change most Americans wanted.
Predictably, it triggered a massive backlash.” (Heritage Foundation 2009
Annual Report)

“By the time we closed the book on 2017, the Trump administration had
embraced 64 percent of our 321 recommendations. Congress embraced
many reforms too... And once again, Washington observers referred to
Heritage as ‘the president’s think tank’” (Heritage Foundation 2017 Annual Report)

Following the elections of Barack Obama and Donald Trump to the American
presidency, the Heritage Foundation’s annual reports summarized their respective first
years in office quite differently. In 2009, the prominent conservative think tank quite
clearly sided with the opposition to President Obama’s push for “change”, while in
2017 the organization proudly advertised its influence over President Trump’s agenda
and its triumphant return as “the president’s think tank.” What had changed so
dramatically in just eight years? Although there were important internal changes
at Heritage throughout this period1 , it seems that a key difference was the election
1

The most important change at Heritage during this time, according to observers in Washington,
was the selection of Jim DeMint as Heritage President. This decision had important impacts on the
day-to-day operation of the think tank, though many interview subjects suggested that DeMint’s
selection was both a cause and a consequence of broader changes at Heritage, namely a turn to
greater political activism and confrontation. I discuss these trends throughout this chapter.
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of a Republican president and Republican control of Congress. Under Democratic
government, the Heritage Foundation was a reactionary force; under Republicans,
Heritage was once again a major player in Washington politics.
This overt display of partisanship fits uneasily with the historical and legal understandings of the role of think tanks in US policymaking. Think tanks originated
in the Progressive Era and aimed to apply “scientific knowledge” to pressing public
problems. These organizations valued concepts such as “efficiency” and “objectivity”,
and for much of the early 20th century they served as relatively neutral informationproducing institutions (Rich, 2004). As prominent think tank scholar Andrew Rich
(2004, 37) notes, the earliest think tanks sought to “maintain a distance from political
debates and an exclusive focus instead on careful investigation.”
This early orientation fits well with the contemporary legal categorization of American think tanks, which are classified as 501(c)3 tax-exempt organizations that “may
not attempt to influence legislation as a substantial part of [their] activities and... may
not participate in any campaign activity” (Internal Revenue Service, N.d.). And, for
a variety of reasons, partisan politicking was seen as a losing strategy by think tanks
for much of their history. More recently, however, the activities of the Heritage Foundation and organizations like it suggest that the Progressive notion of think tanks as
apartisan and apolitical bodies is being severely challenged. These organizations align
– if only in practice – with a single political party; they establish affiliate groups that
engage in direct advocacy efforts and electoral politics; and they are viewed increasingly favorably by members of their preferred party and with growing skepticism and
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outright anger by their opponents.2 These developments raise important questions
about the role of think tanks in an era of partisan polarization.
At the same time, policy practitioners point to some prominent examples of think
tanks that seem to have resisted the temptation to become more partisan in the face
of increased polarization. The Brookings Institution – while frequently described as
“left of center” by pundits – is viewed by many policy researchers as an organization
that attempts to carry on the legacy of Progressive objectivity. A small number of
new think tanks have also been founded around the explicit notion of counteracting
the tendency towards ideological and politicized research. The Niskanen Center, for
example, was founded in 2015 to “meaningfully engage with a broad range of ideological and political actors – a valuable asset in a world where odd-bedfellow coalitions
are increasingly necessary to get anything accomplished.”3 The contrast between the
Niskanen Center and the Heritage Foundation raises important questions about think
tanks in the modern era. Why have certain think tanks seemingly adopted a nonpartisan or bipartisan approach while others have often engaged in outright partisan
politicking? Have these alternative approaches lent certain types of organizations
more influence in the policy process?
Similar questions can be asked about interest groups, which also produce or at
least utilize policy research in their advocacy efforts. Furthermore, unlike think tanks,
2

To give just one example of the growing animosity surrounding more partisan think tanks, in
April 2017 several hundred protesters gathered at the Heritage Foundation to decry the organization’s influence over the Trump Administration budget. When asked about the incident, a Heritage
employee said that this was the first such protest in her memory.
3

Niskanen Center Conspectus (2017).
https://bit.ly/2TkEk1p
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interest groups are legally allowed to lobby, campaign, and support candidates, granting them the tools to directly support their preferred party. Still, throughout most
of the 20th century scholars tended to view these organizations as “access-seekers”
(e.g. Truman, 1951; Hansen, 1991) who eschewed overt partisanship due to the costs
of aligning too closely with a party which, at some point, would become a minority in
Washington. The influence of interest groups was thus seen to hinge on their ability
to cultivate relationships with incumbents from both parties (Lowery and Brasher,
2004), a strategy that was possible – and at least mildly successful (Hall and Wayman,
1990; Hansen, 1991) – in an era of relative bipartisanship.
Given increased partisan polarization, however, some scholars have suggested that
certain interest groups now align, sometimes strongly, with a single preferred party
(Sinclair, 2006; Bawn et al., 2012). This is especially true for single-issue groups like
the National Rifle Association or EMILY’s List, which are popularly understood to
be Republican and Democratic affiliates, respectively. The polarization of the parties
on the issues of gun and abortion rights means that these organizations find fewer
and fewer allies in the opposing party (and more and stronger allies in their preferred
party). Quasi-party interest groups like Swing Left or various Tea Party organizations
are also, unsurprisingly, quite partisan in their efforts.
Even traditional “access-seeking” interest groups, however, appear to be more
partisan in their efforts than in the past. The traditional business interests of the
Chamber of Commerce, which bills itself as above the fray of partisan politics, now
find a more comfortable home in the modern Republican Party, and as such the Chamber has strongly supported Republican initiatives like the 2018 tax cuts through their
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research. Similarly, the American Association of Retired Persons is often aligned with
the goals of the Democratic Party, and in fact its support of the Affordable Care Act
led to the founding of a number of “conservative alternatives” to the group. Empirical
investigations generally support the notion that even traditional interest groups are
now operating in more partisan ways. In an analysis of group contributions in the
2016 election, I find that 60 percent of PACs contributed at least three-quarters of
their funds to candidates from a single party. Relatedly, Brunell (2005) shows that
groups have partisan preferences even when they contribute to candidates from both
parties, with PACs directing “sincere” (i.e. electorally useful) contributions to candidates from their preferred party and “strategic” (and less impactful) donations to
others. In the aggregate, Grossmann and Dominguez (2009) find that interest groups
form two competing, partisan coalitions in their endorsements and contributions but
not in legislative debates, though their measure of legislative coordination – operationalized as mentions of group coalitions in the Congressional Record – is fairly
strict.
Aside from anecdotal examples and studies of PAC contributions, however, little
research has been conducted on the potentially evolving nature of research production
at think tanks and interest groups in an era of partisan polarization. As a result,
important questions remain. How, if at all, has increased polarization impacted the
demand for and supply of policy research? Have organizations changed their policy
research and advocacy efforts to meet these new incentives? Have others resisted
these polarizing tendencies, and if so which types of organizations are likely to adapt
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rather than resist? And, perhaps most importantly, do those organizations that adopt
a partisan approach have a stronger impact on the policymaking process?
I leverage a wide range of data sources to attempt to answer these questions. In
this and the next chapter I investigate two important and interrelated phenomena in
explaining the impact of partisan polarization on the world of policy research. First,
at the same time that partisan polarization has increased substantially, Congress’
capacity to conduct policy research and develop policy proposals has declined precipitously. Congress – including its component institutions (i.e. parties and committees)
and individual members – requires at least a minimal amount of information to inform and justify decisions. In other words, members of Congress are demanders of
policy information.
For most Congressional actors, however, policy information is akin to a “credence
good” in economics (Darby and Karni, 1973), meaning that consumers lack the knowledge to understand the quality of the good or service they are receiving. In such a
market, factors like advertising, social connections, and trust are important conditioning factors in any transaction. Furthermore, members of Congress are awash in
information and surrounding by organizations willing to provide it, compounding the
problem of information processing and prioritization in Congress. This is one of the
main paradoxes of the modern Congress: despite declining internal capacity, Congress
actually faces an oversupply of policy information.
In such an environment, actors must develop strategies for sorting through informational inputs. And, in an environment defined by partisan polarization, an
increasingly prominent heuristic adopted by members of Congress is the partisan fit
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of the information and, relatedly, the organization providing it. In short, members
are likely to seek out information that advances their preexisting beliefs – and these
beliefs are increasingly tied to the preferences and goals of their political party. In the
aggregate, this means that members of Congress are more likely to receive and accept
information that affirms their partisan goals, and to welcome and utilize information
produced by trusted or well-connected organizations that consistently support the
efforts of their party.
Secondly, the changing demand for policy information has downstream effects on
the incentives for outside groups producing such research. These outside groups can
be considered informational suppliers, and they must match their research production
with the market for such services. In attempting to match their supply of information
with the demand for it in Congress, outside groups perceive two incentives which are
often in conflict with one another.
First, given partisan polarization, groups face pressure to consistently “invest” in
a single party and develop a long-term reputation as a trusted party ally in order to
achieve policy influence. These organizations strive to become the go-to source for
information in their preferred party, and they often adopt aggressive advertising and
advocacy strategies to ensure their ideas are readily identifiable. In the process, such
groups become trusted by and well-connected with party members (including other
informal allies), helping to overcome the problem of information asymmetries in their
transactions with members of Congress. This mode of operation could be described
as an advocacy strategy based on developing and providing the most useful – in a partisan, electoral, or legislative sense – information to Congressional allies. Importantly,
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useful information is not necessarily nuanced or objective, but rather persuasive for
members of a particular party and minimally defensible in policy arguments.
On the other hand, however, many outside groups believe that they still trade on
their credibility and reputation for strong empirical research, and that organizations
who consistently violate this norm will face strong criticism from opposing members
of Congress and other outside actors. Thus, some groups pursue a Progressive or
enlightened operating strategy, producing the “best” empirical research based on
available evidence and maintaining their reputation as moderate voices in an extreme
era. Unfortunately, though, partisan polarization means that nearly every piece of
evidence promoted by one party will be challenged by the other, so that the costs
of violating the norm of credibility have declined, relatively, in the modern era. As
a result, it seems that groups in the Progressive mold have become a smaller subset
of the overall universe of research-producing organizations. Furthermore, to stay
effective in a marketplace where transactions are based on trust and social capital,
even these groups have adopted some of the same marketing and promotion strategies
found at more partisan organizations.
Thus, it seems that the current marketplace for ideas places a premium on politicized, partisan information. While it is true that some organizations have resisted
these incentives, it is probably more accurate to say that some groups have changed
in less significant ways in response to polarization while others have readily entered
into the political fray. If more and more groups view partisan politics as an effective influence strategy, an important implications is that the production of research
is now defined less by pluralistic dynamics and more by a coalitional model, where
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groups predictably align with a particular party and one another in their research
and advocacy efforts.
The tension between incentives for partisan versus credible information leads
groups to align along two dimensions. On the first dimension, groups differ according
to their level of direct engagement with the political system, with organizations in
the Progressive mold maintaining a disengaged and more academic orientation and
many partisan organizations pursuing a strategy based around direct engagement
with politics. The second dimension differentiates groups according to the extent of
their ideological or partisan preferences, with some organizations pursuing a moderate or access-oriented strategy while others adopt an explicitly ideological or partisan
orientation.
Thus, I am able to identify four ideal type organizations that differ across these
two dimensions. Still, as spatial metaphors, each dimension should be considered a
spectrum. Groups can and have moved along these dimensions over time, representing
varying degrees to which organizations have changed in response to growing polarization. In general, the overall tendency seems to be towards organizations becoming
more direct in their efforts to influence politics and more partisan in their strategies,
though there are notable exceptions. In the next chapter, I investigate various indicators that seem to differentiate these organizational types, including group funding
sources and expenditures, internal decision-making processes, and inter-group collaborations.
The methods employed in these chapters can be considered a “kitchen sink” approach to the study of this topic. Because the internal operations, thought processes,
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and considerations of political groups are opaque at best, I leverage numerous data
sources to triangulate answers to my questions. Interviews with policy researchers
and advocates in Washington, D.C. inform the bulk of the analysis, as policy practitioners themselves are likely best able to articulate the pressures and incentives
that they face. However, to validate these findings and provide greater detail, I
also analyze groups’ financial records found in 990 tax forms to investigate funding
and expenditure dynamics; annual reports to understand the degree of partisan and
political engagement; and event participant lists to assess the extent of inter-group
collaboration.
As a final note, the opacity of most research producing organizations also informs
my decisions regarding which groups to focus on in this chapter. For a variety of
reasons, large interest groups and think tanks are most likely to provide information
on their funding and collaborations to the public. Thus, I focus here on prominent,
national, “full service” think tanks that address multiple domestic issue areas in their
research,4 as well as well-known national interest groups that address relatively broad
issue areas (e.g. the economy). I focus on these prominent groups as ideal types,
though there is reason to believe that smaller organizations behave in similar ways
but on a reduced scale. In the final chapter I expand my focus to include many smaller
interest groups and think tanks, though I continue to emphasize the importance of
prominent, multi-issue groups, which I show are the most important actors in most
policy debates.
4

This approach is similar to the one adopted by Rich (2004) in his famous study of American
think tanks.
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2.1

Research Incentives in the Modern Era
Contemporary members of Congress often lack the resources and expertise needed

to craft detailed policy arguments and legislation (e.g. Jones, 1976; Ehrenhalt, 1991;
Curry, 2015). The individualization and intensity of modern campaigning means
that emergent politicians tend to possess strong electoral skills but lack the ability or
desire to formulate coherent policies (Ehrenhalt, 1991). In modern Congresses there
have been few policy experts in the style of, for example, Wilbur Mills, with prestige
instead accruing to strong fundraisers and campaigners. These same electorallyminded politicians tend to employ staff with political connections and experience
rather than policy expertise (Romzek and Utter, 1997; Webb and Kolodny, 2006).
Aside from certain pet projects and geographically relevant issue areas, then, rankand-file members of Congress are often left “legislating in the dark” (Curry, 2015).
As individual members with limited policymaking experience make up more and
more of the legislative body, congressional committees – the traditional workhorses
of Congress – have also experienced a notable decline in their policymaking powers (Rohde, 1991; Sinclair, 2006). Between 1990 and 2015, committee staff shrunk by
nearly 45 percent in the House and 19 percent in the Senate (Reynolds, 2017), siphoning policy resources away from once dominant committee chairs. Instead, decisionmaking power on many major issues has concentrated in the hands of Congressional
leadership, especially in the House of Representatives (Curry, 2015). As one senior researcher at the Chamber of Commerce noted, “Like a gravitational body, the
Speaker’s Office over time drew more and more power unto itself... The Speaker’s
Office and the rest of leadership... has reabsorbed an enormous amount of power
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and the [committee] chairmen are largely irrelevant” on most major issues.5 These
leaders utilize their informational advantages “to influence how legislation is drafted,
how lawmakers perceive the legislation, and ultimately what is passed in committee
and on the floor” (Curry, 2015, 7).
The proximate result of these internal developments is an institution with limited
congressional capacity, or the ability to fulfill its legislative and oversight responsibilities (Lewallen, Theriault and Jones, 2016). Indeed, a recent survey of congressional
staffers found that 95 percent of respondents thought it was very or somewhat important that “Members have adequate time and resources to understand, consider and
deliberate policy and legislaton” but only 24 percent were somewhat or very satisfied with current time and resource levels (Goldschmidt, 2017). According to several
interview subjects, the concentration of Congressional power – intertwined with increasing Congressional gridlock – plays an important role in defining incentives for
members of Congress, encouraging contemporary legislators to neglect investments in
policymaking. For example, the same Chamber of Commerce researcher stated:
Unfortunately, because members of Congress and Senators spend so much
time fundraising [and] doing institutional business and managing their
offices, they don’t seem to spend as much time on subject matter [or]
becoming experts as they once did... It used to be that, if you’re a member
of Congress after a couple terms, you need to be quite familiar with an
extraordinary range of topics and you accumulate knowledge over time if
you apply yourself. [And] then there would be those one or two issues that
were of particular interest to you and/or your district and you became an
expert in those. Well, if legislation rarely passes or if you rarely get to
influence the legislation that does pass, why would you do that?
5

Interview with US Chamber of Commerce Senior Researcher. June 25th, 2018. Washington,
D.C.
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With limited individual and institutional policymaking capacity, members of Congress
have become increasingly reliant on information produced and disseminated by other
actors. Of course, some observers might object that contemporary legislators are
not all that interested in policy information given their nearly “single-minded focus”
on reelection (Mayhew, 1974). Passing party policies, however, is an activity that
collectively benefits members in their reelection bids (Cox and McCubbins, 1993),
and legislators need some minimal amount of information to justify their votes to
constituents. Thus, rank-and-file members require what might be termed “talking
points”, or rationales – often premised on empirical research – for their policy decisions. At the institutional level, committees and leaders require ideas, information,
and even legislative language as fodder for policy designs. Given declining congressional capacity, these resources often originate outside of these formal institutions.
This reliance on outside actors, though, does not necessarily mean that members
must draw on the often motivated research conducted by think tanks and interest
groups. Indeed, several prominent governmental institutions – namely the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressiona Budget Office (CBO), and Congressional Research Service (CRS) – exist to serve the informational needs of members in
an objective fashion. As a longtime researcher at the CRS noted of the organization,
“the whole mission of the place is to provide objective, nonpartisan [information].
That’s... the statutory mandate.” Still, as Figure 2.1 shows, since 2010 member
requests for CRS reports have declined precipitously and do not seem to correspond
to the overall workload of Congress, suggesting that members (or at least leaders) are
turning to other organizations for information.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Congressional Research Service reports and congressional
workload, 2010-2017. Customized CRS reports for members of Congress are charted
on the left axis and recorded votes in the House and Senate on the right axis. Report
data comes from the Congressional Research Service. Data on recorded Congressional
votes comes from the Brookings Institution’s Vital Statistics on Congress (Reynolds,
2017).

This intuition is corroborated by policy researchers and advocates in the Capitol.
A Heritage Foundation researcher, for instance, stated that members of Congress
“really rely heavily on outside groups to inform them and [even] write their legislation
sometimes.” She went on to describe the importance of “working groups..., personal
meetings with staffers..., [and] coalition groups” to ensure that Heritage is able “to
know about possible legislation before it gets introduced and... to influence that
process [by] shar[ing] our knowledge and information. There is always a great need
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for context, policy data, and a lot of information [because of] the high turnover in
Congress.”6
Similarly, when asked how changes in Congressional capacity had impacted the
influence of outside groups, one researcher suggested that an internally weak Congress
is more reliant on – and susceptible to – information provided by other actors. He
traced these developments to the early 1990s, noting that “when Gingrich came in [as
leader of the House, he] cut back on staff all over the place. It’s still a legacy today
in part, which I’m sure interest groups and executive [staff] love.”7 Indeed, most
outside groups are proactive in attempting to convey their ideas and preferences to
members of Congress. One lobbyist, reflecting on his time as a Congressional staffer,
said that “you get a lot [of research] delivered to you whether you want it or not. A
lot of lobbyists and a lot of advocacy people would present [their ideas].”8 These are
not neutral developments, as members of Congress face an abundance of information
from outside actors with their own particular and often opaque interests – interests
that do not necessarily reflect the will of the average voter.
This fact highlights one of the great paradoxes of the modern Congress: despite
the decline of institutional policymaking resources, members of Congress actually
face an oversupply of policy relevant information. One lobbyist suggested that –
given technological change and the proliferation of think tanks – modern members of
6

Interview with Heritage Foundation Policy Researcher. July 9th, 2018. Virtual Interview.

7

Interview with Congressional Research Service Senior Specialist. June 26th, 2018. Washington,
D.C.
8

Interview with New York Life Lobbyist. June 26th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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Congress are confronted with a “tsunami of information.”9 Similarly, a think tank
executive stated:
I think policymakers have problems identifying [good ideas]. There’s just
too much information and... lobbyists and think tanks [trying to] help
people identify ideas... And then professors are out there doing research,
and [so] it’s very hard to get [your ideas] into the policy process.10
As a result, members of Congress – or more likely their staff and institutions like
committees and party leadership – must develop methods for sorting through the vast
supply of policy ideas and information. In broad terms, this “information processing”
(Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) can be viewed as a transaction between informational
demanders (members of Congress) and information suppliers (outside groups), where
the suppliers are almost always better informed about the quality of their research
product. These informational asymmetries mean that policy information is akin to
an experience or credence good (Darby and Karni, 1973), where it is very costly or
impossible for a consumer to determine the quality of a good before it is obtained
and – in the case of credence goods – even after it has been ‘purchased’. The crowded
nature of the market for policy research compounds the problem of identifying quality
information. In such a marketplace, consumers are likely to rely on “credentialing”,
“highly simplying heuristics”, and inherent biases when making decisions (Andersen
and Philipsen, 1998). In much the same way, politicians must develop informational
shortcuts to aid in the selection and interpretation of policy information.
At the same time, on the supply side, outside groups hope to make their research
and ideas stand out within a crowded space. If policy information is a credence good,
9

Interview with New York Life Lobbyist. June 26th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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Interview with Cato Institute executive. June 28th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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this means that groups – by and large – cannot rely on the inherent quality of their
research as a marketing strategy. Of course, the revealed credibility of an organization
in the long term might act as a sort of “credentialing” within the policymaking
community, but there is an alternative – and increasingly common – strategy that
groups can adopt when promoting their research: playing on the inherent biases of
members of Congress and the most commom heuristics that they employ in decisionmaking. In an era of extreme polarization, the dominant bias amongst members of
Congress is most certainly partisanship, and the most common heuristic employed is
quite likely to be the partisanship of the promoting organization. Thus, the long-term
partisan reputations of information providers send important signals about a product
whose quality is otherwise unknown. Common partisan commitments – in other
words, membership in the same extended party network – essentially signals that the
actors will promote something akin to a member’s long-term interests and therefore
has valuable resources to add in partisan policy battles. Conceiving of members of
Congress as demanders of policy information and outside groups as the suppliers
of this resource, demonstrated partisan loyalty might act as a “brand” that guides
consumers (here, politicians) to particular products (here, useful policy information).

2.1.1

Information Processing: Some Basics

In broad terms, this project is focused on institutional information processing,
both within Congress and at outside research producing institutions. A lengthy literature on this topic has established that most institutions – especially pluralistic,
non-hierarchical ones like Congress – are inundated with information, shifting the
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analytical focus from how institutions search for information to how they prioritize
it (see, for example, Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Furthermore, the emphasis on
institutional prioritization has led to a micro-level focus on how the individuals that
comprise these institutions make decisions, with a sizable faction in the field of economics arguing that individuals are “boundedly rational”, making partially informed
decisions based on limited information, cognitive capabilities, and time (Simon, 1983).
Institutions, in other words, are the aggregation of decisions made at the individual
level. In Congress, recent scholarship has shown that certain actors – namely leadership – have greater informational and decision-making power, and therefore have a
greater effect on the overall decision-making of the institution (Curry, 2015). These
assumptions – of informational oversupply, imperfect information processing, and informational asymmetries – provide an important basis for the study of contemporary
Congressional policymaking (though, as I note below, extant literature on these topics
has several glaring blind spots).
The literature on information processing in the policy process starts from the
premise that policy preferences are part of broader informational systems that need
to be explained in order to fully understand policy outcomes. Most models in this
vein adopt the “garbage can” approach discussed in the previous chapter, assuming that individual actors are embedded within complex institutional configurations
defined by pluralistic, redundant, and parallel channels of information resulting in informational oversupply (Jones, Baumgartner and de la Mare, 2005). Within such an
environment, cognitively limited or “boundedly rational” actors require strategies to
sift through informational inputs (Workman, Jones and Jochim, 2009). As Jones and
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Baumgartner (2005) note, “Oversupply calls not for search, but for prioritization”
(78). Most scholars in this field, then, focus on how institutions ‘select’ problems and
solutions, a process more broadly termed “agenda setting.”
Importantly, the fact that individuals are less than fully rational means that ambiguity and bias creep into agenda setting processes. Ambiguity, according to Jones
and Baumgartner (2005), means that the same information is subject to multiple
interpretations. In later work, they write that “the search for information is tightly
connected with the implementation of solutions; therefore, our attitudes and curiosity
about the nature of a social problem are closely tied with our beliefs about the value
of government responses to the public policy challenges we face” (Baumgartner and
Jones, 2015, 2). The inherent “political power of information,” they continue, means
that actors are biased in their interpretation of it, so that “sometimes these efforts
become highly charged partisan battles” (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015, 196-197).
These are important insights, and they fit with the general theory advanced here.
Still, while this literature draws attention to individual decision-making processes,
it is surprisingly neglectful of the actual micro-level considerations that individuals
draw on when prioritizing information. Walgrave and Dejaeghere (2016, 231) offer an
excellent assessment of the state of the field in their study of Belgian policymakers,
writing that the “agendasetting literature... does not study individuals but institutions. It studies policy output, the result of information selection, not the selection
process itself.” They further explain that:
Bounded rationality provides a useful framework by suggesting that selection is key. But this framework is not very concrete as to how this
selection task is accomplished. Bounded rationality simply pinpoints the
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fallibility of the human mind and says that drastic information reduction
is unavoidable. One way in which politicians (and other humans) organize
their selective processing of information, the literature says, is by relying
on heuristics... Yet, again, extant work in political science is not very specific as to which heuristics politicians employ and whether there are other
“tricks” they have in place to wade through the information maelstrom
(230).
Furthermore, the artificial limits that information processing scholars place on
their analyses – namely, their focus only on the role of information in agenda setting
– seems to miss important information processing aspects later in the policymaking
process. Once the agenda has been set (i.e. a policy problem has been identified
and deemed worthy – by some segment of elites – of government action), how is
information processed and used? Or, in other words, given that a problem has been
defined – itself an incredibly important part of politics and power – how do members
of Congress process and utilize information to advance their ideas and battle their
political opponents?
To fill this theoretical gap, I focus on the how of information processing, or which
heuristics and biases members employ when selecting information. I also focus far
less on problem definition – a key component of agenda setting studies – and to a
greater degree on the use of information in exogenously defined policy debates. I
ultimately arrive at the conclusion that members of Congress rely heavily on partisan
fit as a heuristic when selecting information. This process can also be described as
confirmation bias, where members are more likely to accept information that confirms
their preexisting (partisan) beliefs and more likely to critique and reject information
that challenges their preferences. In the long-term, groups can develop reputations
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as providers of such information, institutionalizing – if only informally – their role in
a particular party’s network.
Before turning to these findings, however, two more proximate questions should be
addressed. The first concerns the actual goals of individual legislators – in processing
information, what are the ultimate objectives of legislators and what role does policy
information play therein? The literature on this topic clearly demonstrates that
members seek reelection to office, perhaps even at the expense of other goals (Mayhew,
1974), though others have suggested that power and policy goals are also important
outcomes that members seek (Fenno, 1973, 1977). Policy information is not in itself
all that helpful in aiding reelection – most constituents care little about the specifics
of any given policy – but it is useful to the degree that passing public policy aids
in reelection and to the degree that policy information is necessary to justify policy
positions. Thus, we would expect members to seek out ‘minimum informational
justifications’ for their policy stances.
This is more than just an individual story, however. Cox and McCubbins (2004)
argue that electoral outcomes hinge not just on individual reputations but also on a
party’s reputation or “brand name”, which itself derives from the party’s legislative
record. As such, individual members delegate powers – including over informational
resources – to party leadership in an effort to develop the common good that is
party reputation.11 If anything, growing partisan polarization should increase the
11

As in the case of the information processing literature discussed above, Cox and McCubbins
(2004) focus the majority of their attention on delegated authority over agenda setting institutions
(e.g. committees), though they do mention that parties seek to control policymaking resources more
generally. I focus here on one such type of resource: policy information.
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importance of party branding and accelerate the tendency for rank-and-file members
to defer to party leaders (indeed, there is some evidence of this; see Curry, 2015).
At the very least, polarization means that individual and partisan goals are less in
conflict with one another than they once were (see, for example, Poole and Rosenthal,
1997). Party leaders, committee chairpersons, and other decision-makers – much
like individual legislators – require information to justify policies, and likely more
than just the ‘minimum informational justifications’ that rank-and-file members seek
out. In committees, caucuses, and legislative drafting, information and references
to external authorities are potent weapons in what are most often partisan policy
battles (Stone, 1996), not to mention the basis for actual policy design. While it
may be true that policymaking is less informed than it once was – and this is an
open empirical question – we are certainly not at the point where policymakers craft
legislation without informational inputs.
Thus, based on existing literature we can surmise that members of Congress seek
policy information to the degree that it aids in their reelection and policy goals, with
the two objectives intertwined with one another. This occurs within the context of
partisanship – a successful party oftentimes means a successful legislator. It follows
that members, leaders, and parties should seek out information that furthers partisan
legislative goals.12 In the aggregate, this tendency to accept information that fits
12

This is not to say that members are necessarily disingenuous or dishonest, but only that their
partisan preferences and goals are likely to cloud their interpretation of new information. Studies
have shown that average citizens engage in such “partisan motivated reasoning”, where they seek
out – and weight more heavily – information that confirms their preexisting beliefs while also “counterarguing” discordant information more forcefully (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Druckman, Peterson
and Slothuus, 2013). There is reason to believe that government elites reason in much the same way.
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with preexisting partisan beliefs should have a profound effect on the transfer and
dissemination of information within Congress.
Beyond the desire for partisan information, however, there is another reason that
members might be more willing to accept information from trusted partisan allies.
This brings us to the second important question: what type of good is policy information and how does this affect informational transactions in the policy process? It
was noted above that policy information is akin to a credence or experience good in
economics. This conclusion is based, quite simply, on the fact that policy information
is not a “search good”, or a good for which judgments about product quality can
be made by a consumer prior to purchase (Nelson, 1970). Because members lack
specialized knowledge in most policy areas, they are unable to seek out the best – i.e.
the most objective or empirically valid – policy research. In other words, independent
knowledge about product quality is almost entirely lacking. Furthermore, in these
exchanges members of Congress lack pricing information, a key signal of quality in
economic markets.
Thus, policy information should be viewed as either an experience good or a
credence good. The former suggests that members can learn something about the
quality of the information once they have “consumed” it, while the latter would mean
that members do not possess the knowledge to judge quality even after utilizing the
information in their debates and public statements. If we think of information as
an experience good, this would mean that members learn more about the quality of
research as they utilize it in debates, with other actors and groups providing feedback.
There is some reason to believe that members would be unlikely to internalize critiques
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of low quality research due to factors like confirmation bias and motivated reasoning,
but it is still possible that criticism (or praise) from allies would alter their decision
calculus moving forward. This would, in essence, mean that a member has learned
something about the quality of particular research – and a particular organization –
through the experience of utilizing said information in policy debates. If we conceive
of information as a credence good, however, even the act of employing particular
research or information in a policy debate would add little to the member’s knowledge
of the quality of said information.
In the end, the distinction between experience and credence goods is not all that
important here, as the selection processes involved with both types of goods are
impacted by similar factors. The key similarity for both types of goods is that there
are information asymmetries between buyers and sellers prior to the purchase of
a good (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). In other words, sellers know far more
than consumers about the quality and required level of the good they are providing.
Consumers, in fact, often know nothing when it comes to directly assessing quality.
As a result, consumers must rely on indirect indicators of product quality. One such
indicator is credentialing, or establishing “confidence based on external evidence”
like professional accreditation, third party verification, or customer loyalty (Andersen
and Philipsen, 1998, 7). But, there are no formal accrediting institutions in the realm
of research producing organizations. Customer loyalty – or an organization’s status
as a “go-to” voice on a particular policy topic (Grossmann, 2012) – may act as an
indicator of quality, but loyalty – for the reasons outlined above – may be conditioned
by partisan bias.
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Indeed, scholars of experience and credence goods note that “the application of biases and highly simplifying heuristics” form the basis of most transactions (Andersen
and Philipsen, 1998, 4). We have now come full circle, as the information processing
literature similarly suggests that preexisting goals are more important for understanding information uptake than searching for new information (Simon, 1983). Conceiving
of policy information as a credence good helps us understand why: members not only
face too much information, but – absent the costly decision to become subject matter
experts – they lack the requisite knowledge to discern between alternative pieces of
evidence. Thus legislators, aside from just desiring partisan information, also rely on
partisanship as a necessary simplifying heuristic when sorting through informational
inputs. In an era of partisan polarization, this is likely one of the most common biases
introduced in the policymaking process.
However, as noted, there has been limited attention paid to the types of biases
and heuristics that arise in information processing in the policy process. The study
by Walgrave and Dejaeghere (2016, 230) is a notable exception, though they study
Belgium, a less polarized political system than the United States. Nevertheless, their
study finds that members deal with informational oversupply by, first, instituting procedures that “shield them from raw information” and, second, by applying “heuristic
filters” such as ideology and efficacy. In a related study on information processing
in U.S. congressional committees, Lewallen, Theriault and Jones (2016) find that
members are now receiving more one-sided information and are spending less time
learning about potential alternative solutions. Together, these studies lend some
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credence to the idea that partisanship plays an increasingly important role in how
members interpret information.
Indeed, policy practitioners in the Capitol describe an increasing propensity for
members of Congress to accept information that fits with their party’s agenda and
reject information that challenges it. In some cases this means that members of
Congress and their staff simply ignore informational inputs that are perceived as
against their partisan interest. For instance, one Heritage Foundation researcher
noted:
I’ve never talked to a Democratic member of Congress... I can’t imagine
that happening. If a Democratic member of Congress asked me to come
to their office and brief them on [my issue area] Id just about fall out of my
chair... Id be happy to, but itd be extremely unusual. [The reputation of
our think tank] short-circuits [our influence] at that initial stage. I think
they probably assume we don’t do good research, which is inherently tied
to them thinking maybe the assumptions we make don’t make sense.13
Another subject similarly noted that Republicans would be unlikely to interact with
or draw on research advocated by organizations associated with Democratic Party
goals. He said:
I think people on the Republican side, I don’t think many of them would
look at [the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities’] documents. They
just wouldn’t. They’d skim through the title [and] say, “Wait a minute,
almost all of these are attacking ideas that we’ve developed, why on earth
should we have [interactions] with this organization?” So [the impact of
partisanship is] almost self-fulfilling.14
In other cases, however, subjects noted that Congressional staff might read research conducted by a wide range of actors but reject outright conclusions that contradict their beliefs. Such a strategy can help policymakers anticipate their opponents’
13

Interview with Heritage Foundation Policy Research. July 13th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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Interview with Brookings Institution Senior Fellow. July 5th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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arguments, serving their own needs but not necessarily resulting in robust discussion
or engagement with the opposing side. A researcher who has worked at both the
Heritage Foundation and the Brookings Institution noted:
A lot of staff that will look at organizations’ work, they will look at the
information and material they pulled together and sometimes they will
just look at the conclusions. Because they’re kind of just interested to
see what the scholar or organization says, but they’re not going to be
influenced by those conclusions. I remember when I was at Heritage we
would often go over to Democratic members and staff and have really
good conversations with them and many of them, in some way, would
jokingly say, “You know, we get your stuff. And we read the first twothirds, which is all of the analysis, but when we get to conclusions we just
rip them off and throw them away.” And that’s probably an exaggeration,
but it underscores the point that a lot of people say, “Yeah, we’re really
interested in seeing how a conservative institution would look at this issue.
And there’s always good stuff in there, things we didn’t know and good
arguments we should be thinking about. But we’re not going to do what
you tell us we should be doing because we just don’t agree with you.”15
Each of these statements highlights the increasing importance of partisan reputations and commitments for the reception and selective interpretation of policy
research by members of Congress. Most respondents framed this dynamic negatively
– i.e. members are unlikely to internalize ideas advocated by organizations affiliated
with the opposing party – but others suggested that members of Congress are also
more likely to accept ideas developed by trusted partisan allies (see the next section).
In such transactions, the long-term, demonstrated commitment of an organization to
the goals of a particular party serves as a heuristic that helps members sort through
a mass of information and identify the most useful pieces of evidence. Through these
informational shortcuts, members are able to overcome – if only imperfectly – the
profound informational asymmetries that define policymaking. An important impli15
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cation of this finding is that outside groups can actually benefit from investing in a
single party over time and developing a reputation as a producer of trusted partisan
information. This fact is a key change that has resulted from – and likely contributed
to – increased partisan polarization. While it is certainly true that politicians have
always preferred information that advances their goals, it seems to be that certain
organizations are consistently aligned with members’ goals across a range of issues,
that these goals are highly correlated with partisan affiliations, and that policy actors
are increasingly aware of these reputations and utilize them when processing informational inputs. In other words, the demand curve for policy research has shifted
due to partisan polarization, and as a many result research producing organizations
have altered their “supply” of research.

2.1.2

Informational Demands and Group Incentives

The increasing impact of partisanship on information processing has important
effects on how outside groups operate and which organizations are successful. Just
as politics is said to be “downstream” from culture, policy research institutions are
downstream from partisan politics, reacting to the incentives provided by those in
positions of power. Research producing organizations, then, might be viewed in terms
of “outsourcing” or “consulting” – they provide information to meet the demands
of the political marketplace, determined first and foremost by those in positions of
power. In a similar way, Hall and Deardorff (2006) describe lobbying as a “legislative
subsidy”, where outside groups provide allies with resources to aid them in their
efforts to pass mutually acceptable policy. To stay relevant and impactful, outside

56

groups must match their supply of research with the demand for particular types
of information.16 If members of Congress desire – and are more likely to accept and
utilize – information that fits their pre-existing beliefs and partisan goals, then groups
that consistently provide such information might develop long-term reputations that
enhance their policy influence when their preferred party controls government.
The Heritage Foundation, according to most interview subjects, epitomizes this
relationship between partisan reputations and policy influence. Founded in 1973,
Heritage was in many ways a conservative reaction to the perceived detachment and
liberal bias of existing think tanks. Instead, Heritage endeavored, from the start, to
directly influence political outcomes, with particular advocacy strategies – like the
formation of an advocacy organization, the encouragement a “revolving door” culture,
and the adoption of aggressive marketing tactics – flowing from this decision. Heritage
scholars, more than mere academic researchers, were expected to be fierce advocates
for conservative ideas, with a 1985 New York Times article quoting Heritage’s thenVice President of Research as saying, “Everyone here is an advocate. We all recognize
that we are here to do battle.”17 The same article stated that “Heritage analysts are
not expected to develop highly original ideas in major books or articles that will
shape scholarly thinking on an issue. Rather, they are expected to cultivate sources
16
It is worth noting again that information is a catchall term. When it comes to members of
Congress it is highly unlikely that they demand particular types of research (e.g. credible or quantitative), but rather they value particular types of information based on their implications and the
conclusions that they support.
17

Quoted in “Heritage Foundation: Success in Obscurity” (Boffey, 1985).
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in Congress and the Administration, sense what issues are becoming ripe and produce
terse position papers that can be used to sway political argument.”
In line with this view of Heritage, one employee described the organization as a
“do tank” that “wants to be effective in accomplishing conservative policy victories...
so we have to work with those actors that are in the positions to implement policy.”18
Another subject recalled that:
Heritage... consciously founded themselves to be more relevant. [I heard]
a story about some of the founders of Heritage actually put[ting] fake dust
on [another organization’s report because they had...] held off on putting
out recommendations because the debate was going on [in Congress].
They didn’t want to prejudice the outcome. Maybe that’s true. Maybe
that’s just the iconic story of why they felt like, “Oh, well we have to be
more relevant. We have to put out talking points that are going to go to
the Hill that they can use in the debate.”19
This founding vision – aimed at enhancing the influence of Heritage by directly
investing in and engaging with the political system – has an important effect on the
strategies of the think tank. In short, directly and successfully engaging with politics
in the modern era means engaging with a system defined mainly by partisan polarization. As a result, the Heritage Foundation has focused its research and advocacy
efforts in such a way that they work almost exclusively through the Republican Party
to accomplish their goals, as Republicans closely reflect their preferences on most
issues (and the Democratic Party is increasingly antagonistic towards them). As one
former employee stated:
What happened in the last few years I was at Heritage was... [the organization] tended to focus much more on seeing the Republican Party –
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and even a subset of the Republican Party – as the primary vehicle to
move conservative ideas forward... Clearly in the last several years, Heritage was really focused more and more on a subset of conservative[s], and
more recently the Trump Administration, to move ideas forward. And
thats sort of taken them out of the mainstream of think tanks that traditionally can work together on issues. So you don’t tend to see Heritage
scholars so frequently now in these sorts of broader activities or projects
or convenings where you’ll get a whole range of scholars [on the] left and
right. They don’t tend to be there anymore.20
Thus, it seems that Heritage – responding to political reality and incentives for
certain types of research – has operated in such a way that it can reasonably be
described as an informal affiliate of the Republican Party, or a member of the Republican extended party network. Other organizations – even more moderate ones –
have earned similar partisan reputations. One conservative respondent, reflecting on
perceptions of research he conducted at Heritage (his former employer) as opposed
to Brookings (his current employer), noted:
When people think of Brookings... [they] think of Brookings as a left wing
organization. Therefore, if I write something at Brookings a lot of people
on the left read what I write. If I wrote the identical document from the
Heritage Foundation, or even maybe from the American Enterprise Institute, they would discount it. They don’t read it [when I’m at Heritage],
but they’ll read what I write if it’s [from] Brookings... I’m making the
same arguments and actually the language I’m using isn’t that different
than what I would [use] at Heritage. But because I work at the Brookings
Institution, people will read it and say it’s really interesting and assume
it’s kind of middle of the road when it’s not really.21
In an era defined by partisan polarization, then, policy practitioners tend to view
groups in polarized terms. The research that groups conduct seems to feed into perceptions of these groups as affiliates of or ‘leaners’ towards a particular partisan view,
and these reputations condition the influence of this research on various audiences.
20
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Still, some organizations seem to more actively promote their partisan reputations.
The selection of Jim DeMint – a former Republican Senator and Tea Party leader –
as the head of Heritage was cited by several interview subjects as both a cause and
effect of Heritage’s long-term reputation as a Republican ally. One former Heritage
staffer, reflecting on the appointment, recalled that “DeMint changed how [Heritage]
functioned. It’s not expert-heavy anymore. Under DeMint, he wanted the think tank
to take a political position and ask the policy people to find out how to support it. His
vision was different.”22 The title of one 2014 New York Times article simply stated
that there was, “In the DeMint Era at Heritage, A Shift From Policy to Politics.”
Other indicators of Heritage’s alignment with the Republican Party frequently
arose in interviews. As noted previously, one Heritage researcher said that he had
never been asked to visit a Democratic member’s office to discuss policy. The same
interview subject described how, in general, think tanks that invest in a particular
party as an influence strategy alter their behavior in more subtle ways. He stated:
I think it’s generally true that if you rely on one party for influence, you
would be foolish to disregard or be cavalier with the working relationship with that party. It would be very foolish to not take into consideration maintaining that working relationship and maintaining good dialogue.
And will that mean in many cases being less critical than you might be
otherwise? Yeah, definitely, but maintaining that working relationship is
so pivotal. If you lose that, if you’re too harsh, you closed the door to
your influence entirely.23
In other words, influence and access are the coin of the realm for outside groups
like Heritage, and efforts to maintain a working relationship with members of their
22
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preferred party often take priority. Another Heritage researcher described “longstanding relationships” with Republican actors and the “institutional reputation” of
Heritage as a trusted Republican ally as important components of the organization’s
influence. Maintaining these connections and reputation “doesn’t necessarily mean
you’re changing the policies,” she noted, “just that you’re putting emphasis on a
certain aspect of that policy change.”24
Importantly – and perhaps worryingly – this investment in the success of the Republican Party seems to pay dividends for the Heritage Foundation, enhancing its
influence over policy outcomes when Republicans control government. As the introductory quote to this chapter noted, the Heritage Foundation proudly proclaimed its
influence over the Trump Administration in its 2017 annual report, citing a 64 percent policy success rate. Similarly, both interview subjects at the Heritage Foundation
pointed to the direct impact of Heritage reports – for example, their Blueprint for
Reorganization and various tax reform reports – on Republican priorities in the 115th
Congress. This influence was enabled by two factors, according to one researcher:
One [reason was] this administration didn’t have much policy depth. So
when they won the election, they were sort of like, “Now what do we do?”
And that’s where Heritage comes in. We’re like, “We work on these issues
year round, so we’ll stand by your side and help guide that administration.” [And secondly,] we also had a team dedicated to staffing the new
administration. They were collecting resumes in these big binders, basically assembling hundreds of recommendations for conservatives all across
the country that would be available to be hired by the administration and
to be appointed for administration positions. And I think thirty of my
colleagues actually went and worked... for the administration or at least
helped during the transition... And so we actually had people power, we
had manpower in the White House and in the executive agencies where
24
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it was relevant. And then we also had long-standing relationships with
many of the Presidents appointees that Heritage had built over many
years. And I think that’s where the institutional reputation really comes
in and is so important... We were aware of what they were trying to do
and then we would produce a product specifically for them. [We would]
talk to them about our proposals, get more insights into what they were
trying to accomplish so we can tailor our proposals... in terms of what
they’re trying to accomplish.25
In this quote, we see the importance that a lack of “policy depth” amongst politicians plays in enhancing the influence of outside groups in policymaking. Perhaps
more importantly, though, we also see the importance of thick social ties in determining which groups have access and influence over largely uninformed politicians.
Organizations and ideas do not randomly fill the vacuum of policy ignorance, as the
garbage can model of choice predicts, but rather influence is conditional on on factors
like “long-standing relationships” with people in positions of power and “institutional
reputation[s]” for particular types of research. The fact that Heritage seems to tailor
products to particular policymakers again hints at their attempts to directly influence
debates (and may serve as an indictment against the objectivity of Heritage research).
In sum, then, it seems that the Heritage Foundation – and others like it – can
actually benefit by developing a reputation as a trusted ally of a particular political
party. Such organizations – operating as ‘realists’ within a political environment defined by partisan polarization – are responding to formal party members’ demands
for politically valuable research.26 The theory tested here suggests that these in25
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It is worth mentioning that the causal relationship between research producing organizations
and partisan polarization is a messy one. These “realists” might not only be reacting to polarization
but also driving it, making them active participants rather than passive reactionaries. And, in fact,
many of these organizations are funded by individuals and groups – the Koch network is the most
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centives should, to varying degrees, structure the research and advocacy efforts of
outside groups. The Heritage Foundation may be an extreme example of this tendency, but overall outside organizations exist in a similar political space which has
surely impacted their behavior. Before turning to a discussion of the impact of partisan polarization on the universe of policy actors, however, it is important to note
that there is a counterbalancing incentive – institutional credibility – that might place
limits on the extent to which groups can act as partisan affiliates. Unfortunately, it
seems that credibility has become less important – relative to partisan loyalty – in
determining which groups are most influential in the policy process.

2.1.3

Constraints on Politicized Information

The tradeoff between research credibility and partisan fit highlights the fact that
members of Congress desire useful information that furthers their goals. In a pluralistic political environment – especially one with polarized parties – suspect research has
limited value because it will certainly be challenged by opponents. As one interview
subject noted:
[If] I was a lawmaker and somebody comes in from the oil industry, what
are they going to tell me...? They’re going to talk about the benefits
of oil. Sure, I’ll listen. And then I might say, “Hey, what are some of
the downsides of what you’re saying?” And the probabilities are good
lobbyists will also tell you straightforwardly that here’s the problem with
it. If they don’t my response is, “Listen, I have environmental groups
waiting to see me next. So somebody will tell me outside. So it’s in your
interest.” The coin of the realm for good lobbyists is also to be truthful
and honest with the staff and the members because if their credibility
is lost... another member’s [going to] stand on the floor and say, “Hey,

notorious example – who are also selecting extreme candidates, financing partisan issue campaigns,
and generally contributing to increased partisan polarization.
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you’re full of baloney, here’s the real information, CRS said this or GAO
said this.”27
Or, as another subject stated:
The consequences, long-term, for you giving them something not defensible are very great or could be very great... You have to do something
impactful... [but] also in the long-term you cant make mistakes because
your impact will diminish, for obvious reasons.28
Thus, outside groups must balance their preferences – and the goals of their preferred party – with their long-term reputation as a credible policy research institution.
Groups that can occupy the space between partisan goals and credibility should be
in a privileged position to influence public policy. In many instances this balance
is achieved by producing objective, empirical research built on assumptions that fit
with a particular ideological or partisan objective. One researcher described this dynamic, noting that “you have to be credible [but]... you can massage the numbers any
number of different ways by the assumptions you’ve used. But they’re not infinitely
malleable and you have to be reasonable to some extent, work within the realm of
the possible, that’s [a] constraint.”29 In this way, groups pushing for disparate partisan goals can lay credible claim to reason and objectivity while also advancing a
particular viewpoint.
Because party members lack the time or expertise to fully understand these assumptions, they can reference an institution’s credibility while also utilizing their
research in quite partisan ways. For this reason, we often see formal party members
27

Interview with Congressional Research Service Senior Specialist. June 26th, 2018. Washington,
D.C.
28

Interview with Heritage Foundation Policy Research. July 13th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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Interview with Heritage Foundation Policy Research. July 13th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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arguing entirely different points and coming to entirely different conclusion than their
opponents, with these arguments and conclusions rooted in ostensibly credible policy research. One interview subject compared this phenomenon to scholarly debates
rooted in theoretical or methodological disagreements. He said:
Like in academia..., the assumptions you build into a model can lead you
to very different conclusions even with the same data underlying [them].
So in a way no ones wrong, its just a matter of how that influence[s]
the political process or the discourse. Well it does make it so people
talk past each other, but I dont think thats the fault of the think tanks.
Theyre making the assumptions that they think are most descriptive of
the phenomenon or theyre making the assumptions that they think are
most relevant or theyre using the data that they think is most relevant.
So in a way that can only take you so far, and its really incumbent upon
the practitioners to come in, look at the data, and see who they agree
with, see whose assumptions they agree with. And its not really the think
tanks job to look at the range of think tanks and adopt a median set of
assumptions. Thats crazy. So its the practitioners job to do that work
on the back end. But too often that doesn’t happen. So in a way, its
natural that people start to talk past each other... There are several sets
of assumptions that are defensible depending on what you think is most
important about a phenomenon. Thats a source of polarization thats
reflective of a reality, its not... artificial.30
Of course, some assumptions – methodological or otherwise – are more defensible
than others, but groups that frequently engage with a particular party work to expand
the realm of the credible to enable advocacy for a particular viewpoint. This is not
the only option faced by outside groups – many maintain their credibility by keeping
their distance from partisan politics and conducting solid research – but it seems to
be an increasingly attractive and influential strategy in the modern era.
30

Interview with Heritage Foundation Policy Research. July 13th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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2.1.4

Informational Supply and Demand

To summarize the argument presented in this section, it seems clear that members
of Congress require outside information to develop policies and policy arguments. In
other words, they demand policy research and ideas. At the same time, as the two
parties pull farther and farther apart on a range of issues, members are unlikely to
seek the ‘best’ research available. Rather, they should seek out information that furthers their partisan goals while also providing credible justifications for their stances.
Groups that can thread this needle – providing information that is useful, in a partisan sense, and defensible, in an academic (or at least political) sense – should be in
a privileged position to influence the agenda of their preferred party. Thus, it seems
likely that the supply of policy research has been altered by the increased partisan
polarization in Congress. As a result, one might ask: How has increased partisan
polarization impacted the broader universe of policy research institutions?

2.2

The Changing Organizational Landscape
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that groups who seek

to influence the policy process face two competing incentives. On the one hand,
information is useful – and thus influential – only to the degree that it is viewed as
credible by a sufficient number of interested actors. Thus, outside groups have an
incentive to provide nuanced and well-supported analyses in order to maintain their
reputation as important and trustworthy policy actors. This can be described as the
“enlightened” or Progressive model of policy research, where groups aim to produce
the best available evidence for a given policy topic. While these organizations might
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shift debates through agenda setting and framing – and while it is generally true
that many of these groups have adopted more aggressive marketing strategies in the
modern era – their policy research is generally viewed as even-handed by other policy
researchers.
On the other hand, many decision-makers desire information that supports their
preexisting beliefs and partisan goals, and they appear to use organizational reputations – of partisan loyalty, ideology, and the like – as a heuristic when interpreting
outside information. Their perception of which organizations are credible might also
be colored by their particular beliefs and preferences. Thus, some organizations might
perceive an incentive to provide information and research that supports commonly
shared partisan goals, perhaps at the expense of their long-term credibility in the
broader policymaking realm. This is not to say that credibility is always achieved at
the expense of partisan loyalty, but only that groups who consistently provide useful
information for a particular party might earn reputations – often rightly deserved
– as biased actors. This model of research production is more akin to an advocacy
strategy, where groups aim to produce the most effective arguments to further their
particular partisan or ideological preferences.
Given these competing incentives, it is logical that the wide range of outside
groups have pursued alternative strategies in the contemporary political environment. Indeed, interview subjects described several emergent ideal type organizations
and suggested that alternative organizational strategies, missions, and characteristics correspond to these group types. One subject described these broader changes

67

utilizing a market metaphor similar to the one employed here, noting that changing
demand for research has altered the universe of research producers. He stated:
In general, if you look across the world of think tanks in Washington, they
are all... evolving in very deep and fundamental ways and new institutions
are cropping up. The “Old Guard” - if you think of the Old Guard
being [the] American Enterprise Institute, Brookings [Institution], Urban
[Institute], Council on Foreign Relations - the Old Guard is for most part
pulling back from policy and less relevant than they used to be. And a
New Guard has cropped up, which is intensely more political. They are
specifically designed to work with the political processes and parties, not
always on a partisan basis, but definitely on a political advocacy basis.
And they had to do that in part to be consistent with the evolution of
political processes... away from the center to the extremes. Well, the
market for think tank activity followed that movement and in some cases,
once they saw where the movement was going, [they] went to lead it...
which is the natural entrepreneurial to do. What Heritage was doing was
part of this process of all think tanks changing the way they operate, either
become more ivory tower-ish or more political and less [about] simply
writing good policy papers to try to advance ideas.31
Other subjects similarly differentiated between groups with more academic or more
political orientations, with many noting that groups engaging in direct advocacy
efforts were becoming both increasingly numerous and influential. As a researcher at
the Bipartisan Policy Center noted:
I do think that there’s probably a move [toward] all think tanks having
a little more [of a] quick and dirty explanation for things. I think there
was always a little bit of that... [but] they probably do more of it... The
new think tanks... will go advise staff and members of Congress on what
to do this second rather than [in] the long run.32
When contrasted with such politically-minded organizations, the concept of “Old
Guard” groups – a term which subjects often paired with adjectives like “objective”,
“academic”, and “ivory tower-ish” – carries with it a certain normative affinity for
31
Interview with US Chamber of Commerce Senior Researcher. June 25th, 2018. Washington,
D.C.
32

Interview with Bipartisan Policy Center Policy Researcher. July 29th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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organizations that embody the Progressive ideal of rational inquiry and dispassionate
debate. Such views are likely exaggerated – most Brookings scholars, for example,
would likely agree that they are passionate about particular policy problems and have
strongly held beliefs about correct solutions – but nearly every subject noted that Old
Guard groups were qualitatively different than newer, more political organizations.
Furthermore, Old Guard groups generally place a greater emphasis on concepts like
“objectivity” and “independence” in their reports, while newer organizations are far
more upfront about their particular biases. For example, the Urban Institute’s mission statement describes it as “the trusted source for unbiased, authoritative insights”
and “a nonprofit research organization that believes decisions shaped by facts, rather
than ideology, have the power to improve public policy and practice.” The Heritage Foundation’s mission statement, in comparison, begins with a direct statement
of the impact of ideology on their research, writing that “The mission of The Heritage Foundation is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on
the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional
American values, and a strong national defense.”
In describing the difference between these types of organizations, subjects typically made a distinction between academically-oriented organizations focused on the
“long term evolution of ideas” and more activist institutions seeking political “impact”, often at the expense of nuanced research.33 In the aggregate, interview subjects
33

It is worth noting that Stone (1996) distinguishes between ‘old guard’ and ‘new partisan’ think
tanks in much the same way as my interview subjects. She writes that “The ‘old guard’ are a
more academic and non-political tradition of think-tank, while the ‘new partisans’ are increasingly
entrepreneurial and likely to be more specialised, more directly policy focused and partisan in their
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most often described the Brookings Institution, Urban Institute, Cato Institute, and
American Enterprise Institute as Old Guard academics, while overwhelmingly associating New Guard political groups with the Heritage Foundation, Center for American
Progress (CAP), and – to a lesser extent – the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC).
However, as these fairly eclectic groupings reveal, the simple distinction between
Old Guard and New Guard institutions obscures another important difference in the
universe of policy research organizations. Certain groups – in both camps – were
described as ideological or partisan organizations (e.g. AEI or CAP), while others – again spanning the Old/New Guard distinction – were characterized as more
access-oriented or non-partisan (e.g. Brookings or BPC). Thus, it seems that the Old
Guard/New Guard dichotomy is not synonymous with the credible/partisan distinction outlined in the previous section. More academically-minded groups cannot be
assumed to be non-ideological, and groups engaged in more direct political advocacy
are not necessarily partisan in these efforts.
For this reason, it is useful to distinguish modern research producing organizations
according to two dimensions. Each dimension should be thought of in spatial terms,
where groups in the same quadrant might vary in their intensity and have likely
shifted over time. Table 2.1 outlines these two dimensions and provides descriptions
and examples of the types of organizations that occupy each quadrant. The first
spectrum concerns the extent to which an organization involves itself in the day-today practice of politics. At one extreme are groups that are very academic in their

research and analysis” (18). As I note below, however, the dichotomy employed by both my subjects
and Stone obscures important differences found at research producing institutions.
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Access-Oriented/
Partisan
Academic
Orientation
(Indirect Engagement)

Non-

Ideological/Partisan

Moderate-Academic

Partisan-Academic

More centrist, Old Guard
think tanks

Old Guard think tanks with
ideological or partisan preferences

Examples:

Brookings Institution, Urban
Institute

American Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute

Political
Orientation
(Direct Engagement)

Moderate-Political

Partisan-Political

Traditional interest groups
and “Problem-Solver” think
tanks

Many newer think tanks
(with advocacy arms) and
ideological interest groups

AARP,
Center

Heritage Foundation, Center
for American Progress, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, Chamber of Commerce, National Rifle Association

Examples:

Bipartisan

Policy

Table 2.1: Typology of research producing interest groups and think tanks.
Organizations differ according to their level of a) direct engagement with
politics and b) ideological or partisan preferences.

approach to policy research, abstaining from direct attempts to influence politics
or the policy process. At the other extreme are groups that have very political
orientations, directly engaging in electoral politics and the policy process in an effort
to influence political outcomes. As I explore below, there has been a general trend in
which all groups have become more direct in their advocacy and marketing strategies,
though there are still major differences between more academic and more political
organizations.
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The second dimension along which groups differ concerns the degree to which
they display preferences for a particular ideology or political party. This dimension
ranges from access-oriented and non-partisan organizations – who often produce more
moderate, non-ideological research – to more ideological organizations (whose research
consistently supports a particular policy viewpoint which may overlap considerably
with a single political party) and even some explicitly partisan organizations (who
may be willing to alter their agenda or even research to fit with party preferences).
Importantly, ideologically motivated and partisan organizations appear to be growing
in both number and influence. Of the domestic policy think tanks listed amongst the
top 25 in either the 2008 or 2017 Think Tank Index Report, more than 70 percent
have clearly identifiable ideologies, and two – the Heritage Foundation and Center
for American Progress – were described by respondents are having strong partisan
preferences (see Table 2.2) (McGann, 2017). And, the influence of these two partisan
organizations increased – substantially, in the case of CAP – over the nine year period.

2.2.1

Academic and Indirect Strategies

The top row of Table 2.1 provides several examples of organizations that are closer
to academics in their approach to policy research. This description is not necessarily
normative, but it does indicate that groups in this vein are significantly less involved,
compared with other organizations, in efforts to directly impact the political process.
Rather, these institutions conduct research in an effort to inform political debates,
without taking the additional step of forcefully advocating for the acceptance of their
ideas by those in positions of power (though individual scholars may engage in such
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Think Tank

Ideology

2008 Ranking

2017 Ranking

Trend

Brookings Institution

Slightly Liberal

1

1

–

Heritage Foundation

Strongly
servative

5

4

Ò

Center for American Progress

Strongly Liberal

17

7

Ò

Cato Institute

Conservative

9

10

Ó

Urban Institute

Centrist

20

11

Ò

National Bureau of Economic
Research

Centrist

14

12

Ò

American Enterprise Institute

Conservative

8

14

Ó

Resources for the Future

Liberal

24

22

Ò

Manhattan Institute

Strongly
servative

23

29

Ó

Mercatus Center

Conservative

30

39

Ó

New America

Centrist

22

43

Ó

Con-

Con-

Table 2.2: Top US think tanks, focused primarily on domestic policy, according to the
University of Pennsylvania’s 2008 and 2017 Think Tank Index Reports. The report
ranks think tanks according to journalist and scholar ratings of influence and importance. Think tank ideologies are based off of interview subjects’ own perceptions as
well as the stated mission of the organization. The trend of an organization indicates
whether its ranking on the list has increased or decreased over the period and the
intensity of the change.

self-promotion). For example, the Brookings Institution was described by one respondent as “a long way from Capitol Hill” – both physically and symbolically –
and “much more like a university setting” where ideas are investigated, debated, and
developed.34 The group’s mission statement describes its research as “rooted in openminded inquiry” and notes that “the Institution does not take positions on issues” as
part of its “commitment to... the individual independence of its scholars.” The Cato
34

Interview with Brookings Institution Senior Fellow. July 5th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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Institute – despite having a libertarian perspective – is another example of an academic, indirectly engaged organization. A respondent described the role of the Cato
Institute as helping to address the fact that policymakers are often “poorly informed
and there’s stuff out there that people don’t even know about that’s appeared in a
journal somewhere that’s really important, [that] really has implications.”35 Organizations in this category attempt to rectify these limitations, disseminating academic
research to a broader audience.
One key characteristic of organizations in the indirect mold is that they are almost
exclusively think tanks. Indeed, because interest groups are founded around the
express purpose of directly influencing politics, one could say that all academic (i.e.
non-political) research centers are think tanks, though not all think tanks have an
indirect or academic orientation. Furthermore, the inclusion of a think tank in the
academic category does not mean that they are non-ideological or non-partisan. In
fact, both the American Enterprise and Cato Institutes were described by respondents
as Old Guard academic as well as ideologically driven. (The Cato mission statement
acknowledges this odd combination, noting that the organization is “dedicated to the
principles of individual liberty, limited government, free markets, and peace” – an
inherently ideological standpoint – at the same time that “its scholars and analysts
conduct independent, nonpartisan research on a wide range of policy issues.”) The
key factor that unites places like Brookings and the Urban Institute with AEI and
Cato is the fact that, even if they possess ideological viewpoints, they do not engage in
35

Interview with Cato Institute executive. June 28th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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significant efforts to advance these perspectives beyond traditional think tank research
functions.
Indeed, while researchers at these organizations often testify before Congress and
do, in fact, inform policy debates, they do not engage in the types of direct advocacy
and promotion that characterize other actors. In fact, some academically-oriented
institutions refrain from directly engaging in political debates even at the expense of
their ability to inform policy designs and outcomes. A former Cato Institute employee
recalled such an occasion, noting:
I remember once during [the] McCain-Feingold [debate]... somebody in
Congress called someone at Cato. I learned that they wanted me to come
to the office and help to design some poison pills about a vote that was
upcoming and the decision was [made] not to do that. It was just getting
too involved with politics.36
Several other interview subjects brought up a similar, canonical story in the think
tank world in which the American Enterprise Institute waited to publish a relevant
policy report because Congress was voting on a similar issue. The reason, as the story
goes, was that AEI “didn’t want to prejudice the outcome” of the Congressional vote37
– a position that is almost unthinkable in the modern era, when many organizations
publish specialized reports aimed at impacting specific votes.
Rather than through direct advocacy, the impact of indirect organizations is often felt more subtly. At the Cato Institute, for example, an executive described the
organization’s influence as “kind of indirect..., just slow, stead[y]” – the role of the
think tank, as he saw it, boiled down to “moving debates in the direction of freedom
36

Interview with Institute for Free Speech executive. June 28th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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Interview with Bipartisan Policy Center Policy Researcher. July 29th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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even though you’re not getting too many specific... Cato proposals passed.”38 Still,
this focus on the long-term evolution of ideas has not fully insulated academic organizations from the realities of politics. In a world where influence is often measured by
social media engagements and newspaper op-eds, even academically-oriented groups
have become increasingly public-facing. Still, they have not paired these strategies
with direct efforts to lobby and influence government, and so they do not employ the
kind of all encompassing advocacy strategy found at more political organizations.

2.2.2

Direct Political Activism

This kind of indirect advocacy can be contrasted with organizations that possess
more of a political orientation and directly engage in political processes. In this category we find both interest groups – including traditional, access-oriented groups like
AARP as well as ideologically-driven groups like the American Conservative Union
– and think tanks. Importantly, most think tanks in this grouping can be characterized as strongly ideological or partisan; it seems that the decision to directly engage
with politics goes hand-in-hand with the decision to pursue an ideological or partisan
agenda. A notable exception to this rule is seen in the Bipartisan Policy Center,
an organization that can be described as a “Problem-Solver” think tank aimed at
working within politics to reduce polarization and improve governance. As I note
below, however, even access-oriented interest groups and problem-solver think tanks
have – in their efforts to impact political outcomes – been subjected to the influence
of polarized politics.
38
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The concept of direct engagement with politics refers to traditional interest group
strategies such as base mobilization, candidate support, policy advocacy, and lobbying. Different types of interest groups place different emphases on various strategies,
with mass-based organizations most likely to engage in “outsider” electoral tactics.
For example, a director at the National Rifle Association (NRA) noted that, in attempting to influence policy outcomes:
The best thing we can do is rely on what our strongest asset is... And that
is to make sure that our grassroots - our members and supporters - are
constantly communicating to their elected officials, and they’re constantly
communicating to candidates to office, and they’re constantly communicating with their neighbors and friends about why it is that we believe
gun control will not achieve the goals that we all seek.39
Still, groups like the NRA rely on or engage in policy research in order to justify their
stances and bolster their arguments with lawmakers. As the same NRA respondent
remarked:
Policy research does play a role in my job..., to kind of validate why we
believe our arguments are most sound and our policy positions are most
sound... I rely almost exclusively on outside research and data to kind
of provide the statistical and academic backing of the philosophical point
that I make, to show why we believe our positions are superior to those
of our opponents.
Thus, for some direct engagement organizations, policy research plays a supporting
role in their efforts to impact political outcomes. For other interest groups – especially
traditional business interests and others without large membership bases – policy
research is a potent tool through which to directly impact politics. As one in-house
lobbyist at a large insurance company stated simply, policy research “is the most
important thing because I can’t do my job if I’m not delivering facts or fact-based
39

Interview with National Rifle Association Director. July 14th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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analysis to people up on the Hill.”40 Policy research, then, is in many ways weaponized
by direct engagement organizations in order to further political goals.
Most think tanks in this vein similarly orient their direct influence efforts around
their research production. As one respondent suggested, think tanks like Heritage
emphasize “the objective of working through the political process... to get policy
changes and not just doing research. The research [is] designed to build a case, to
make the argument for policy change.”41 This focus is borne out in the Heritage
mission, which states that the organization aims to both “formulate” and “promote”
conservative policies (emphasis added). Unlike academic organizations, however, politically engaged think tanks pair scholarly research with the kinds of direct advocacy
efforts that were previously reserved for interest groups. The Center for American
Progress, for example, notes that its approach is not only to “develop new policy
ideas” but also to “challenge the media to cover the issues that truly matter, and
shape the national debate... [b]y employing an extensive communications and outreach effort that we adapt to a rapidly changing media landscape.”
Think tanks in this category frequently have affiliated 501(c)4 organizations – often called “action funds” – that allow groups to skirt the lobbying limits placed on
501(c)3’s and contribute campaign funds through associated Super PACs. Heritage
Action for America, for instance, was created in 2010 out of a desire to “be able to
spend money to push legislation we think the country needs without the obstacles
40
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faced by a nonprofit like the Heritage Foundation” (Fuelner and Needham, 2010). Heritage Action raised roughly $11.5 million in contributions in 2016, using this money
to advertise Heritage research and influence, identify “key votes” and grade members
on their stances, and engage in direct lobbying efforts to influence policy outcomes.42
The Center for American Progress Action Fund – imitating and perhaps improving
upon the activist Heritage model – received $7.6 million in grants and contributions
in 2016 despite the fact that the CAP think tank has a much smaller overall budget
than Heritage.
These action funds and, to the degree that they are allowed, think tanks themselves engage in activities and strategies quite similar to those employed by traditional
interest groups. A researcher at the Heritage Foundation, asked to reflect on differences between Heritage and the Brookings Institution, listed a wide range of direct
action strategies that distinguished her employer. The main difference, she noted,
is that direct advocacy is institutionalized at the Heritage Foundation: while “there
might be a few folks at Brookings who take it upon themselves to get hands-on, at
Heritage it really is a culture.”43 This hands-on approach revolves around establishing and encouraging a revolving door between Heritage and government institutions
(“because that access is valuable and also, having that institutional knowledge..., that
is highly prized”); training the next generation of policy practitioners (“it allows us
to instill in them our conservative ideas and intellectual leanings and... build long42

It is worth noting that the Heritage Foundation think tank raised $88.8 million – significantly
more than Heritage Action – in 2016.
43

Interview with Heritage Foundation Policy Researcher. July 9th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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term relationships”); and socializing with those in positions of power (“to strengthen
bonds... and give members an alternative to just the Speaker’s Office in Congress
where they usually get most of their leadership”). ‘Thick’ individual and institutional ties within the EPN, then, seem to be important avenues of influence in the
policy process.
Direct action think tanks also seem to care much more about how their research
and ideas are received, not only by members of Congress but also by the general
public. Much like the NRA subject, this Heritage scholar described efforts to mobilize
popular support for conservative ideas and attempts to use this support – alongside
their research – to influence politicians:
I’ve noticed that not just our organization but other organizations as well
have become much more concerned with winning over hearts and minds.
So not just talking to the lawmakers and providing technical guidance,
but also being a bit more effective in a public-facing way. And I think
in many ways it has to do with trying to organize the grassroots to get
support from the bottom up for policies.44
At Heritage, these tactics even include the adoption of marketing strategies to further
particular viewpoints, revealing a keen focus on the overall political influence of their
research:
What we try to do [at Heritage] is have the best research that’s accurate,
factual, timely and relevant, but also marketed in a digestible way. So we
put a lot of resources into message testing. We have a group here dedicated
to American perceptions... where we do polls and focus groups. We work
with organizations that specialize in this to get key insights into what
the American people think about certain issues and how they respond
to certain words and phrases so that we can better tailor our research
in a way that is going to be more attractive, will be better received and
therefore we can be more impactful.45
44
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In general, modern research producing institutions are much more concerned with
media ‘hits’ and other quantitative indicators of influence. This can be seen in the
fact that both the Heritage Foundation and Brookings Institution – as well as other
organizations – publish statistics on social media followers, newsletter subscribers,
file downloads, and website visits in their annual reports. These efforts are aimed
at demonstrating impact to donors, lawmakers, and the general public. And, certain
think tanks have recognized that influence and impact can be furthered through direct
engagement with the political system. For this reason, it is important to remember
that most organizations have shifted closer to the political end of the spectrum,
adopting somewhat more direct strategies to market their research. The trajectories
of various organizations, however, differ substantially, with some groups employing
aggressive advocacy strategies that are typically not found at more academic institutions.
As a final note on direct action groups, it is once again true that politically-minded
organizations can be either access-oriented and non-partisan or more ideological and
partisan. Traditional interest groups still tend to seek access (and thus influence) in
order to further the particularistic goals of their members. Increasing partisan polarization has also resulted in a distinct breed of direct action groups focused specifically
on encouraging bipartisanship, such as the Bipartisan Policy and Niskanen Centers.
On the other hand, some think tanks and interest groups – mostly founded within
the last several decades – possess strong ideological and/or partisan preferences and
directly engage with partisan politics to further them (e.g. Heritage, CAP, and the
NRA). In fact, it seems that there is a tendency for all direct action groups to “play”
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the game of partisan politics. This is because the decision to engage with politics necessarily means that groups engage with polarized politics, and so we often see them
becoming more partisan in their efforts over time. The AARP, for instance, faced
strong criticism from the right for its support of the Affordable Care Act, and as a
result conservative Republicans have often turned from the organization in favor of
several smaller conservative groups representing the retired. Even those organizations
that have strongly resisted polarization still must work through a process defined by
two distinct political parties. As a researcher at the Bipartisan Policy Center stated:
Were not asking [politicians] to stop being Republicans or Democrats,
were just asking them to sort of hammer it out... [W]e are actually seeking
out what a real Republican and a real Democrat can do, so thats different
than some other places... It can mean horse trading, it could mean meeting
in the middle... That, in a way I think, is a value of being bipartisan
rather than, “Hey, everybody agrees that the thing you should do is this.”
I mean, theres no credibility.46
Unfortunately, as this same respondent noted, the spaces in which Republicans and
Democrats might agree have shrunk over time, making bipartisan efforts increasingly
difficult and, conversely, encouraging further partisanship and division in the policy
process.

2.2.3

Access and Non-Partisan Strategies

Throughout the previous sections I have frequently mentioned the fact that influence strategies are not predictably related to the level of partisanship at research
institutions. Both academic and political organizations, for example, produce access46
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oriented or non-partisan research. One subject described this orientation as practical
rather than ideological:
We are wedded to the practical and that usually involves compromise,
which is a dirty word because compromise is antithetical to raising large
sums of money, right? So institutions like the Chamber and many think
tanks - the old line, old guard think tanks, oftentimes the unions - have
fairly practical concerns. They have political [aspects] to them obviously
because we live in a political world, it’s policy, but... thats a very different
market process.47
These more practical groups seek to produce research that will inform debates and
shift policy – often at the margins – towards their preferences. In the case of interest
groups, this could be research that furthers particular material interests, though these
interests do not entirely overlap with the goals of a particular party or ideology. In the
case of non-partisan think tanks, their research may similarly have a “perspective”
that is not consistently tied to a single party. For example, one lobbyist described his
efforts as fairly bipartisan:
I don’t take party positions except in the sense that the company itself
[has a position]. And right now the way [our PAC works] is we give about
60/40, 60 percent to Republicans, 40 percent to Democrats. Should ratios
or control change, we change... Its really just a reflection of the balance
of power... And I would say, based on my familiarity with other lobbyists,
that... a lot of companies do the same thing.48
But, to reiterate, even non-partisan groups must be cognizant of partisan polarization, the dominant force in contemporary politics. It would be reasonable to say that
access-oriented and non-partisan organizations have biases that arise independent of
– or predate – the two parties’ contemporary, polarized policy positions. However, a
47
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D.C.
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Interview with New York Life Lobbyist. June 26th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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key implication of partisan polarization is that more internally coherent party positions make ideologically consistent groups appear more partisan even if they have not
changed their positions. Thus, when surveying the universe of policy research organizations, many appear to be more partisan than they once were. The cases of AARP
and the Chamber of Commerce – seen by many as Democratic and Republican, respectively – highlight this point. Even if these groups have not actually become more
partisan, many decision-makers behave as if this were true, and their preferences now
align fairly consistently with a single political party.49
For many non-partisan groups, the impact of polarization often arises subtly, reflecting these changing perceptions amongst those in positions of power. One subject
described how his background in Republican politics was a reputation that follows
him to this day, impacting his ability to convince Democratic members. In fact,
he noted that most lobbying operations alter their strategies to accommodate the
partisan biases of members of Congress, stating:
I’m a Republican, or at least that’s where I came from, my background
being on the Hill. I was not hired to be a Republican... but like a lot
of companies, we divvy up responsibilities when it comes to interacting
with members of Congress or the administration along party lines. So...
it’s more infrequent that I engage with Democrats... What differentiates
maybe what I do from somebody who worked at say a think tank that’s
affiliated with a particular ideology [is] I still have to go out and lobby
[Democrat] Richie Neal, I gotta work with Ron Kind from Wisconsin and
I gotta go up and deal with Ron Wyden from Oregon... [But] because

49
The alignment of preferences with a single political party has even moved some previously accessoriented groups from the non-partisan category to the partisan category. This is the case for the
Chamber, which has contributed considerably more to Republican candidates in recent years. For
this reason, I consider the Chamber to be a Partisan-Political group.
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I’ve channeled my activities more toward [Republicans] Ill end up having
better relationships.50,51
Thus, access-oriented or non-partisan groups recognize that partisan polarization impacts their influence, but they are unwilling to invest in a particular party in the
way that other organizations might. Such a strategy would certainly subject their
influence to the ups and downs of partisan politics. Or, as one respondent noted, they
“operate like we need friends on both sides and we need to find people to work with
because we’re going to be here long after they’re gone.”52 At the same time, however,
respondents recognized that a non-partisan strategy “makes it harder to find a way
to be effective” in the modern era.53 As such, an increasing number of organizations
appear to be pursuing influence strategies based in partisan politics.

2.2.4

Ideological and Partisan Strategies

Because of changing demands for policy research in Congress, it seems that more
and more think tanks and interest groups have adopted partisan research and influence strategies. In some cases this might mean that academically oriented think tanks
possess an ideological agenda that aligns most closely with a single party. Groups like
the Cato Institute and the American Enterprise Institute, for example, have fairly
consistent conservative and libertarian perspectives, respectively. At both of these
50
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This quote also provides further evidence that members of Congress want information for reasons
other than its informative value. Rather, social trust is an incredibly important conditioning factor
in the exchange of information.
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organizations, their right-leaning ideologies actually predate the modern era of partisan polarization, and they appear to be relatively consistent in their approach to
policy research. At the same time, the polarization of the two parties means that
groups with more conservative ideologies are increasingly aligned with the goals of
the Republican Party. Liberal actors, in much the same way, now closely align with
the Democrats. This process is in many ways similar to the concept of “partisan
sorting” (e.g. Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, 2005) – while neither Cato nor AEI appear
to be growing more ideologically extreme in their views, at least in comparison to the
two parties, their ideas are now best reflected in the agenda of the Republican Party,
and this fact has become increasingly clear as its distance from the Democratic Party
grows.
Thus, one respondent remarked that certain groups can predictably associate with
a single party yet still produce credible research, as their partisan alignment is somewhat incidental to their overall ideological perspective. He said:
[There are] a lot more groups that are affiliated with the Democratic
Party [or] the Republican Party, and it’s not that... the research is [not]
highly competent... But that means you’ve got a point of view, right?
That’s what they’re there for and so they share that point of view with
lawmakers, and lawmakers know that as well.54
On the other hand, groups in the mold of the Heritage Foundation, CAP, and
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities can be considered partisan affiliates,
meaning that they purposefully align with a particular party because they see it as
the best avenue for influence. Rather than sorting, these organizations seem closer to
54
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active participants in the process of polarization. To again quote a US Chamber of
Commerce researcher, such organizations “saw where [politics] was going [and] they
went to lead it.”55 Or, as another respondent noted:
Theres a much, much wider array of institutions of big sizes and a lot of
them do line up pretty closely to one party one way or the other. And I do
think that’s what the pressure is now... When you look at something like
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, for example, they are heavily
just seen by the Democratic Party, almost like the Democratic think tank.
Technically that’s not true, it’s not [part of] the party, but almost everybody there... would align with the Democratic Party enthusiastically and
see that it was really the only vehicle to get ideas developed. I think the
pressure is on an organization to become even more aligned in a party
way right now.56
Groups in this mold have often adopted new strategies to thrive in an era of
polarization. As one subject stated, partisan groups are “changing the way they
operate [and] becoming more political and less [about] simply writing good policy
papers to try to advance ideas.”57 Because many of these groups are also direct
advocacy organizations, these strategies tend to revolve around the traditional interest
group tactics discussed previously. Importantly, these advocacy strategies typically
differentiate partisan-ideological organizations that have enthusiastically entered the
political fray and participated in the polarization of politics from those who have
been “pulled” into a polarized system.
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2.2.5

A Contemporary Typology of Research Producing Organizations

Having outlined the two dimensions along which modern research producing institutions operate, we are now able to distinguish four ideal types. Like all ideal
types, these categories are abstractions, but they highlight the important – and contradictory – forces operating on outside groups and the various strategies they have
adopted to meet them. The four ideal types include:

1. Moderate-Academic Organizations: Groups in the Moderate-Academic
mold – which, to the best of my knowledge, include only think tanks – most
closely resemble the Progressive ideal of research production. They generally
adhere to strong internal research norms and abstain from institutionalized efforts to directly influence political outcomes. These think tanks tend to be older
– such as the Brookings Institution (founded in 1916) or the RAND Corporation (founded in 1948) – and their founding missions and decades of practice
have resisted, as much as possible, the polarizing tendencies that others have
succumbed to. Often these organizations adopt an explicitly non-partisan or
non-ideological approach. It is easy to view this configuration as normatively
‘better’ than other strategies, and indeed this is a viewpoint that I am sympathetic to. However, it is important to remember that these groups exist in an
era of partisan polarization, are often viewed in partisan terms, and produce
research that is used and abused by partisan actors. Thus, true ModerateAcademic organizations appear to be an increasingly rare entity, and the mod-

88

erating influence that they could potentially play in contemporary politics is
likely underrealized.
2. Moderate-Political Organizations: Much like Moderate-Academics, groups
classified as Moderate-Political pursue a centrist or non-ideological approach
to their policy research. Often, though, this orientation is a simple reflection
of the fact that partisanship is a poor strategy for groups seeking access to
policymakers in order to push policy towards particular interests. Thus, most
Moderate-Political groups are interest groups that directly engage in politics but
do so in a way that furthers narrow interests that are not predictably associated
with any one party. To the degree that these groups align with a party, it is
often “just a reflection of the balance of power” and subject to change should a
different party take control of government. Still, these organizations are heavily
involved in the day-to-day activities of politics. They invest in strategies such
as grassroots mobilization, electoral politics, and lobbying to further their aims.
And, the growing internal cohesiveness of the two parties has meant that these
groups are often perceived to be (e.g. AARP) or actually (e.g. the Chamber
of Commerce) moving towards the preferences of a single political party. This
movement, though, is slower and less deliberate than at other organizational
types.
3. Partisan-Academic Organizations: Groups considered Partisan-Academic,
on the other hand, tend to have particular ideological or partisan viewpoints,
but they maintain an academic approach that limits their willingness to engage
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in direct advocacy or influence strategies. As one subject noted, even though
these groups have ideological perspectives, they “often will work on issues at a
more academic level and stay within the intellectual framework of an issue.”58
These organizations tend to be part of the original Old Guard of think tanks,
founded as high-quality research institutions with particular ideological orientations. The American Enterprise Institute (founded in 1938) and the Cato
Institute (founded in 1977) exemplify this model. And, as noted above, it does
not appear that Partisan-Academic organizations have significantly altered their
beliefs or strategies in the modern era. As one responded noted, “I tend to think
a place like AEI still has... an intellectual mission, even though it has a conservative viewpoint.”59 Instead, it seems that these organizations – due to their
consistent ideological approaches – have found themselves better aligned with
a single party as the two parties have grown apart.
4. Partisan-Political Organizations: The final ideal type identified is the class
of think tanks and interest groups defined as Partisan-Political organizations.
Such organizations combine encouragement of partisanship and polarization
with an active participation in these processes. Many of these groups are among
the “New Guard” of entrants since the 1970’s, and they share a blending of research production and direct, partisan political advocacy. As one responded
remarked, “They’ve got PhD’s, yes, but they’ve [also] got people with lots of
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political experience.”60 Think tanks in this mold – such as Heritage and CAP
– were readily identified with a single political party by my subjects and, in
fact, admit that their goals are best accomplished through the Republican or
Democratic Parties, respectively. They also pair their partisan preferences with
interest group strategies such as lobbying, revolving door practices, and organized political pressure. They view themselves as “do tanks” and work closely
alongside politicians to advance their agendas. At such think tanks, the line
between research and advocacy – the line between their 501(c)3 and 501(c)4
arms – is often blurry. A Heritage Foundation employee, for instance, described
how “I’ll sometimes go along with a member of our 501(c)4, which is Heritage
Action. They have strong relationships with members of Congress and if there’s
something that a Congress member wants to know more about or there’s a bill
and they’re hesitant, they don’t know the history of the legislation [and they]
are wondering what some of the possible ramifications of some language might
be, [then] I might come in and give them a little background or just give them a
refresher course.”61 Interest groups in this category – such as the NRA or American Conservative Union – similarly engage in direct advocacy, though research
production is a relatively smaller portion of their overall influence strategy.
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2.2.6

An Unequal Arms Race

Of these four ideal types, it seems clear that the momentum is on the side of
Partisan-Political organizations. These groups occupy a unique intersection: they
produce the kind of research that is most strongly desired by members of Congress,
and they engage in direct advocacy efforts to ensure that members are aware of their
research products. While changing political dynamics mean that most groups are now
more closely aligned with one party or the other, these groups are actively participating in partisan policymaking. As such, they likely have the strongest reputations as
producers of valuable partisan information; they have established themselves as the
trusted, go-to source for information within their EPN. As one Heritage researcher
stated, “I think we have that conservative brand that is strong, where I get a lot of
leverage out of the organization that I’m affiliated with.”62 Implicit in this statement
is that the “leverage” is over like-minded conservative organizations and Republican
members of Congress.
According to most respondents, Partisan-Political groups comprise the bulk of organizations founded in the last several decades. Many of these groups – such as CAP
and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities – explicitly modeled themselves after
the success of the Heritage Foundation, the quintessential Partisan-Political organization. Thus, one respondent concluded that the “terrain” of partisan advocacy “is well
populated on the left and the right... You’ve got very sophisticated organizations...
[that are] solidly ideological and more linked with people in a party... It’s the people
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who want to somehow figure out a way to break down some of these differences and...
draw a wider coalition together [that are lacking]... There are fewer of those kinds of
institutions.”63 In other words, when it comes to the prevalence of Partisan-Political
versus other organizations, it is not “an equal arms race.”64
Does the inflow of newly partisan interest groups and think tanks mean that
such organizations have greater influence over policy debates, designs, and outcomes?
While this question is addressed in detail in later chapters, it is worth noting now
that, according to practitioners in the Capitol, this is in fact the case. One respondent, reflecting on the Cato Institute’s “intense concern to avoid pay-for-play or the
appearance of” it, acknowledged the downsides of a more academic approach to policy
research:
The benefit [of our approach] would be that you might actually be able
to maintain some independence, but the obvious cost is the other side,
right?... Libertarians are different in that there’s a kind of – it’s weird
that they’re drawn to Washington because they [hate] politics... I don’t
know, I liked that when I was younger. Now I’m thinking I see the costs
more than the benefits.65
Conversely, both Heritage Foundation researchers I interviewed noted that their
unique approach was highly effective, especially compared to other research organizations. Others concurred, noting:
[At] Heritage you just feel like [they’re saying] “what are the needs of the
Republican Party today?” They’ll turn out something to satisfy those
needs, [which] probably does give them more direct influence... [I]t’s certainly easier in a sense to measure what Heritage does.66
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Before turning to questions of influence, however, it is worthwhile to explore the
alternative institutional practices that are employed by various types of organizations
and that help explain why Partisan-Political groups likely have greater influence in
the policy process. This is the task of the next chapter, in which I investigate the
alternative organizational processes and strategies that differentiate Partisan-Political
groups from more academic and less ideological organizations.
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CHAPTER 3
MONEY, MANAGEMENT, AND MEETINGS

Foundations are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity and
from lobbying elected officials about legislation...Yet a notable portion of
foundation spending - a growing portion for some foundations - is targeted
almost directly at the political process. This spending is intended to win
the “war of ideas” under way in American politics. It supports research
and advocacy that aims to influence how elected officials and the public
think about a broad range of policies. (Rich, 2005)

Our belief is that when the research product has been printed, then the
job is only half done. That is when we start marketing it to the media...
We have as part of our charge the selling of ideas, the selling of policy
proposals. We are out there actively selling these things, day after day. Its
our mission. (Herb Berkowitz, former Vice President for Communications
at the Heritage Foundation)1

The growing number and prominence of Partisan-Political organizations has fundamentally altered the universe of research-producing institutions. While groups
claim to value academic integrity and a general disengagement from politics, in reality the line between academic research production and direct political advocacy has
been blurred at many organizations. A growing segment of scholars believes, as the
above quote from Herb Berkowitz suggests, that research production is but half the
battle in their efforts to influence policy outcomes. As a result, we see a notable
1

Quoted in Rich (2005).
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increase in the types of activities “targeted almost directly at the political process”
(Rich, 2005).
These strategies are now commonplace at Partisan-Political organizations, and
they are becoming relatively more common at other types of groups as well. Still,
beyond some of the most obvious indicators of direct influence – like lobbying, revolving door hiring, and public advocacy campaigns – we know relatively little about
the day-to-day practices that various types of groups engage in. Do more political
groups have institutional designs and practices that enhance their influence over the
policy process? Are more academic groups set up more like research universities?
And how do decisions regarding organizational structure and activities influence the
nature and influence of groups?
In this chapter I argue that the everyday operations of Partisan-Political groups
differ substantially from the practices found at more academic organizations. These
differences are both a cause and a consequence of the decision to (not) engage directly in the political process. Understanding how various groups operate, though,
is not merely an exercise in validating the group typology outlined in the previous
chapter. Rather, the operational practices found at different types of groups lead to
very different predictions about the degree of influence each type has over the policy
process. In the most extreme case, Partisan-Political groups have centralized control over funding and review processes, spend substantial amounts on direct political
advocacy, and tend to engage in more symbolic, relationship-building collaborations
with like-minded partisans. In this way, think tanks and interest groups with clear
partisan preferences have become central players in their respective extended party
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networks, which should enhance their influence over the policy process when their
party controls government. More academic organizations, on the other hand, tend to
spend money on traditional research enterprises, including internal review processes
that screen for academic credibility and research collaborations with a diverse set of
actors. While such activities help these groups maintain an aura of credibility, it is
unclear whether this is an effective strategy in the modern era.
To highlight these differences, I focus in this chapter on four organizational characteristics that highlight not only the alternative objectives of various groups but
also provide clear predictions about which groups will be most influential in the policy process. In particular, I investigate the various ways in which organizations are
funded; the relative importance and intentions of internal review processes; the activities and programs that groups prioritize; and the extent and composition of external
research collaborations. Though not the central focus of this chapter, this approach
does have the added benefit of validating the typology of research producing organizations presented in the previous chapter. As I show throughout the chapter, the
level of direct political engagement and partisanship at an organization is revealed
in a wide range of behaviors. The most important pattern, for our purposes, is the
fact that Partisan-Political groups engage in notably different activities than their
more academic or non-partisan counterparts. Once again, however, we will see that
the general trend amongst research producing organizations is towards more direct
engagement and advocacy of their policy ideas.
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3.1

Behind Closed Doors: Funding and Review Processes
Two of the characteristics investigated here can be described as internal to an or-

ganization. Such decisions are often made ‘behind closed doors’ and are opaque to the
public, relating instead to how an organization operates (and why they do so). These
strategies inform the internal operation of groups, from the day-to-day activities of
scholars to the overall organizational mission. The way in which a group is funded, for
example, is tied not only to its goals but also the degree of academic freedom enjoyed
by its scholars. Academic independence, in turn, is reflected in and conditioned by
the types of research review processes employed by the group. These two characteristics combine to grant more partisan organizations substantial centralized control
over their scholars and their overall messaging. This control appears to be used to
further the ideological goals of the group and the (mostly) individual donors who fund
them. Furthermore, the ability to present a coherent, unified organizational message
to the public is likely a necessary prerequisite for policy influence. At academic organizations, however, scholars enjoy greater freedom in how they utilize research funds
and what findings they publish. This academic freedom is important for maintaining
an aura of objectivity, but it can also result in mixed messaging that undermines
direct political influence. Thus, the different institutional ‘cultures” found at these
ideal types are reflected in, driven by, and fed back upon the day-to-day processes of
fundraising and research production, with important implications for policy influence.
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3.1.1

Organizational Funding

First, nearly every interview subject suggested that organizational funding dynamics are intimately intertwined with a group’s degree of engagement with the political
system and the extent of their ideological or partisan preferences. At this time it is
not worth untangling whether funders inform group strategies or whether particular group strategies attract certain types of funding, and it is likely that the two are
mutually reinforcing (Lowry, 1999). Regardless of the causal direction of this relationship, however, two aspects of organizational funding emerge as important correlates
of group strategies and influence: the extent to which contributions come mainly from
institutional as opposed to individual funders, and the degree to which fundraising is
an individual as opposed to a collective enterprise.

3.1.1.1

Institutional and Individual Funders

Because most interest groups and think tanks are highly reliant on voluntary contributions, an institution’s fundraising portfolio – or the distribution of funds from
various sources – should be related to (and have a strong effect on) the strategies
adopted by that group. To ensure continued institutional viability, rational executives may adjust their focus to attract funds from particular types of donors. As
Lowry (1999, 759) found in his study of non-profit citizen groups and think tanks,
“Governance structures and program activities... are choice variables... and the
choices made affect the likely mix of funding sources. Once these decisions are made
and patterns of financial support are established, they become mutually reinforcing.”
Describing this phenomenon, one interview subject suggested that non-endowed or-
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ganizations are the most susceptible to market forces deriving from the preferences
of their contributors, stating:
If you think about think tanks [it’s] overgeneralizing, but it’s useful [they]
come in two flavors, not political, but structural. The one is they raised
the money that they spend and the other is they have a large endowment
and they don’t worry about raising money very much. The ones that raise
[the] money they spend are going to behave the exact same as your local
restaurant: right there in the marketplace. They’re trying to raise money.
The more money they raise, the more they can do what they want to
do. And by the way, the leadership gets a bigger paycheck. Just like a
business, it’s a marketplace. The endowed foundations tend to... make
grants and they give grand speeches [and] people listen to them because
we’re hoping to get one of those grants.2
To this observation I would add that organizations raising funds mainly from individuals are likely operating within a different “marketplace” than those that draw
contributions largely from institutional sources (e.g. businesses, foundations, or government). Scholars studying campaign contributors in the modern era of polarization
have found that individual donors tend to support more ideologically extreme candidates, with traditional party and interest group organizations tending to fund relative
moderates (e.g. La Raja and Schaffner, 2015). While empirical studies of individual
contributors to think tanks and foundations are severely lacking, there is reason to
believe that those who take the relatively rare step of giving to policy research institutes are similar to – and perhaps even a more extreme version of – those who give
to campaigns. In other words, they are likely highly interested and active in politics,
strong partisans, and ideologically extreme in comparison to the general public.
2

Interview with US Chamber of Commerce Senior Researcher. June 25th, 2018. Washington,
D.C.
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Indeed, subjects described individual funders as quite similar to party campaign
donors. One simply stated that “I think it’s just more natural to raise money...
for a cause [from] groups of people who are related to party givers. There’s some
people who feel more comfortable giving to ideas than the party.”3 Furthermore,
most subjects noted that individual contributors are qualitatively different than their
institutional counterparts. One difference derives from the motivations for giving
– while institutional funders generally seek out benefits like good will, access, or
information (Lowry, 1999), individual funders tend to give in order to support the long
term mission, ideas, or perspective of an organization. A Cato Institute executive,
reflecting on the types of donors Cato attracts, noted that:
Cato doesn’t take money from the government or business. Businesses can
give [but] we don’t get a lot from business, we don’t get anything from
government. So it was going to be individuals or foundations, mostly
individuals. So you need a donor core that is willing to hang in there...
[B]y the time I come into the picture in the late eighties or nineties, [think
tanks are] all going on about influence. “We want to have influence. How
do we have influence?.”.. [But] our donors have selected out [of that
mindset] and they’re willing to tolerate the bigger picture and talk about
the long game... These are donors who are willing to say, “Well, I recognize
that maybe next week we’re not going to change things.”4
Another difference between individual and institutional donors derives from the
extent to which they are willing to accommodate new, unorthodox, or ideologically
extreme ideas. Institutional funders seeking good will or policy influence are unlikely to support organizations whose research ‘rocks the boat’, as such ideas can
be detrimental to both public perceptions and the policy goals of the donor. Furthermore, many institutional contributors seek simply to protect the status quo and
3
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would therefore be unlikely to support an organization, like the Cato Institute, that
is focused on the long term evolution of ideological ideas. Motivated individuals, on
the other hand, face no such constraints, and – if they are invested political activists
with strong pre-existing beliefs – they may actually prefer institutions that invest
in partisan or ideologically motivated ideas. An interview subject at the Chamber
of Commerce – whose funding sources are unknown but likely include mostly business interests rather than individuals – described the importance of different funding
sources for organizational approaches:
[Our members have] a very practical point of view. We can’t afford the
extreme partisan[ship], right? Well [on] the other hand, the [groups] who
are more extreme can’t afford necessarily to be practical. They’re subject
to a very simple reality which is the American people today respond to
the loudest screamers and, when they respond, money follows. So when
money follows the organizations are then incentivized on the extremes
to continue to be extreme and to not compromise. Because that’s what
allows them to raise money. It is a market response. [A] political market
response as reflected by cash.
Because individual donors are less averse to extremism, we would expect more
ideological or partisan organizations (like those in the right hand column of Table
2.1) to draw most of their funds from individual contributors. Indeed, the Heritage
Foundation – the quintessential example of a Partisan-Political think tank – proudly
proclaims on its website that “Heritage relies on the private financial support of
the general public – individuals, foundations, and corporations – for its income, and
accepts no government funds and performs no contract work.” Further examination
of their funding since 2010, depicted in Figure 3.1, reveals that individual donors are
the single largest source of contributions, comprising close to 80 percent of their funds
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Annual Revenue by Source: Heritage Foundation
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Figure 3.1: Heritage Foundation annual funding by source. Data comes from Heritage
Foundation annual reports, 2010-2017.

in any given year. A survey of these contributors would almost certainly find that
they are strongly conservative Republicans.
Similarly, the American Enterprise Institute draws a plurality of its funding from
individual donors, though its status as a Partisan-Academic organization seems to also
attract significant amounts of money from corporations and foundations (see Figure
3.2). In general, it seems that organizations operating at the intersection of academic
research and ideological promotion are able to attract funding from both institutions
– who may appreciate the ability to further their material goals, intertwined with a
particular ideological viewpoint, while also being able to point to scholarly credibility
– and individuals – who appreciate and embody the particular ideological bent of the
organization.
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Annual Revenue by Source: American Enterprise Institute
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Figure 3.2: American Enterprise Institute annual funding by source. Data comes
from AEI annual reports, 2010-2017.

On the other hand, organizations that are more traditional (and less ideological)
in their approach to research should attract greater institutional funding. Many such
institutions – including government agencies, large foundations, and corporations –
seek empirical research that can credibly be used to further their material or foundational goals. Access-oriented and non-partisan organizations, regardless of whether
or not they engage in direct political advocacy, should be in a privileged position to
meet these needs. Indeed, when we look at the funding distribution for the Urban
Institute (a Moderate-Academic organization) in Figure 3.3, we see that the institute
collects the majority of its funds from foundations and government grants. Funding
from corporations represents a relatively small portion of Urban Institute revenue
in most years, and individual funders comprise only 1-2 percent of total operating
revenue in any given year.
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Figure 3.3: Urban Institute annual funding by source. Data comes from Urban
Institute annual reports, 2013-2017.

In general, then, it seems that institutions funded mainly by individuals have the
freedom – and perhaps the mandate – to produce more politically or ideologically
motivated research. As one Heritage Foundation researcher remarked:
Because Heritage is not dependent on any particular pot of funding – our
funding pool is highly diversified – we can be independent because we’re
financially independent. And that also gives us political independence
because upsetting a lawmaker here or there... if we were dependent on, you
know, a smaller funding pool, then we would have to be more responsive
to those concerns. But we really are able to push forth what we believe
is the conservative message... at the risk of occasionally offending and
upsetting some of our allies (emphasis added).5
Furthermore, although individually-funded organizations often pursue more ideological or partisan strategies, their relative independence from corporate funding – seen
by many as “corrupt” – actually grants them a unique form of credibility. As one
respondent noted, individual funders remove the appearance of “pay for play” or fi5
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nancially motivated research.6 In this way, certain organizations that are predictably
aligned with a single political party may actually be able to lay claim to a form of
credibility – perhaps more accurately described as “purity” – outside of the traditional
notion of academic objectivity.

3.1.1.2

Individualized and Collective Fundraising

Aside from the source of funds, another major difference arises between organizations that have more centralized, bureaucratic fundraising operations and those
that rely more heavily on individual scholars to attract grants and contracts. Understandably, groups that raise funds largely from individual contributors tend to
also have centralized fundraising operations or “development” offices, as few scholars have the resources to collect money to support their research via many smaller
individual contributions. The individual contributors giving to these organizations
are often contributing to a broader cause and, as a result, care more about an institution’s viewpoint than the reputation of any particular scholar. Conversely, groups
that attract government and foundation grants or contracts often rely more heavily
on individual scholars’ efforts to raise funds for particular issues or projects. This is
because institutional contributors – unlike individuals – tend to support research on
particular topical problems and are therefore likely to care about the track record of
the scholars conducting the research, in addition to the overall institutional reputation
of their employer.
6
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At the Heritage Foundation, for example, one scholar stated that “at a lot of
places, if you are a research fellow you’re doing some amount of development. I don’t
do any development.”7 Instead, Heritage has a robust development team tasked with
collecting and centralizing money to be distributed to various researchers, projects,
and objectives. This team – according to a 2017 internship advertisement – includes
staff working on “Donor Relations” (with eighteen fundraisers travelling nationwide
to solicit funds); “Donor Relations Advancement” (with staff producing written materials and other gifts to distribute to major donors); “Gift Planning” (where staff help
solicit long-term gifts from individuals and estates); and “Membership Programs”
(with staff providing products for Heritage’s rank-and-file members).8
The Brookings Institution, on the other hand, typically has one development
staffer tied to each research program, with much less emphasis on donor cultivation
and retention. Instead, individual researchers often perform these functions, with
a Brookings employee describing the organization as a “condominium of scholars
where... people are buying their own ‘units’ but then there’s common services that
you pay for.”9 Similarly, while the Urban Institute has several employees working on
development, they also have a robust “Contracting Department” that aids scholars
in attracting funds, reflecting the importance of contracted work and grants at the
organization.
7
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Heritage Foundation. October 25th, 2017. “Development/Fundraising.” https://herit.ag/
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9
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Respondents employed at organizations with centralized, bureaucratic fundraising
operations noted that this setup results in “very, very significant” academic freedom,
as “the donors aren’t really calling the shots in the same way” that they might if
particular projects were tied to outside funding.10 In another way, however, centralized fundraising operations simply shift researchers’ attention from the preferences
of outside donors to the preferences of the organization that employs them. A centralized pot of money allows think tank and interest group executives to engage in
more hierarchical monitoring of their scholars’ agendas and their institution’s messaging. Unlike organizations where scholars can look outside for interested donors,
the viability of a particular project is tied to the willingness of the organization itself
to fund it, as “the funding is not as earmarked for particular people and particular
projects.”11 As such, bureaucratic fundraising organizations have significantly more
positive and negative agenda setting power. While scholar-fundraisers may be more
attentive to the desires of their institutional backers, researchers at centralized organizations must be more responsive to the goals and demands of their employer. In
this way, the processes of fundraising – as much as the source of these funds – impacts
the internal dynamics and strategies at particular organizations.

3.1.2

Internal Review Processes

This fact is seen most clearly in the different internal review processes employed
at various types of institutions. In general, it seems that organizations engaged in
10
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more direct political advocacy also tend to have more centralized, hierarchical review
processes. In the case of both think tanks and interest groups, this centralized control
results from – or is reflective of – the fact that individual scholars have little access
to independent funding. More academic organizations, on the other hand, tend to
have fewer formalized review processes and less direct control over the scholarship
that their researchers are producing. This design likely reflects not only the fact that
individual scholars have greater control over funding, but also a norm of scholarly
independence that pervades such organizations. In many ways, scholars at indirect
academic institutions resemble academics in a university setting.
Indeed, one subject said that “I think its fair to say that AEI and Brookings are
more like universities and let the scholars do their own things... Whereas some of
the other places are much more, you run things up the flagpole.”12 As a result of
this scholarly independence, at academic organizations there is often a wider array of
scholarly opinions and a more ideologically diverse set of researchers. The Brookings
Institution is perhaps the best example of such an organization. One interview subject, previously employed by the Heritage Foundation, noted that he was recruited
by Brookings in part because his ideological perspective was in the minority at the
organization. He described the “idea that you can get a range of opinions” as “one
of the hallmarks of Brookings.”13 Many academic organizations value this diversity
because it contributes to their reputation for even-handedness and credibility. Or, as
12
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one subject noted in jest, hiring “people who are a little off the ideological bent of
the place, the joke is that’s great for your tax status.”14 Beyond maintaining their
status as 501(c)3’s, though, it seems that ideological diversity is built into the norms
of some academic organizations.
Of course, ideological diversity is a relative term. At organizations like the American Enterprise or Cato Institutes, for example, there is a clear rightward or libertarian
preference, but these groups are still more likely than Partisan-Political organizations
to employ or engage with (see below) scholars who hold alternative views. Even the
Brookings Institution has at least a mild ideological perspective. According to an
employee there:
Brookings does... independent [research] – which means nonaligned, it
doesn’t mean that the scholars all have the same views in the middle of
the spectrum. I think it’s quite fair to say the overwhelming proportion
of people at Brookings are on the center left. That said, there’s voices
right across the spectrum. There may not be as many conservatives here
as you would get somewhere else, but the conservative voice is very strong
here. I mean, my [more conservative] work... is very strongly promoted
by Brookings. There’s no hesitation about that.15
Thus, what seems to distinguish academic-minded organizations is the importance
placed on bringing in alternative viewpoints – even if all perspectives are not evenly
represented – and allowing scholars the freedom to pursue their research independent
of centralized organizational control. Elaborating on this point, the same subject
noted a key difference between academic and political groups:
[Brookings] doesn’t have quite the full complement of views on the centerright that Brookings would hope to have quite honestly. But it’s doing
14
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what it can, I think, to... have a wide range of opinions that are collegial...
Even though we disagree that’s very much the Brookings model. It’s the
model of a number of thinks tanks [like the Urban Institute and] some
of the more contract think tanks... You would see that two individual
scholars have their own view. And then you get a think tank like Heritage or [Center for] American Progress and, to an extent, the American
Enterprise Institute, and groups like that that tend to have a more kind
of corporate position. Even if technically they say they don’t, they sort
of do.16
Thus, the comparative ideological diversity at academic organizations is often
accompanied by relatively lax monitoring of scholars and fewer internal review processes through which executives can control the organization’s overall messaging.
Conversely, the “corporate positions” found at political organizations are necessarily
accompanied by more centralized control over both the work of individual scholars and
the overall messaging of the institution. It is useful to once again think of Brookings
and organizations like it as a “condominium of scholars” who share certain resources
(and perhaps general goals and perspectives) but who are not subjected to a significant amount of oversight from their employer. Political groups like the Chamber of
Commerce and the Heritage Foundation, on the other hand, act more like corporations, with a single corporate position on most issues and an organizational structure
build around hierarchical relationships. Or, as one subject framed it:
Here at Brookings, we are more like independent scholars in a condominium... [while] at Heritage you’re part of a team and the team makes
decisions and decides how to approach a particular issue. You have a
collective responsibility... [W]hen I was at Heritage, [they] don’t tell people what to do [or] what to say and think about something, but when
[they] make recommendations as Heritage - and this is the same for [the
Center for] American Progress [and] a number of think tanks that are
like this - there is a conversation in the organization about how to approach a certain issue. And when [they] put recommendations together

16
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[at] somewhere like Heritage, they are the recommendations of the Heritage Foundation... [At] Brookings they are the scholars recommendations
and conclusions. That’s why at Brookings, you can get two different scholars having opposing views about what to do and it often happens because
there isn’t the ‘Brookings’ position’, even though you read in the paper
that Brookings says so and so... It’s always an individual scholar. That’s
a big difference.17
In other words, political organizations are much more likely to utilize research review
processes to more aggressively police the messaging of their scholars and ensure that
research production feeds into the political goals of the group.
What do these differing internal review processes look like in practice? It seems
that they differ in terms of both the extent of centralization as well as the objectives of such editing processes. Academic organizations tend to have decentralized
review processes – one subject said that Brookings, for example, had no mandatory
guidelines for copy editing – that prioritize factors like academic integrity and style.
Political organizations tend to have more formalized, centralized, and hierarchical review processes that edit for factors like “fit” or “consistency” with the organization’s
message and ideology. Several subjects – including those who had worked at both
academic and political organizations – outlined this comparison in their interviews.
For example, someone who worked at both Heritage and Brookings described how the
former edited for both arguments (i.e. academic credibility) and recommendations
(i.e. the translation of this research to the political sphere), while the latter had no
formalized review at all. He stated:
[At places like Heritage] you tend to get a lot of review, including review
even of the style of a product by that project team. [At Brookings] when

17
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I first came it was kind of individuals and there was really no formal
review process which really surprised me. At Heritage there was a very
strict review process at two levels: there was one that really reviewed the
arguments and [one that reviewed] the recommendations... [I]t was kind
of a collective cause, youre part of the team and the team develops the
recommendations, so at Heritage we would have a conversation... about
their recommendations and... I would avoid overruling anybody, but we
[would] have an argument sometimes, [or] certainly a discussion about
what the recommendation should be. So there was that process which is
common in any situation where you have a team developing anything –
[it’s the] same in a commercial situation. So then we would have a very
strict editing process and [the research would go] to a professional editor,
raising issues about arguments and copy editing... Brookings does not do
that kind of that kind of editing review.18
Similarly, a subject previously employed at Brookings but now at the AARP noted
that centralized review procesess are quite common at interest groups, saying:
At Brookings... I was the research director, so I would say, “Okay, I’m
going to work on this paper, we’re going to write this paper soup to nuts.”
I’d be involved in it... and then there wasn’t much of a vetting process.
I didn’t have to get clearance from various people, didn’t have to make
sure that it didn’t get anybody hot... We didn’t have to go through layers
and layers of review. Whereas over here, AARP is big and it’s dynamic.
It has lots of different issues that it works on. A lot of people work on
those issues. And so you just need to coordinate your activities with the
whole range of other people, not just in the policy shop.19
The greater degree of centralized review at political organizations enables stronger
control over group messaging and policy recommendations. This control, in turn, allows these organizations to predictably support their ideological view and, potentially,
align with a single party. While it is not the case, as noted above, that political organizations “tell people what to do, what to say and think about something,” it is true
that higher-ups at an organization like Heritage have much greater agenda setting
18
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power. This agenda setting is likely both positive – meaning leadership helps determine which topics are focused on – and negative – where leadership has the power to
restrict attention to an acceptable realm of relatively agreed-upon topics. Restricting
attention to consensual issues is an especially important aspect of political advocacy
and EPN maintenance. Such agenda setting means that scholars at more political organizations write – to a greater degree – with their organizational mission as a central
frame (though some of this may be due to self-selection into a particular organization
– and its viewpoint – rather than altered behavior). As one Heritage scholar noted:
In both [academia and at Heritage] theres a real editing process, so youre
writing with editors in mind to some extent in both some places. In
academia youre writing with a potential outside reviewer in mind, or several depending on if youre writing something for an edited volume, book,
or an article. Here youre writing with our higher ups in mind and... rarely
in life do you get to just write what you think exactly.20
While I suggest here that centralized review could be problematic for objectivity,
it is true that such hierarchical control has some positive benefits. One subject
suggested that strong and formalized review processes make scholars more attentive
to how their work will be interpreted, perhaps resulting in a greater focus on solid
research production. He said:
At Heritage... in a way you have to be more careful. The expectation is a
greater degree of care [because] leadership is going to be [more involved]
and there are people who are going to be reading it with an extremely
critical eye. So... everything you say has to be rigorously footnoted and
you can’t be taking any poetic license with the truth. So in a way I think
that the editing process has the same effect here as the reviewing process
has in academia. Both settings you know that someone is going to be
looking over your shoulder, looking at your numbers, making sure that
the citations that you lay down say what you claim they say, etc... In
20
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fact, Im more cautious with my claims maybe at Heritage, knowing that
it would reflect very poorly on the organization if I was wrong or not as
careful as I should be and also knowing that there are people who are
reading Heritage’s work [and who] would [like to] embarrass Heritage very
much.21
Still, on balance it seems that organizations with stronger internal controls produce
research that supports a consistent ideological position, casting doubt on the notion
that such research is more objective.
As a final note, centralized review processes do not always result in more ideological research. In fact, they have the potential to improve objectivity, but only if these
review processes prioritize accuracy over organizational fit. In other words, it matters
what the overall objectives of these review processes are. At most ideological groups
the objective is likely to ensure that research is sufficiently in line with pre-existing
beliefs and preferences. At the CRS, on the other hand, there are “a lot of reviews
before a product goes out” to ensure that said product fits with the agency’s goals, or
is “objective [and] non-partisan in terms of the information and how it’s presented.”22
These very different objectives are likely to have very different effects on the quality,
conclusions, and influence of policy research.

3.2

The Public Face: Programs and Collaborations
Groups differ not only in their internal fundraising and research processes, but also

in the ways that they engage with the broader public, other research organizations,
and those in positions of power. If the previous section addressed the question of
21
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how these groups are operating, this section aims to understand what they are doing
in the policy process and who they are doing it with. Together, these activities and
interactions represent the “public face” of an organization, or the ways in which they
transmit their research to the world. I focus on two specific indicators of public engagement. First, I investigate how groups spend their money and the programs that
they prioritize. This indicator helps address the question of what these groups are
doing (or not doing) to promote their research. Second, I study group collaborations
– revealed in event participation – to understand whether or not groups utilize partnerships to signal diversity and independence or, alternatively, to further a particular
partisan or ideological viewpoint.
Once again, different types of organizations prioritize different strategies and objectives, leading to the expectation that more political and partisan groups have
become increasingly influential in the policy process. For example, political organizations are much more likely to spend money on programs that educate the public
and push for policy change, while academic groups tend to focus more exclusively
on research production for its own sake. When it comes to group collaborations,
partisan organizations tend to partner with ideologically similar actors – resulting
in relatively symbolic endeavors that help maintain partisan coalitions – while nonpartisan groups engage in more diverse collaborations that signal widespread buy-in
and academic independence. These two findings combine to paint a stark picture
of Partisan-Political organizations as groups that are willing and able to forcefully
advocate a unified policy message to their preferred party.
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3.2.1

Expenditures and Programs

To begin, I focus on how various groups prioritize certain activities. These differences are seen most clearly in organizational expenditures and programming. Aggregate expenditures can provide a clear indication of the overall trajectory of an
organization, while itemized expenditures can provide insights into their priorities
and goals. Prominent organizational programs, similarly, can reveal a group’s top
strategies and objectives.
First, it is instructive to examine trends in aggregate expenditures at several
organizations.23 Are certain types of groups experiencing notable growth? Are others
more stagnant? To answer these questions, Table 3.1 provides data on group expenses
in 2001 and 2016 as well as statistics on the percentage increase and the average annual
increase in group expenditures over the period. The groups are listed in order of
growth, with the top organizations experiencing the greatest increase in expenditures
in recent years. The Center for American Progress (1,509% increase) and National
Rifle Association Foundation24 (424% increase) stand out in terms of their exceptional
growth.25 The Brookings Institution also experienced notable growth (246%).
On the other hand, the Urban Institute (34% growth) and the American Medical
Association Foundation (31% growth) have been relatively stagnant. We should be

23

I focus here on expenditures, which I believe are the best indicator of organizational growth,
but it is worth noting that organizational revenues closely track expenditures for all groups.
24

When possible, I compare think tank expenditures to expenditures at interest group research
arms (mostly foundations) to focus attention on research productivity (rather than, for instance,
electoral or lobbying efforts).
25

It is worth noting that CAP was founded in 2003, and so its growth may simply be an indication
that new organizations experience more substantial growth than well-established groups. Still, over
a thirteen year period the group’s expenses grew by a factor of more than fifteen.
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cautious about overgeneralizing based on this limited data, but there does appear
to be a fairly clear trend: most ideological organizations have experienced notable
growth in the last fifteen years. This is especially true for organizations like CAP, the
NRA Foundation, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute.
The Brookings Institution – as a Moderate-Academic organization – is a notable
exception to this trend. Similarly, the AARP Foundation – though described by
many as somewhat liberal – is by most accounts a traditional access-oriented interest
group that has also grown substantially in the last fifteen years.
These trends are even more pronounced if we compare similar organizational types,
thereby isolating potential differential effects on expenditures at interest groups as
opposed to think tanks. Comparing the three interest groups in the sample – again,
based on very limited data – there appears to be a positive correlation between the
degree of partisanship and the extent of growth. The fastest grower, the NRA Foundation, has strong Republican preferences, while the AARP Foundation, with slightly
Democratic preferences, has grown at a relatively slower (though still impressive) rate.
The American Medical Association Foundation (a presumably non-partisan organization), on the other hand, has had limited growth.
A similar story emerges when we examine think tanks, though the Brookings
Institution represents an aberration from the pattern. By far the fastest growth
is found at CAP, an explicitly Democratic think tank. The Heritage Foundation
and American Enterprise Institute – considered either Republican or conservative
actors – have also had modest growth. Aside from Brookings, the remaining centrist
think tank – the Urban Institute – has had slow growth. There is, however, a very
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Figure 3.4: Brookings Institution expenditures by category, 2009 and 2017.

important caveat to these trends: in terms of overall expenditures, the Brookings
Institution and Urban Institution – with 2016 annual expenditures of $104 million
and $87 million, respectively – still rank amongst the most prominent organizations
examined here. In fact, of the four organizations with the largest expenditures, only
one (the Heritage Foundation) has strong partisan preferences, suggesting that the
progressive legacy might still privilege Old Guard organizations when it comes to
revenue and expenditures.
How are these groups spending their funds? In answering this question we again
observe key differences between various organizational types, revealing differing motives and objectives. One way to understand group priorities is to examine trends in
broad expenditure categories over time. Many think tanks publish, in the name of
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Figure 3.5: Cato Institute expenditures by category, 2009 and 2017.

transparency, such information in their annual reports. This data is self-reported, and
expenditures are categorized in different ways at different organizations, so caution
is in order. Still, Figures 3.4-3.6 – which present self-reported expenditures for the
Brookings Institution, Cato Institute, and Heritage Foundation in 2009 and 2017 –
indicate that the two academic organizations spend the vast majority of their budgets on actual policy research while the Heritage Foundation spends much more on
activities like public education, fundraising, and media and government relations.
The Brookings Institution, for example, spent close to 69 percent of their budget
on “Programs” – mainly research-oriented (see below) – in 2009. By 2017 this figure
had dropped somewhat to 63 percent, with “Education” efforts comprising a larger
portion of the budget. This trend suggests, as discussed earlier, that Brookings and
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other Moderate-Academic organizations have become relatively more concerned with
their “public face” and their overall “influence” at the expense of research activities.
The Cato Institute, on the other hand, also spends a lot on “Research” but has not
reduced their allocations to these efforts in recent years.
The strong focus on research production at academic organizations can be contrasted with the more political Heritage Foundation, where “Research” activities
comprise only 34 percent and 30 percent of the budget in 2009 and 2017, respectively. Based on budget allocations, Heritage seems to be roughly equally concerned
with non-research activities like educational campaigns, fundraising, and media and
government outreach. And, in fact, in 2017 the organization prioritized education
(roughly 34 percent of the budget) over research production. Far more than Brookings, then, the Heritage Foundation increasingly engages in efforts to influence the
public and elected officials. Research production at Heritage is but one of many goals,
and in fact was not the primary financial focus in 2017.
Unfortunately, most interest groups do not make the same type of information on
expenditures available to the public. Of the interest groups listed in Table 3.1, the
NRA and AARP Foundations provide only aggregate data on “programs” that is not
informative for highlighting differences between the groups,26 and the AMA Foundation does not publish expenditures data. We can obtain a general understanding of
interest group allocations, however, by focusing on the NARAL Pro-Choice America
26

In 2017, the NRA and AARP Foundations, respectively, spent 85 and 80 percent of their budgets on “program services.” The remaining funds were spent on fundraising (12 and 11 percent,
respectively) and administration costs (3 and 9 percent).

122

Percent of Operating Expenses

100

75

50

25

0
Education

Fundraising

Management

2009

Media & Gov't
Relations

Research

2017

Figure 3.6: Heritage Foundation expenditures by category, 2009 and 2017.

Foundation, a traditional pro-choice interest group that publishes relatively detailed
data on expenditures (see Figure 3.7). As expected, NARAL is much more likely to
allocate funding to “Campaigns and Programs” and “Communications” than “Policy,” reflecting the fact that – for most interest groups – original policy research is a
relatively minor tool used to influence political outcomes.
As a final indicator of organizational priorities, it is worthwhile to examine the
most prominent programs at various types of groups. While the aggregate expenditures data presented thus far generally obscures the actual activities of each organization, these same groups are required to report, in their tax forms, the three activities
on which they spent the greatest amount of money. Based on the evidence presented
thus far, we would expect more academic organizations to prioritize original research

123

100

Percent of Operating Expenses

75

50

25

0
Campaigns &
Programs

Communications

Fundraising

Management

Policy

Figure 3.7: NARAL expenditures by category, 2017.

production, while more political and partisan organizations should be more likely to
engage in direct advocacy efforts like outreach, education, and policy advocacy and
lobbying.
Indeed, the activities at various types of organizations – combined with descriptions of each program – generally confirm these predictions. This fact can be seen in
Table 3.2, which depicts the frequency with which each organization listed a particular type of activity amongst their three largest expenditures between 2002 and 2016.
Political organizations – including all interest groups as well as Heritage and CAP
– tend to combine their research activities with a focus on outreach and education
efforts and direct policy advocacy. At the AARP Foundation, for instance, 33 percent
of their top activities were aimed at education and 29 percent were aimed at policy
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Group

Outreacha

Education

Policyb

Researchc

Overhead

AARP Foundation

–

33%

29%

–

33%

Brookings Institution

–

–

–

100%

–

Cato Institute

5%

5%

–

90%

–

Center for American
Progress

17%

39%

–

44%

–

Center on Budget &
Policy Priorities

–

–

–

100%

–

Heritage Foundation

–

33%

–

66%

–

NARAL Foundation

37.5%

–

12.5%

25%

25%

NRA Foundation

–

100%

–

–

–

Urban Institute

–

–

–

100%

–

Table 3.2: Top group programs, by category, from 2002 to 2016. Data is self-reported
by organizations in their annual tax forms and includes the name, description, and
total expenditures associated with the three largest (in terms of spending) group
activities. Each activity was coding into one of five categories, with percentages
indicating the frequency with which a particular activity was one of the top three
expenditures over the time period.
a
The Outreach category includes programs aimed at communication with the public,
fundraising, and non-policy events.
b
The Policy category includes non-research policy efforts like advocacy and lobbying.
c
The Research category includes original research activities and publishing.

advocacy. At the NARAL Foundation, outreach and policy advocacy comprised 50
percent of their top activities, with research comprising 25 percent. And at the NRA
Foundation, education was the only type of activity listed during the period.
At most of the more partisan think tanks, these types of educational and outreach
programs are paired with research activities, again indicating that research production
is part of a broader influence strategy at such groups. At the Heritage Foundation, for
example, educational efforts represent one-third of activities while research production
comprises the remainder. In fact, in each year for which data was collected, the
Heritage Foundation’s top activities paint an image of an organization focused on
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research production, publication, and dissemination to elected officials and the public.
The yearly descriptions of these strategies state that Heritage engages in:
• Public Policy Research – “This program produces hundreds of research papers annually on policy matters ranging from economic to defense oriented.
Papers address current and alternative policy”
• Publishing Findings or Media and Government Relations – “This program distributes research products to those from members of congress to the
general public. Information distributed through print, digitally, radio and TV”
• Education Programs – “The [Heritage Foundation] hosts events to educate
many populations from gov’t (sic) officials to the general public on a wide variety
of topics”
Similarly, the Center for American Progress combined public-facing advocacy efforts (outreach and education represent 56 percent of activities) with research production (44 percent of activities). The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, on
the other hand, stands out amongst partisan-political think tanks as the only group
to devote their top activities entirely to research production. These programs include
topics like “State Fiscal and Related Projects,” “State Low-Income Program and
Related Projects,” and “Federal Policy, Research and Analysis.”
The activities of CBPP are more in line with those of academic think tanks like
Brookings, Cato, and Urban. At Brookings and Urban, for instance, 100 percent
of their top activities revolved around research production. At Cato, 90 percent of
activities dealt with research production while outreach and education each comprised
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5 percent of the top activities. In other words, these types of organizations do in fact
appear to be primarily focused on the “long-term evolution of ideas.” Traditional
interest groups and activist think tanks, on the other hand, appear to engage in
activities aimed at translating their research to the public sphere and advocating for
its influence in policy debates.

3.2.2

Research Collaborations

The final characteristic of various group types investigated here concerns the extent and composition of external collaborations with other institutions and scholars.
Nearly ever organization examined here collaborates with other groups, resulting in
research products that are co-authored and often co-sponsored by multiple organizations. These collaborations often arise from repeated interactions amongst policy
researchers, or as one scholar described it:
These groups come together... [and] they just kind of keep going, going,
going forever. I guess people read each other’s stuff and e-mail, and then
[meet at] conferences, and you have these events on these different things
and you meet people, you meet speakers. This is kind of small [town],
I mean in D.C. there’s tons of events..., so you see all the people in the
audience are people who work on this issue, you see the same people over
and over again and you exchange cards.27
Thus, it appears that interpersonal ties in the D.C. community play an important
role in structuring interactions and research collaborations. Given increasing partisan
polarization and animosity, it seems likely that these ties are increasingly formed
within partisan camps, perhaps disrupting bipartisan collaboration. Still, these are
only hypotheses. Are scholars at certain types of groups interacting mainly with
27
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others from the same ideological or partisan background? Can certain groups bridge
the divide between the parties through collaborative research and advocacy?
Respondents generally suggested that cross-institutional collaborations lend research products greater reach and credibility. They signal buy-in from relevant actors, enhance the credibility of the research product, and suggest the viability of an
approach to a wide range of allies. However, the main pattern that emerged from
interviews and other data sources suggests that Partisan-Political groups – because
they hold more rigid ideological and partisan perspectives – are participating in fewer
and less ideologically diverse research coalitions. The ties they do form with other
groups and individuals tend to be with like-minded actors, often those within the
same extended party network. This fact may result from purposeful decisions to
avoid collaborations and the potential to dilute a particular viewpoint, but it may
also be because Partisan-Political organizations have strong reputations for motivated
research and, as a result, other groups may be unwilling to collaborate with them.
These reputations develop over time. The Heritage Foundation, for example,
has historically taken part in well-known research collaborations with actors like the
Brookings Institution and AEI. In fact, Campbell and Pedersen (2014) list Heritage as
one of several groups that frequently collaborate with organizations from diverse political backgrounds. This is almost certainly an overstatement, or at least not as true
now as it once was. My subjects – including employees at the organization – almost
always said that Heritage tended to interact with other conservative organizations
and has been part of fewer diverse collaborations in recent years.
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Again, though, this is a relatively new trend that appears to be accelerating
as a result of increasing polarization and the growing reputation of Heritage as a
Republican ally. Campbell and Pedersen (2014) describe a working group – called the
Brookings-Heritage Fiscal Seminar – that held meetings with a bipartisan selection of
budget experts. The meetings – which included researchers from Heritage, Brookings,
Urban, the Progressive Policy Institute, and others – were truly diverse, but the
working group does not appear to have issued any public reports or statements since
2009. Another example of a relatively diverse collaboration offered by Campbell and
Pedersen (2014) is the “Fiscal Wake Up Tour,” a joint public engagement initiative
sponsored by the Heritage Foundation, Brookings Institution, and Concord Coalition.
This collaboration, however, was aimed mostly at educating the public on agreed upon
policy problems, and it ended around 2005. In fact, even at the time, the authors
quote a Heritage Foundation researcher who said that the organization had trouble
finding groups who were willing to collaborate due to Heritage’s reputation. The
authors write of the collaboration process:
[T]hese organizations still have to perform a delicate dance. Despite their
interests in cooperation they want to advance their own policy agendas...
This is why participating in cooperative initiatives may alienate organizations from one another who share political convictions. For example,
sometimes when the Heritage Foundations Stuart Butler has gone with a
proposal for joint activities to some of the centrist research organizations
they have told him, “We have problems with people on our left. We are
getting flack. He explained, “They could name organizations that are very
angry with them for doing this, very angry [because] they have made the
decision to essentially hang out with people like me.
My own research (see below) suggests that these issues have only intensified over
time. Even if diverse collaborations involving Heritage were more common in the
past – and indeed, Campbell and Pedersen (2014) descibe a Heritage-Brookings-AEI
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research triumvirate as commonplace in the early 2000’s – these types of relationships
become increasingly difficult as Heritage’s reputation as a Republican ally intensifies.
On the other hand, Moderate-Academic organizations seem to participate in more
– and more ideologically diverse – research coalitions. The Brookings Institution is especially well known for its collaborative research, including many projects conducted
with ideologically diverse organizations. A cursory search of the Brookings website
found mentions of the following collaborations, among others:
• The American Well-Being Project (with Washington Universty in St. Louis)
• The USC-Brookings Schaffer Initiative for Health Policy (with the University
of Southern California Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics)
• The AEI-Brookings Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity (with AEI,
the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and the Ford Foundation)
• The Evidence-Based Policymaking Collaborative (with the Urban Institute,
AEI, and Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative)
• The Tax Policy Center (with the Urban Institute)
• States of Change: Demographics and Democracy Project (with the Center for
American Progress, Bipartisan Policy Center, and Public Religion Research
Institute)
These collaborative projects and centers are diverse not only in terms of the types
of actors (including academics, university centers, think tanks, and foundations) but
also in terms of the ideological diversity of the actors in them.
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The frequent collaborations between AEI and Brookings are an excellent example
of this fact. Several subjects noted the importance of the personal relationship between Norm Ornstein (AEI) and Thomas Mann (Brookings) in giving rise to some of
these collaborations. One remarked that “the thing about Norm and Tom is they went
to graduate school together thirty years ago and they had this weird, long personal
connection, and this is [why they are] probably politically closer than the institutions
were.”28 Together, this “Mann-Ornstein partnership” produced a number of books,
academic articles, and op-eds. Even though AEI and Brookings might be politically
‘distant’, the strong personal relationship between their scholars helped initiate collaborations and resulted in widely respected research products. It is easy to imagine
that – absent such personal connections – two ideologically distinct organizations
would be far less likely to collaborate. And, there is some evidence that such ideologically diverse personal relationships are less common than they once were in Congress
(e.g. Alduncin, Parker and Theriault, 2017). To the degree that the same is true in
the policy research world, collaborative efforts that span the ideological spectrum are
likely to decline in number.
Still, the value of such collaborations are clear. Reflecting on the AEI-Brookings
Election Reform Project – another Mann-Ornstein collaboration – one researcher
recalled that the final recommendations were a function of the fact that “we were
able to have the resources of each big [think] tank and it’s connections to bring other

28
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people in.”29 Aside from just resources and manpower, however, these collaborations
also send an important signal about the quality and perspective of the research.
This is especially true in projects that attract ideologically diverse actors. The AEIBrookings Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity, for example, resulted in a
“consensus plan” with the grand conclusion that:
The only way forward... is to work together. No side has a monopoly on
the truth, but each side can block legislative action. We therefore created
a working group of top experts on poverty, evenly balanced between progressives and conservatives (and including a few centrists). We obtained
sponsorship and financial support from the American Enterprise Institute,
the Brookings Institution, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and the Ford
Foundation. We worked together for fourteen months, drawing on principles designed to maximize civility, trust, and open-mindedness within the
group. We knew that the final product would reflect compromises made
by people of good will and differing views.30
The lofty concepts of “evenly balanced” experts, “civility, trust, and open-mindedness,”
and “compromise made by people of good will and differing views” hearken back to
the Progressive ideals of research production (though the authors still acknowledge
that these experts bring their ideological baggage to the table). More importantly,
they signal to readers that the research produced is nuanced, even-handed, and inviting to actors from a variety of backgrounds. Unfortunately, as noted in the previous
chapter, it appears that the demand for this type of research has declined over time.
Both Moderate-Political and Partisan-Academic organizations are also likely to
frequently participate in inter-institutional collaborations with relatively diverse actors. While Moderate-Political groups (mainly interest groups) may participate in

29
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AEI-Brookings Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity. 2015. “Opportunity, Responsibility, and Security A Consensus Plan for Reducing Poverty and Restoring the American Dream.”
https://brook.gs/2CBwSGy
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such coalitions to signal widespread support for their ideas, Partisan-Academic groups
might do so to bolster their reputations as academic research institutes. For example,
I sat in on an event at the American Enterprise Institute (Partisan-Academic) on the
topic of poverty and income assistance. This event included AEI researchers as well
as scholars from academia, Results for America (a relatively non-partisan group), and
the Center on Budget and Policy Prioties (a liberal organization), revealing a willingness on the part of AEI to engage in debates with a wide range of organizations.
Indeed, the conversation at this event was nuanced, collegial, and empirically-based.
The only notable indication of AEI’s ideological orientation was seen in the audience
questions, which generally revealed a pre-existing bias amongst attendees towards
conservative policies. At a similar event held by the Cato Institute, two scholars from
different extremes on the issue of campaign finance regulation engaged in a traditional
debate over the topic, presenting the audience with an alternative to Cato’s libertarian
stance. At both these events, Partisan-Academic groups revealed a greater willingness (compared with Partisan-Political organizations) to engage in dialogue with their
apparent political opponents.
These anecdotes and quotes, then, suggest strong and potentially growing differences in the types of collaborations that various groups engage in. To more rigorously test these general observations, I collected data on the institutional affiliations
of participants in public events like these from January to December 2018.31 Because
31

I focused on a relatively small sample of groups as a starting point. These groups are the American Enterprise Institute, Bipartisan Policy Center, Brookings Institution, Cato Institute, Center for
American Progress, Chamber of Commerce, and Heritage Foundation. Though small, this sample
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groups advertise these events to the public, they can be systematically analyzed in
a way that collaborative publications cannot. I consider participation in an event a
“connection” between these scholars and their respective institutions, and I use this
indicator to operationalize institutional collaborations. Using network analysis techniques, I created a directed tie between two organizations if the first group hosted
an event in which a representative from the second group participated. These ties
are weighted according to the number of times an institution’s scholars have participated in another group’s events. Thus, this network can help reveal the extent to
which groups collaborate as well as their willingness to collaborate with groups from
different ideological backgrounds.
Before turning to this network – which focuses only on connections amongst interest groups and think tanks – it is informative to examine the prevalence of connections
with a wide range of different actor types. Table 3.3 presents the percentage of event
participants, at each organization, from various types of institutions. The Chamber
of Commerce is fairly unique in the fact that it tends to interact with business and
industry representatives (41 percent) and has few connections to think tanks (2.1
percent) and academia (1.7 percent). The Chamber also has fairly strong connections to other interest groups and the executive branch (14 percent each) and foreign
or international actors (13 percent). Thus, the Chamber seems to reveal, in its interactions with those in the private sector and in government, its role as a business
representative and its emphasis on a direct advocacy approach.

has good balance across the ideal types outlined here, and the data collection procedure results in
a much larger number of organizations represented overall.
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Table 3.3: Policy event participants, by the type of organization the participant is affiliated with. Columns might not add up
to 100 percent because of an omitted “other” category.
a
The Executive Branch category includes those in the White House as well as federal agencies.
a
The Foreign & International category includes agents of foreign governments and non-governmental organizations as well as
international organizations.
c
The State category includes those employed by state governments or at non-governmental organizations whose activity is
limited to a particular state.
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Academic think tanks, on the other hand, are much more likely to interact with
academics and other think tanks. At AEI, Brookings, and Cato Institute events, representatives from think tanks and academia represent the majority of participants.
The Brookings Institution also interacts at fairly high rates with foreign and international actors, indicative of their stronger research focus on foreign affairs. Furthermore, for all three organizations, interest group representatives are a small percentage
of event participants (no more than 2.8 percent). Thus, it seems that academic organizations – with varying degrees of partisanship – are truly academic in their focus:
they tend to interact with scholars from academia and other think tanks, and less so
with more explicitly political organizations like interest groups.
Surprisingly, Partisan-Political think tanks are not all that different from these
more academically-minded research organizations. At the Heritage Foundation, think
tank actors represent a plurality (46.3 percent) of participants, followed by representatives from business and industry (8.1 percent), academia (8 percent), and the
Executive branch (7.7 percent). Heritage, then, is somewhat more likely to interact
with those in positions of power, but they still display a preference for other think
tanks and academics. The same is true at the Center for American Progress, where
think tank employees and academics represent 45.2 percent of participants. CAP,
though, is unique in its focus on nonprofits and state actors, perhaps as a reflection
of their emphasis on state-level activism and hands-on work.
Some of these results, then, fit with expectations about differences between academic and political organizations, but others (e.g. the importance of think tanks and
academics at political think tanks) are a bit surprising. Still, it could be that the types
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of think tanks these groups interact with are qualitatively different. More specifically,
political groups might interact with a more ideologically similar and homogeneous set
of think tanks. To test this hypothesis, Figure 3.8 depicts a network connecting hosting organizations to the interest groups and think tanks they invite to their events.
Ties between groups are weighted according to the frequency of event participation,
and nodes are colored according to their partisan preferences (Democratic affiliates
in blue, Republican affiliates in red, and non-partisan actors in tan). The network
graph suggests that the ideological homophily hypothesis holds for both Heritage and
CAP. Both organizations form connections, almost exclusively, with co-partisans and
non-partisan actors, and they form very few ties with opposing partisans. More academic organizations like Brookings, AEI, and Cato, on the other hand, display some
level of partisan homophily but also form a significant number of ties with opposing
partisans.
This fact can be seen more clearly in Table 3.4, which presents the percentage
of ties each organization formed with actors from various ideological backgrounds.
The distributions suggest that Heritage and CAP – the two Partisan-Political organizations in the sample – are significantly less likely to form ties with actors from
opposing backgrounds (and significantly more likely to form ties with co-partisans).
This is especially true for the Heritage Foundation – 72 percent of their ties are sent to
conservative organizations, while only 4 percent are formed with liberal groups. AEI
and Cato – both Partisan-Academic – are somewhat biased in their tie formation but
have a more even distribution of ties across conservative, liberal, and centrist groups.
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Figure 3.8: Policy events participation network. Nodes represent interest groups and
think tanks that have hosted or participated in events, and they are colored according to their partisan preferences. Ties represent participation in an event hosted by
one of the seven organizations investigated, and they are weighted according to the
number of times an actor from a particular organization participated in the hosting
organization’s events. Nodes with degree greater than two (i.e. they hosted or participated in at least two events) are labelled. The network is arranged according to
the Davidson-Harel algorithm.
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Table 3.4: Ideological distribution of policy event participants from interest groups and think tanks.
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The Brookings Institution is even more even-handed – they form half their ties with
centrists and roughly a quarter of their ties with conservatives and liberals.
My own interview results corroborate these findings and provide greater detail on
the dynamics of cross-group collaborations. In general, respondents described how
Partisan-Political groups like Heritage and CAP have changed over time, becoming
less willing to participate in broad-based research collaborations. This fact is related
to the inherently political goals of such organizations. Because Partisan-Political
groups seek political influence, often by working through a single party, they are
likely to assess potential collaborations in terms of the ideological composition of
the coalition, the signals they will send to policymakers, and the effects they will
have on their overall influence. While there is certainly value in signaling, through
diverse coalitions, that a particular approach has widespread buy-in, it appears that
the relative value of such coalitions have declined over time. The cause of this trend
seems to be the market dynamics outlined in the previous chapter: politicians and
parties find research that is consistent with their goals to be more valuable than
research that is nuanced and objective. Ideologically homogeneous collaborations,
not surprisingly, lend themselves to the first type of research, incentivizing certain
groups to invest more heavily in them.
At the same time, more academic or moderate organizations might be less willing
to work with Partisan-Political groups because of their well-deserved reputations as
ideologically motivated. In other words, it seems that the decision to engage in
direct political advocacy necessarily restricts the domain of actors that are willing to
collaborate with Partisan-Political organizations. Thus, a cycle is initiated whereby
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more partisan organizations engage in more homogeneous coalitions and, in turn, drive
more moderate organizations away. Describing these changes, one subject noted:
When I was [at Heritage] running the... domestic research departments...
eight years ago I certainly – with the support of Heritage – reached out on
many occasions to work with other organizations... The staff were engaged
quite heavily in projects and panels and so forth with other institutions.
[But] in the last few years that I was there – and particularly just before I
left – [these projects] became more political... in the sense of focusing on
sort of longer term political strategy and the politics of issues rather than
trying to look at how to build coalitions on particular issues across the
spectrum... And thats sort of taken them out of the mainstream of think
tanks that traditionally can work together on issues. So you dont tend to
see Heritage scholars so frequently now in these sorts of broader activities
or projects or convenings where youll get a whole range of scholars [on
the] left and right. They dont tend to be there anymore.32
Because groups like Heritage have been “taken... out of the mainstream of think
tanks,” the ideological composition of groups and scholars that they collaborate with
has become more homogeneous. One Heritage scholar, asked which organizations she
frequently collaborates with, listed a number of organizations, all on the center or
more extreme right of the ideological spectrum:
I have allies, some of them more centrist and moderate and then others
that are also more steadfast ideologically. So I work closely with the Cato
Institute, the Mercatus Center, the [Committee] for a Responsible Federal
Budget, I would call that a more centrist-moderate group. Americans
for Prosperity, the Koch Network. The National Taxpayers Union, the
Coalition to Reduce Spending, a number of smaller groups that work in
the same issue areas as I do... And we do occasionally have working
groups where we meet every couple of weeks or every month when we
trying to organize the coalition toward one particular goal and going in
one direction.33
These collaborations, then, seem to mix research production and policy advocacy,
thereby restricting membership to those that are in agreement on particular political
32
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issues and approaches. The notion that groups from similar ideological or partisan
backgrounds are better able to work towards “one particular goal” is also an important
indicator that such coalitions might have greater influence over policy debates and
designs. At the very least, it means that collaborators are not seriously exposed to
many ideas supported by the opposing party, likely precluding compromise even in
the initial stages of policy research and discussion. As a Heritage researcher focused
on civil service reform noted:
The people who are our adversaries are never at the table... They’re just
not there... There’s sort of like a distance factor that sort of hangs over
everything, but they’re never really at the table so we never really run
into them... Heres a “for instance”: there’s a working group that I’m a
part of that met today. Was there a public sector union representative?
No. The reason is because that would not be productive. You know what
I mean? So if there’s [someone who] is going to be so radically outside of
your envelope, they’re probably not going to be at the table. And should
they be? I don’t think so, because you know what they’re going to say.
It’s not like it’s going to be any sort of mystery. They’re going to oppose
every single thing that’s coming up. And that would not be productive.34
Of course, collaborations at places like Heritage are not entirely ideologically homogeneous. As discussed, there have been prominent coalitions between Heritage,
Brookings, and other center-left groups. Such collaborations seem to be less common
as partisan polarization and perceptions of group commitments have increased. One
subject noted that, in the past, “Heritage and Brookings did... a number of things
together” but “that’s kind of less [common now because] even though Brookings has
not really been a [leftist] organization, people kind of think of it that way.”35 This
fact is a reflection of both conscious decisions by Heritage as well as political reality.
34
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Another subject described how the degree of polarization in research collaborations
depends on the extent to which an issue is politicized by the parties:
Usually you’re going to run into people with the same ideological commitments, [but it] somewhat depends on the issue area. In mine, a little
less so. Because there’s a lot of, well they’re just more bipartisan, there’s
just more bipartisanship when it comes to civil service reform. So... it’s
a wider spectrum... than maybe there would be on, oh, I don’t know,
abortion policy or reproductive policy. So it depends, not every issue is
equally polarized.36
In general, though, it seems that Partisan-Political organizations view ideological
consistency in their external collaborations as a potent political tool that increases
their policy influence. Indeed, several subjects suggested that ideologically disparate
groups could find common ground on most topics, but they make political decisions
that prevent such compromise. Such decisions are reflective of polarized politics and
the demands of members of Congress. In other words:
What [polarization has] done is increasingly forced discussions to happen
in camps, and not a lot of discussion... I could sit down with a couple
buddies from a right think tank and a couple of buddies from a left tank
and – if Senator Schumer and Mitch McConnell and Paul Ryan and President Trump said, “you guys come up with an answer” – we can come up
with an answer for ourselves, but it wouldn’t be passable. You have to
set the political box for the solution and then we can come up with an
answer. The problem isn’t knowing what to do... Folks at Heritage, folks
at Brookings, folks at Center for American Progress can all come up with
reforms to fix [the problem]... The problem is political decision as to what
those reforms should look like in broad terms. So it is not about labels,
it’s not about struggling to find answers..., it’s about making a political
decision about what the structure of those answers should look like.37
As noted, the fact that certain groups work in ideological “camps” and coordinate
their advocacy efforts may enhance their overall influence. By aligning the prefer36
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ences of consistently liberal or consistently conservative organizations, such coalitions
can send strong signals to members of a particular party that certain ideas are wellsupported by important EPN actors. Thus, coalition building and maintenance is important for overall influence. One infamous forum for such activities – the Wednesday
Meetings held weekly by Americans for Tax Reform – demonstrates how more partisan organizations may be aligning together to further their goals. These meetings
– which attract conservative and Republican interest group and think tank representatives as well as sitting and aspiring politicians – are in many ways the opposite of
the relatively diverse meetings I attended at AEI and Cato. Rather than bringing
in alternative views to further debate and institutional credibility, the Wednesday
Meetings thrive on a shared sense of commitment to the conservative movement.
Thomas Medvetz (2006), in one of the only studies of the secretive meetings, describes them as an important forum in which conservative groups both coordinate
material resources and engage in symbolic practices to establish and maintain the
meaning of conservativism. Representatives from conservative research institutions
concurred with this assessment, describing the meetings as an important “institutional relationship-building forum.”38 Another went so far as to say that the meeting
“is the most important two hours of my week without even a blink” because “you
have a room full of conservatives” that you can convince and unite, resulting in a
“distribution network” for research and ideas.39
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This ideologically conditioned distribution network stands in contrast to the more
diverse networks that define most group interactions outside of Partisan-Political organizations. It is well known that interest groups, for example, work to expand the
scope of their coalitions to signal widespread support for their ideas (e.g. Hula, 2000).
Moderate-Political organizations like this utilize relatively diverse external collaborations as a political tool. Much like Partisan-Political groups, they hope to enhance
their policy influence, but unlike more partisan groups they do so by seeking out relatively bipartisan input on particular topics. According to one respondent, the value
of such bipartisan engagement is an institutional reputation for “being thoughtful,
being relevant, and being interested.” She elaborated on this point, saying:
On the external side what’s really important... is to be at the table to
be part of the conversation. So externally, what we try to do is to signal
through various means that we have value and we can contribute to the
conversation. And we can do that by publishing on the topic. We do
that by convening events. So if we do the research and we have some
new policy solutions to offer, we’ll have this big event... and then we
invite a lot of stakeholders to it... [W]hat we have been able to do very
well at the Public Policy Institute is we’ve been able to have these off
the record, small conversations where we invite stakeholders with diverse
points of views and bring them in and kind of talk through, “These are the
issues, some of the challenges, what are some of the different perspectives?
And then how can we come together and come up with a solution?” And
sometimes we do come up with a solution, sometimes we don’t, but just the
conversation itself will illuminate how different stakeholders think about
an issue... And we actually have a great reputation of being able to pull
in people from both sides of the aisle... [W]e do try to bring in balanced
points of view... The idea there is we want to present ourselves as being
thoughtful, being relevant and being interested.40
Thus, it seems that oftentimes bipartisan input simply means engaging with opponents’ views, as actual compromise is frequently precluded by partisan politics. The
40

Interview with American Association for Retired People Public Policy Institute Vice President.
June 27th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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same researcher described these interactions by saying, “I wouldn’t call it cooperation,
[but] there’s conversation. It’s different [than] on the Hill... where its ideology and
other things that’s driving the conversation.”41 These conversations are facilitated
by bringing together actors with disparate positions and goals. At the AARP, for
example:
We always try to bring in somebody who might have [different views]. We
just think about the balance. So for instance, we had an event a while
back where we brought people in to talk about Medicare and where they
see Medicare going, and we wanted to make sure we had people who would
talk about premium support, for instance..., and that tends to align with
a lot of Republicans... So we have that perspective and then there are a
lot of people on the other side of the aisle who think very differently. So
we brought them in as well... These are difficult problems to solve and the
people who are working in that space..., everybody knows everybody, even
if they’re from opposite sides of the aisle. And what I’ve always found is
by and large people are pretty respectful, so you bring them in.42
Similar dynamics seem to define academically-oriented think tanks as well. As
the network analysis revealed, groups like Brookings and AEI are highly connected
to a range of policy actors. Public events at AEI and Cato fit with this finding,
demonstrating a willingness to engage with opponents and their ideas. For think
tanks, the value of such collaborations seems to be greater credibility and reach. As
one subject described it, “to have Heritage and Brookings together, to most people
sounds like you’re covering the water front of ideas” and thus exposing a wider range
of actors to the research and ideas.43 However, the changing nature of Partisan41

Interview with American Association for Retired People Public Policy Institute Vice President.
June 27th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
42

Interview with American Association for Retired People Public Policy Institute Vice President.
June 27th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
43

Interview with Brookings Institution Senior Fellow. July 5th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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Political groups like Heritage seem to be making it harder to compile these types of
broad-based coalitions. Thus, cross-ideological connections tend to form most often
between academic or access-oriented organizations. Oftentimes this is reflective of the
simple reality that scholars at these groups are more likely to read each others’ work,
know each other personally, and have a more open mind regarding policy debates and
research. To give just one example, a Cato executive noted that:
We have friends at Brookings. People think we’re all fighting with Brookings and all that stuff, [but] none of that’s true... [On the other hand,] we
tried to get some people from Center for American Progress to come to
some of our debates, [and] it’s harder because you may not know them...
It’s just the way that networks form for people that work at think tanks...
It happens for younger people in particular... You’re not going to know
many people from there... But there is something odd going on where
we made these conscious efforts [where] we asked them to events and they
don’t [come]... And that [is] the way politics is. Do I really want to go over
– I’ve been to CAP and it was fine and they were nice people – but I guess
you don’t know what you’re walking into. Do you want to go to a dinner
[at] which everybody around the table is a damn fool from your point of
view? And then you gotta fight with them about it because they’re saying
things you think [are wrong]. It’s just a matter of comfort.44
Thus, it could be said that Partisan-Political groups are increasingly marginalized
from the mainstream of policy research institutions. The overall extent and effect
of this marginalization, however, remains an open empirical question. In the next
chapter I attempt to operationalize and measure connections between policy actors
and assess the impact such connections have on overall policy influence.
44

Interview with Cato Institute executive. June 28th, 2018. Washington, D.C.
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3.3

Conclusions
In this chapter and the last I have utilized a range of data sources to document the

changing demands for policy research and the various incentives these changes have
provided for policy research institutions. The main findings suggest that members
of Congress are information demanders who are heavily reliant on outside actors for
policy ideas and arguments. However, due to partisan polarization, these members
seem to seek out information that best fits with their partisan goals. Thus, outside
groups face new incentives for and constraints on their policy research – the marketplace for ideas has been fundamentally altered. Some seem to rightly perceive that
they can gain prominence and influence by consistently providing research that supports the views of a single political party. This is not always a simple case of callous
partisanship – sometimes it is a reflection of the fact that ideologically motivated
groups are now consistently aligned with a particular polarized party. And, in fact,
there is a key factor, at least historically, that limits the ability of groups to become
partisan shills: their concerns about their long-term reputations for credibility.
Because of the competing incentives between partisanship and credibility, groups
have responded differently to the modern era of politics. In the think tank world, some
groups have become scholar-advocates, producing motivated research and then forcefully advocating it using strategies traditionally reserved for interest groups. These
groups tend to support a single political party in these efforts, making them recognizable elements of a particular extended party network. These Partisan-Political
think tanks are joined by a growing number of interest groups with de facto – and
sometimes even explicit – partisan preferences.
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While some seem to have doubled down on more traditional objectives like research
quality, cross-ideological or bipartisan engagement, and a general disengagement from
politics, others seem to have adapted to an era that places a premium on ideologically
consistent and politically useful partisan information. These alternative strategies
manifest themselves in a variety of ways. At academic institutions, for example,
scholar-fundraisers face fewer internal constraints on their research production and
therefore have greater control over the interpretation of their findings. They also seem
to be freer – and perhaps encouraged – to engage in dialogue and even collaborations
with scholars across the spectrum of groups. The result of these dynamics is typically
an organization with a reputation for credibility, nuance, and relative objectivity,
even as these organizations have become increasingly public-facing.
At more political groups, on the other hand, centralized fundraising operations
and detailed review processes allow for greater control over group messaging. External
collaborations that clash with an organization’s ideological or material goals are also
less common, especially at Partisan-Political organizations. In the case of interest
groups, these dynamics allow for consistent advocacy on issues of importance to the
groups’ members. In the case of Partisan-Political think tanks, funding dynamics and
centralized internal review processes allow leadership to have greater control over
messaging and allow these organizations to advocate a particular partisan and/or
ideological mission. Ideologically consistent external collaborations do not disrupt
this motivated vision, and indeed they may help to further particular ideological or
partisan goals and enmesh the organization within a robust party network.
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An important implication of these findings is that members of Congress seem to
bear the brunt of responsibility for the changing nature of interest groups and think
tanks. Of course some outside actors are more proactive in taking advantage of this
polarized era, but ultimately all seem to be responding to changing incentives from
formal party members. Thus, efforts to inform and improve Congressional policymaking would likely be most effective if they took aim at the underlying cause of
dysfunction: partisan polarization. In other words, while increasing the number and
experience of staff inside Congress and related agencies (e.g. CRS, GAO, and OMB)
might help members become more informed on the issues they face, members still face
competing demands (e.g. reelection, partisan teamsmanship) that are unlikely to be
resolved through such reforms. Similarly, efforts to improve the research produced
at external organizations – which would be legally and practically difficult to design
and implement – might simply increase the influence of those who are able to walk
the line between credibility and partisan usefulness.
Indeed, as it stands Partisan-Political groups should be key actors in the policy
process because they produce consistent, easily digestible, and useful partisan information. In other words, they seem to be important providers of ideas and arguments
that support their preferred party’s legislative agenda.
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CHAPTER 4
POLICY IDEAS, FRAMES, AND INFLUENCE

“[T]hink tanks are the single worst, most undisciplined example of communication Ive ever seen Every time you use the words “privatization and
“Social Security in the same sentence, you frighten seniors This is a specific and perfect example of the intellectual goo-goo heads who are more
interested in policy than they were in success They would rather communicate their way and lose the issue than communicate in a sensible way
and win. The fact is, ideology and communication more often than not
run into each other rather than complement each other.” (Frank Luntz,
2003)1
“We put a lot of resources into message testing. We have a group here
dedicated to American perceptions... where we do polls and focus groups.
We work with organizations that specialize in this to get a key insights into
what the American people think about certain issues and how they respond
to certain words and phrases so that we can better tailor our research in a
way that is going to be more attractive, will be better received and therefore
we can be more impactful.” (Heritage Foundation Researcher, 2018)2
Late in 2003, prominent Republican consultant and pollster Frank Luntz echoed a
common indictment of think tanks: that these research organizations are more interested in ivory-tower ideas than effective political communication. This charge carried
weight, as Luntz is famous for developing political talking points, testing messaging
with focus groups, and eliciting emotional reactions in voters. In short, Luntz does
all the things that, at the time, were thought to be lacking in “undisciplined” think
tank communications. And yet, less than fifteen years later, a Heritage Foundation
1

Quoted in (Frontline, 2003).

2

Interview with Heritage Foundation Policy Researcher. July 9th, 2018. Virtual Interview.
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researcher described to me the great lengths to which the organization goes to markettest their ideas and language. Heritage’s aim – which Luntz would certainly applaud
– is to “better tailor our research in a way that is going to be more attractive, [that]
will be better received and therefore... more impactful.”
Heritage is not alone in focusing intently on the framing and dissemination of
their ideas. As the previous chapters noted, even more academic organizations are
increasingly concerned with their public face, reflecting an acute awareness that policy
influence is contingent on political influence (and that political influence derives, in
part, from effective public communication). Furthermore, as these groups work to
directly impact public opinion, they are also working to provide their political allies
with talking points that offer them political cover as they pursue common interests.
This view of policy research suggests that information is often meant to support
pre-existing (and shared) political goals rather than persuade hesitant legislators to
adopt a particular policy approach. Indeed, Hall and Deardorff (2006) argue that
one prominent form of lobbying involves providing “legislative subsidies” to allied
members of Congress. They write:
[L]obbying is primarily a form of legislative subsidy – a matching grant
of costly policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators. The proximate objective of this
strategy is not to change legislators minds but to assist natural allies in
achieving their own, coincident objectives. Their budget constraint thus
relaxed by lobbyists assistance, already like-minded legislators act as if
they were working on behalf of the group when in fact they are working
on behalf of themselves.
In much the same way, interest group and think tank research activities might be
viewed as efforts to assist partisan allies as they pursue mutually acceptable goals.

152

This perspective fits well with the theory that members of Congress are embedded in
extended party networks populated by outside groups with overlapping preferences.
Given the importance of ideas, framing, and talking points in the policy process,
I focus here on similarities in, and the spread of, policy discourses used by research
producing institutions and members of Congress. To do so, I identify salient phrases
used in think tank and interest group publications and public statements made by
members of Congress in e-mails to constituents. I then systematically trace the flow
or diffusion of this language across actors using network analysis (see below for more
detail). This is but one indicator of the potential influence of outside groups over those
in positions of power, but for a variety of reason I believe it to be an improvement over
existing measures. First, unlike more explicit measures of influence (e.g. lobbying),
an analysis of discourses allows for the discovery of subtler information pathways
and the indirect impact of ideas. Furthermore, this analysis focuses on inherent
connections based on discursive similarity rather than observed connections identified
by, for example, third party policy historians. Secondly, network analysis allows for
the systematic identification of the “policy entrepreneurs” who initiate ideas and
talking points, as well as relationships amongst these actors and others. And, the logic
behind network analysis fits neatly with the theory tested here, which views actors as
embedded within extended party networks. Finally, a focus on texts also allows for
the quantitative and qualitative identification of salient arguments in specific policy
debates.
In this analysis, I attempt to answer two questions deriving from the theory and
evidence presented thus far. First, I ask whether policy ideas and arguments “flow”
153

along predictable partisan lines. This question gets at the heart of the theory advanced here: that political parties (and partisanship) provide exogenous structure
to the research and advocacy activities of outside groups. If, in fact, discourse disseminates most strongly through partisan networks (i.e. EPNs), this would provide
support for the notion that policy influence hinges on thick ties and that, in turn,
these ties are increasingly formed along party lines. Second, I ask whether PartisanPolitical groups are amongst the most influential actors within these networks. The
results presented up to this point suggest they are – these groups have bought into
the current system, defined by partisan polarization, and have most heavily invested
in activities that would enhance their direct political influence.
At this time, I answer these questions by focusing on the policy ideas advanced
in debates surrounding cap-and-trade regulations. I focus on related policy research
and publications leading up to formal legislative action on this issue. In 2009, the
Democratic House voted on the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES),
and a related bill was introduced in the Democratic Senate in 2010. Neither bill
became law, though the House version did pass, mostly along party lines. As I
outline below, the failure of these bills represents a puzzle for existing theories of
policymaking, and the theory of extended party policy networks might help explain
these failures. Specifically, the theory predicts that the two parties heard ideas and
arguments mainly from co-partisan groups, resulting in distinct and opposing partisan
narratives. If members of Congress were “talking past” one another in these debates
– because they were receiving very different informational signals – then the lack of
compromise on this issue makes more sense.
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To test these predictions, I first collected – with the help of research assistants –
detailed data on the public statements made by relevant policy actors. I then used
this data to construct a policy idea diffusion network that traces the flow of language
across these actors. To the degree that the partisan and ideological commitments of
these groups structure the flow of language, it can be said that partisanship is an
important conditioning factor in the acceptance of ideas and a potential reason that
the stances of the two parties have diverged on so many important policy issues.

4.1

Data and Methods
To conduct this analysis, research assistants identified and collected online state-

ments published by interest groups and think tanks – including blog posts, policy
reports, white papers, and other related texts – that contained keywords related to
the topic of cap-and-trade and the first legislative action taken in this area.3 To collect formal party member publications, coders downloaded all e-mails to constituents
(starting in 2009) that contained one or more of the relevant keywords and retained
all paragraphs containing at least one keyword.4 This data was compiled by Lindsey
Cormack (2017) in a comprehensive dataset of congressional e-mails to constituents.
The decision to focus on congressional communications with constituents – rather
than, for example, discourse in committees – is informed by a number of factors. First,
like the online publications made by groups, the language used in member e-mails is
3
These keywords included “cap and trade,” “American Clean Energy and Security Act,” “ACES,”
and “Waxman Markey.”
4
The decision to focus on paragraphs rather than full texts for members of Congress was made
because their newsletters often contain discussions of multiple issue areas of bills.
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intentional rather than ad-libbed, allowing for direct comparisons with the language
employed by groups. Second, it is important to see how members explain issues to
their constituents, as these talking points provide insight into members’ public-facing
justifications for their votes. Finally, Broockman and Butler (2017) find that even
when politicians offer their constituents minimally-justified positions on issues, this
communication can sway constituent opinion, suggesting that elite communications
have independent effects on public opinion. If members themselves are influenced
by the language and preferences of outside groups, then these groups might have an
indirect impact on constituent opinion. Still, the results from this analysis should be
interpreted in light of this methodological decision: the findings speak to the influence
of outside groups over the public discourse of members of Congress. Future research
will aim to extend this analysis to other areas in which members are active, namely
in Congressional committees and floor debates.
Together, these statements comprise the corpus of interest group, think tank,
and formal party member publications. The full corpus was limited to substantively
relevant documents, or publications that 1) make a policy prescription, 2) outline an
argument for or against a particular policy prescription, or 3) outline an argument
for or against a related bill (or other form of government action). Altogether, the
cap-and-trade corpus contains 1,132 distinct publications from 144 unique actors.
There are significant differences across actors in terms of the number of publications and the average words per document. Because the methods employed here might
be more likely to identify influence ties amongst the most prolific actors, the analysis
that follows controls for differences in actor word frequency. Additionally, although
156

the corpus of formal party member publications only extends to 2009 (whereas the
group corpus includes publications going back to 2001), more than two-thirds of the
corpus documents were published after 2009, suggesting that there is limited missing
data for formal party members.5
To understand the diffusion and influence of the language in these texts, I utilize
common textual analysis techniques to focus attention on meaningful concepts and
then use network analysis techniques to identify the persistent pathways through
which these ideas diffused across actors. Because not all language is substantively
relevant – the initial corpora of publications contain a great deal of ‘noise’, or words
that are either quite common or quite rare and thus have limited analytic value – I
employ several common textual analysis techniques to focus attention on meaningful
discourse that can then be traced throughout the network of actors (see Appendix B
for further details of this process). In short, I focus on the earliest usage of the most
meaningful bigrams – or two-word phrases – by each actor.6
These bigrams are ‘traced’ from the earliest users of such language to actors who
adopted the same language at a later point in time. For this reason, any bigrams which
were not associated with at least three unique actors were removed, resulting in 12,169
unique phrases that could potential diffuse across 144 actors in cap-and-trade debates.
Using the Network Inference algorithm, implemented in the R statistical program by
5

There is also reason to believe that members of Congress – given their intense workload and
limited attention – are unlikely to discuss issues that have yet to reach the governmental agenda.
6

Bigrams were chosen as the unit of analysis because they are more likely than singular words
to capture underlying concepts and normative evaluations. For example, the bigrams “energy tax”
and “energy efficiency” have very different connotations and therefore better distinguish between
two actors than the singular term “energy.”
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Linder and Desmarais (2017), these time-stamped bigrams were used to create a latent
diffusion network that approximates the actual spread of language across actors. The
algorithm was originally developed to assess how state-level policy adoptions spread
across the American states, but can generally be employed to identify the underlying
diffusion patterns of any event (here, discourse use) across a set of nodes. Specifically,
it utilizes three main factors when determining the likelihood that a diffusion tie will
form: the number of times actor A uses a bigram before actor B; the length of time
between usage for A and B; and the precision with which actor A’s usage predicts
actor B’s use. If actor B frequently utilizes terms for the first time shortly after actor
A first uses them, and if actor B is significantly less likely to utilize terms if actor A
did not previously employ them, then a persistent influence tie or “edge” is likely to
form from actor A to actor B.
Based on these criteria, the algorithm iteratively adds the highest performing
ties, preferring those that explain the use of other bigrams that have not yet been
adequately explained by current edges. Across multiple iterations, the algorithm
adds edges and performs a Vuong test to determine each additional tie’s statistical
significance. At a specified p-value of 0.01, the NetInf algorithm settled on 786 edges
across 142 actors. The final diffusion network, then, connects actors based on the
extent and order of adoption of common bigrams, with the assumption that rhetoric
that has diffused from one actor to another is indicative of some degree of inter-actor
influence. In this analysis, the true mechanisms of this diffusion are unknown, but
previous chapters suggest that institutional and individual collaborations, working
groups, lobbying, and a variety of other tactics are used to spread ideas.
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Such an approach to the diffusion of policy ideas has numerous benefits. First,
by forming ties based on the overall extent of bigram diffusion, the method enables
the identification of substantively significant pathways of informational and discursive
transmission. Thus, this method is ideal for assessing the potential conditioning role of
partisanship on the spread of ideas. Second, this method allows for the identification
of policy entrepreneurs based not just on how early that actor adopted particular
language but also how strongly that early adoption can explain later usage by other
actors. This is useful for assessing the relative influence of various types of actors and
testing the theory that Partisan-Political groups have pronounced influence in policy
debates.
I utilize an Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) to rigorously analyze
the processes that resulted in the observed network. Unlike linear regression models,
ERGMs appropriately model the interdependence inherent in social networks (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2016). Furthermore, ERGMs allow for the comparison of an
observed network to many possible alternative configurations, enabling insight into
the network- and node-level processes that lead to the observed network structure. In
other words, ERGMs help distinguish between alternative processes that could result
in the same observed network, allowing for the identification of distinct effects deriving from differing theoretical mechanisms. The model presented here had the lowest
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value of the alternative specifications examined
(not shown). Furthermore, analyses in Appendix B show that the model converged
– or was not degenerate – and the simulated networks in the model have a good fit
with the observed data.
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In the analysis that follows, the model includes terms that assess the relative
importance, in predicting the formation of influence ties, of network reciprocity, or
the tendency for influence ties to be mutually formed; partisan homophily, or the
tendency for ties to form between co-partisans (i.e. members of the same EPN); and
partisan reciprocity, or the tendency for mutual ties to form between co-partisans.
The model also includes network-level covariates to account for tie interdependence.
These covariates – which are typically used to improve model fit but are not very
substantively meaningful – include the number of Edges in the network (akin to the
intercept in a regression model) and controls for the number of nodes with Edgewise
Shared Partners equal to 0. Additionally, the model includes covariates that account
for ties that form between nodes with common issue commitments or organizational
structures. These variables include whether or not the nodes are Both Environmental
groups (or members of an environmentally-focused Congressional committee) and
whether or not they are Both Interest Groups or Both Think Tanks. Finally, the
model includes a control for the Absolute Cascade Difference between two actors, or
the absolute difference in the total number of bigrams used by the tie sender and
the tie receiver. This term effectively controls for the possibility that prolific actors
might be more likely to send influence ties to those with fewer associated publications
simply because they are associated with a large number of bigrams.
Additionally, the model includes several covariates that test alternative theories
of tie formation. The first – the Mutual Reciprocity term – tests whether an influence
tie from B to A is more likely to form if A also influences B. This term represents
a network process that should be controlled for, but it also has substantive impli160

cations, testing if directed ties tend to be reciprocated regardless of actors’ partisan
affiliations. Second, two terms – Both Democrats and Both Republicans – test the
main theory of influence tie formation advanced here: that ties are more likely to form
between actors with shared partisan commitments, or those within the same EPN. In
contrast to ties formed based on reciprocity, such ties form on the basis of partisan
homophily. For both the reciprocity and homophily terms, positive and statistically
significant coefficients would suggest that these factors increase the probability of
a tie forming between two actors. Finally, two interaction terms – Mutual x Both
Democrats and Mutual x Both Republicans – test the possibility that reciprocal ties
might form conditional on both actors being members of the same EPN.

4.2

Discourses and Influence in Cap-and-Trade Debates
I begin by focusing on the ideas, influence patterns, and narratives surrounding

the policy issue of cap-and-trade regulations. This became a salient topic following
Barack Obama’s election in 2008, and the Democratic-controlled House and Senate
attempted to pass cap-and-trade legislation in 2009 and 2010, respectively. In both
cases, the legislation aimed to limit industrial pollution by creating a market structure
with limits on the amount of pollution that can be emitted by a firm in a given time
period. In this system, firms are either allocated or sold permits for a set amount of
emissions. Firms can then trade these permits amongst themselves so that polluters
who can cheaply reduce emissions will do so and those who cannot will pay some
additional price for their emissions. In June 2009, the House narrowly passed (219212) a cap-and-trade bill, the American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) Act,

161

almost entirely along party lines. The bill was not considered by the Senate during
the 111th Congress, but Senators Kerry and Lieberman introduced similar legislation,
called the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, in 2010. This bill was never
voted on by the full Senate.
The issue of cap-and-trade is well-suited as an initial case study of the partisan
influence effects hypothesized here. First, the issue could, in theory, lead to bipartisan
compromise rather than partisan polarization, though it is true that environmental
policies tend to elicit intense partisanship (McCright and Dunlap, 2011). In both bills,
Democratic lawmakers introduced policy solutions that reflected ideas and policy
instruments that are inherently conservative in their approach. The bill adopts a
market-based approach (as opposed to, for instance, a direct tax on pollutants) that
had been previously supported by conservative groups and business interests (e.g.
British Petroleum and DuPont) as well as Republican presidents (namely Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush) (Meckling, 2011). Furthermore, scholars have found
that even Republican voters’ opinions on climate change are heterogeneous and vary
geographically, suggesting that some Republican members of Congress might have
supported the bills (Mildenberger et al., 2017). In fact, at the time a cap-and-trade
policy was supported by a majority of voters.7
Thus, we are left with a puzzle regarding how this issue was polarized and this
level of polarization was sustained. Prior research suggests that corporate funding
7

Rabe and Borick (2010) found that 86 percent of Americans thought the federal government
had some or a great deal of responsibility for taking action to reduce global warming. They also
found that 53 percent of respondents somewhat or strongly supported a cap-and-trade system while
only 36 percent somewhat or strongly supported increased taxes on fossil fuels.
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has led to polarized advocacy on this issue (e.g. Farrell, 2016). I take this a step
further, focusing on how outside groups use their research (and the advocacy of this
research) to impact policy debates. If extended party groups use research and ideas to
push their party toward their preferred outcome, we should expect to see an influence
network with distinct coalitions of actors divided along ideological and partisan lines
– reflecting their material and ideological preferences – with the members of a given
coalition utilizing similar language to discuss the topic over time.
Figure 4.1 depicts this cap-and-trade influence network, with directed ties representing the influence – across many bigrams – of one actor’s discourse over the
discourse of another. Larger nodes represent actors that have many outward influence ties, and these nodes are colored according to the partisan preference of the actor.
Interest groups are represented by square nodes, think tanks by circular nodes, and
members of Congress only by their name. In the aggregate, the network depicts the
systemic diffusion of language across actors in the sample.
Several insights can be gleaned from this visualization. First, a limited number
of groups had many diffusion ties while the average actor had a total of only 5.5
inward and outward ties. The median number of outward ties is 0, indicating that
many actors – most often members of Congress – did not influence anyone. Given their
high number of outward-facing diffusion ties, large and centrally located nodes can be
described as influential senders of policy ideas and discourses. On the liberal side, the
most influential nodes include several environmental interest groups (e.g. the National
Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, and Environmental Defense
Fund) and a number of broadly liberal or environmentally-focused think tanks (e.g.
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Figure 4.1: Cap-and-trade influence network. Directed edges indicate a diffusion tie
from one node to another. The plot is arranged according to the Kamada-Kawai algorithm, which places similarly connected nodes close together and unconnected nodes
further apart. Nodes in this graph are shaded according to their partisan classification, where blue indicates a Democratic-affiliated actor, red indicates a Republicanaffiliated actor, and tan indicates a centrist group. Circular nodes represent think
tanks while square nodes represent interest groups. Members of Congress are represented only by their name. Node size is a function of the number of outward diffusion
ties associated with that actor (i.e. the actor’s out-degree).
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the Center for American Progress and Pew Center on Global Climate Change). On
the conservative side, one business group (the US Chamber of Commerce) and three
generalist think tanks (the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, and
Pacific Research Institute) initiate the majority of diffusion ties. Centrist groups
appear less frequently in the network, with the Bipartisan Policy Center as the most
influential group. I explore the role of these influential opinion leaders in more detail
in the next sections.
Members of Congress, as noted, are rarely influential in this debate, and they tend
to be influenced by a relatively small number of outside groups. This fact is reflected
in their peripheral location in the network graph. Instead, they are largely the recipients of ideas developed by outside actors. The network also displays some degree
of ideological or partisan clustering, though the most densely embedded actors share
connections with all types of nodes. Thus, there is evidence of both bipartisanship
and partisanship in this debate. While this might suggest that there are relatively
nonpartisan patterns to ideational diffusion, it is also possible that this visualization
obscures the effect of partisanship on influence tie formation. I investigate this question more rigorously in the next section. Furthermore, the apparent bipartisanship
in the network could be driven by terms that were used by actors regardless of ideological commitment, resulting in diffusion ties that connect the most active nodes
simply because they are highly active. The next two sections attempt to untangle
these alternative diffusion dynamics.
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4.3

Partisan Homophily and Policy Influence
In this section, I empirically test three alternative theories of tie formation in

this diffusion network. The first predicts that influence ties are formed mutually
(i.e. in both directions) regardless of partisanship, while the second suggests that ties
form conditional on partisan homophily, or membership within the same EPN. The
third theory is a mix of these two, predicting that mutual ties form conditional on
partisan homophily. Support for the second and third theoretical mechanisms would
suggest that partisan dynamics are an important conditioning factor in the spread
and acceptance of policy discourse.
Indeed, a test of these alternative theories of influence tie formation demonstrates
that shared partisanship – or membership in the same EPN – is a strong (and sometimes the strongest) predictor of tie formation. This can be seen in Table 4.1, which
shows the results of the ERGM model predicting influence tie formation in cap-andtrade debates. In this model, coefficients represent the change in log-odds of a tie
forming, and so it is difficult to judge their substantive significance. However, positive and significant coefficients indicate that the observed network contains a greater
number of ties between two types of nodes than we would observe in a randomly
generated graph.
The baseline probability of a tie forming between two actors (seen in the Edges
term) is incredibly low (0.8 percent). The fact that the Edges coefficient is negative
indicates that ties are not formed randomly, as most other coefficients have positive values indicating that they increase the baseline probability of a tie forming.
Furthermore, the negative Mutual term indicates that ties are more likely to form
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hierarchically – with one actor influencing another, but not being influenced in return
– rather than reciprocally. This provides some evidence that actors are not mutually
influencing one another regardless of partisanship, though hierarchical ties could still
be formed in bipartisan or nonpartisan ways.
This does not appear to be the case, however. The two terms that account for
partisan homophily – Both Democrats and Both Republicans – are positive and statistically significant at pă0.01, indicating that influence ties are more likely to form
if the two actors share partisan commitments. This effect is nearly twice as large for
two Republicans, suggesting that the Republican EPN was more united – in terms
of shared discourse and influence tie formation – than the Democratic EPN. Still,
the substantive effect of common EPN membership is fairly small, compared to other
terms in the model, for both Democrats and Republicans.
The interaction terms for common EPN membership and mutual tie formation,
however, are much more substantively significant. In the case of two Republicans, the
probability of reciprocal influence ties forming is 7.8 percent, the highest probability of
all the model coefficients. The effect is roughly one-third as large for two Democrats.
Aside from substantive significance, there is another key difference in how members
from the two parties form ties: the Mutual x Both Democrats term is negative,
while the Mutual x Both Republicans term is positive. This means that the effect of
partisan homophily is strongest for Democrats when ties are not reciprocated, while
the opposite is true for Republicans. In practical terms, these coefficients suggest that
two Democrats are more likely to form ties in a hierarchical way – with prominent
organizations influencing less prominent co-partisans, without being influenced in
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Dependent variable:
Diffusion Tie Probability
Edges

´4.810˚˚˚
p0.046q

Edgewise Shared Partners

´1.665˚˚˚
p0.013q

Both Environmental

0.622˚˚˚
p0.073q

Both Interest Groups

2.024˚˚˚
p0.054q

Both Think Tanks

1.254˚˚˚
p0.083q

Cascade Difference

0.001˚˚˚
p0.00002q
´0.577˚˚˚
p0.018q

Mutual

Both Democrats

0.200˚˚˚
p0.044q

Both Republicans

0.479˚˚˚
p0.060q

Mutual x Both Democrats

´0.761˚˚˚
p0.022q

Mutual x Both Republicans

2.334˚˚˚
p0.027q

Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

4,311.510
4,398.460
˚

pă0.1;

˚˚

pă0.05;

˚˚˚

pă0.01

Table 4.1: ERGM predicting influence tie formation in cap-and-trade debates.
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return – while two Republicans are likely to form mutual influence ties. Thus, there
is strong support for hierarchical homophily in the case of Democrats and reciprocal
homophily in the case of Republicans.
Several additional model terms have practical significance as well, and these terms
support the findings presented in previous chapters. Most important here is the fact
that two interest groups or two think tanks are significantly more likely to form
influence ties (5.8 percent and 2.8 probability, respectively). This means that actors
in the omitted category – two members of Congress – are very unlikely to form ties. As
I show in the next section, formal party members are almost never influential, and they
are not influenced as often as other actors. When they are influenced, though, they are
almost always using terms developed by outside groups, often within their extended
party network. Thus, based off qualitative and quantitative analyses, members of
Congress are policy demanders who draw on ideas and information provided by groups
in their extended networks.

4.4

Opinion Leaders and Ideational Imitators
If the cap-and-trade policy subsystem was mostly defined by partisan influence,

what underlying dynamics explain these aggregate patterns? Which actors were the
most influential and, most importantly for this study, were Partisan-Political groups
more influential in cap-and-trade debates than other, more moderate or academic
organizations? To gain leverage on these questions, I focus in this section on the
most highly influential (in terms of out-degree, or the number of outward influence
ties) nodes in the network.
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Table 4.2 lists the most influential nodes in the network, or the actors who influenced the highest number of other actors. These are all interest groups or think
tanks, though this is a reflection of the data rather than a methodological decision.
As noted, the members of Congress in the network rarely influence other actors. In
fact, only one formal party member, Rep. Wally Herger (D-CA), sent an influence tie.
Interest groups and think tanks, on the other hand, sent an average of 9.8 and 12.3
influence ties, respectively. This fact suggests that outside groups, as expected, are
almost exclusively the actors (of those examined here) producing the ideas, talking
points, and arguments that others draw on. These outside groups are the ones developing the intellectual or argumentative ‘infrastructure’ that defines policy discourse.
Oftentimes these talking points make their way to members of Congress, reflected in
the fact that they receive, on average, 2.6 inward influence ties from interest groups
and think tanks. These organizations are influencing one another as well: interest
groups average 9.3 inward influence ties, while think tanks average 8.3. Thus, this
analysis reveals a fairly robust community of outside actors who are engaging with
one another and influencing formal party members.
There is, however, a hierarchy amongst these outside organizations. While they
average between 9.8 and 12.3 outward ties, the most influential actors in Table 4.2
sent far more of these ties than their less influential counterparts. At the high end,
the Center for American Progress and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change
influenced 115 and 104 other actors, respectively. The Heritage Foundation is nearly
as influential, with influence ties to 74 other actors. Importantly, these groups are also
more likely to influence others than to be influenced themselves (see the “Influence
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IG
TT

National
Resources
Defense Council

Brookings Institution

Wildlife

IG

De- IG

50

55

38

23

26

Republican 23

Democrat

Democrat

Republican 35

Centrist

Republican 43

Democrat

Democrat

6

16

16

18

8

18

9

23

26

35

10

In Degree

3.8 to 1

1.4 to 1

1.6 to 1

1.9 to 1

4.8 to 1

2.4 to 1

5.6 to 1

2.4 to 1

2.8 to 1

3.0 to 1

11.5 to 1

Influence
Ratio

47.8 %

69.69 %

42.3 %

42.9 %

NA

37.2 %

36 %

52.7 %

56.8 %

38.5 %

40.0 %

39.1 %

21.7 %

42.3 %

40.0 %

NA

46.5 %

38 %

30.9 %

31.1 %

49.0 %

42.6 %

Ties to Co- Ties
to
Partisans
Opposing
(%)
Partisans
(%)

Table 4.2: Most influential actors in the cap-and-trade network. Displays the top network influencers – defined as the actors with
the highest number of outward influence ties (Out-Degree) – as well as data on the number of inward influence ties (In-Degree),
the ratio of outward to inward influence ties (Influence Ratio), and the percentage of ties sent to actors from the same party
network (Ties to Co-Partisans) or the opposing party network (Ties to Opposing Partisans).
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Democrat
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Pew Center on Global
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Center for American TT
Progress
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Top Network Influencers

Ratio” in Table 4.2). At the low end, the Chamber of Commerce sends two ties for
every one tie it receives, while at the high end the Center for American Progress
influences 11.5 actors for every time it is influenced itself. Thus, these groups appear
to be “opinion leaders” or “policy entrepreneurs” on this issue. These opinion leaders
are a mix of interest groups and think tanks, and they tend to either be concerned
with specific, relevant issue areas (i.e. the environment or the economy) or broadly
ideological in their approach.
Importantly, Partisan-Political groups are over-represented in this sample of influential leaders. To show this, I again focus on the most highly influential groups (rather
than the full sample) because it is quite difficult to systematically classify organizations into the typology from Chapter 2. Rather, in-depth study of an organization is
required to classify groups into the four ideal types I outline. Still, some fairly strong
patterns emerge from this data. The Center for American Progress, Heritage Foundation, and National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) – all Partisan-Political in
their approach – are three of the five most influential actors. They are joined by three
other (somewhat less influential) Partisan-Political interest groups: the Chamber of
Commerce, Environmental Defense Fund, and National Wildlife Federation (NWF).
Thus, more than half of the most influential groups examined here can be considered
Partisan-Political. And, while I do not classify these organizations, all but two of the
next ten most influential groups have partisan preferences, and three of these actors
– because they are interest groups – are by definition Partisan-Political.
The remaining influential groups are mainly Partisan-Academic, including the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change and the American Enterprise and Pacific Research
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Institutes. These groups have ideological or partisan preferences but remain fairly
academic in their approach to public policy. It seems, then, that influence accrues
to organizations with partisan preferences – of the eleven most influential groups,
all but two have ideological viewpoints or revealed preferences that align with a
single political party. Only the Brookings Institution (Moderate-Academic) and the
Bipartisan Policy Center (Moderate-Political) are highly influential without having
strong partisan preferences (though, as noted, the Brookings Institution is viewed by
many as left of center).
Furthermore, these groups are behaving in somewhat partisan ways, though there
is important variation. On average, these top groups sent 44.1 percent of their influence ties to co-partisans and 34.7 percent to members of the opposing party’s EPN,
with the remainder sent to centrist groups. (The full sample of interest groups and
think tanks is even more partisan in their influence, sending 47.4 percent of their ties
to co-partisans and 24.2 percent to opposing partisans.) Thus, there is some degree
of bipartisanship in how influence ties are formed, though more ties are formed on a
partisan basis. Groups do not appear to be entirely isolated in partisan or ideological
bubbles, though they are biased towards their preferred party. I investigate these
partisan and bipartisan patterns in greater detail in the next section.
Similar results emerge when we examine the influence patterns of various types
of organizations. Many Partisan-Political groups, unsurprisingly, are very partisan
in their influence. The Heritage Foundation, NRDC, NWF, and Pacific Research
Institute, for example, all send more ties to co-partisans than to members of the
opposing party. In the most extreme case, the NWF sends 69.6 percent of its ties
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to Democrats and only 21.7 percent to Republicans. The Heritage Foundation and
NRDC send 56.8 and 52.7 percent of their ties to co-partisans and only 31.1 and
31.9 percent to opposing partisans, respectively. Certain other Partisan-Political
groups, however, are surprisingly even-handed in their influence. This is the case
for the Center for American Progress (40 percent to Democrats and 42 percent to
Republicans), the Chamber of Commerce (42.9 percent to Republicans, 40 percent
to Democrats) and the Environmental Defense Fund (42.3 percent to both parties).
Furthermore, two Partisan-Academic groups – the Pew Center on Global Climate
Change and the American Enterprise Institute – send more ties to members of the
opposing party than to actors within their own EPN.
Members of Congress, on the other hand, are more consistently partisan in terms
of which ideas they are accepting (i.e. who influences them). On average, members
of Congress receive 53 percent of their ties from members of their extended party
network, with many of the other ties coming from centrist organizations. In fact, 33
percent of formal party members receive all their ties (which is sometimes just one
tie) from only members of their EPN.
Thus, the results so far suggest that members of Congress do rely on outside
groups for information, ideas, and talking points, and they are fairly biased in how
they do so. They tend to imitate the ideas provided by outside groups within their
extended party network. Within these networks, Partisan-Political groups do appear
to have more power than other ideal types, especially moderate groups. This fits
with the theory advanced here, which says that groups that consistently invest in a
single party develop strong connections to and reputations within that party. The
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influence ties in this network, representing stable informational diffusion pathways,
help to operationalize these connections. These ties and reputations – in combination
with direct advocacy efforts – make Partisan-Political groups the dominant “go-to”
organizations when members need policy information. For this reason, we see that
these types of organizations are highly influential in cap-and-trade debates.
The power of partisan groups is not unchallenged, though. While only two moderate groups are amongst the most influential in the network, these two – the Brookings
Institution and the Bipartisan Policy Center – send a high number of influence ties.
In the case of Brookings, this is likely a reflection of the organization’s long-term reputation as an important player in politics. Despite increased partisan polarization,
this reputation seems to still carry weight in policy debates, allowing Brookings to
influence both Republicans and Democrats at roughly equal rates. In the case of the
Bipartisan Policy Center, on the other hand, their broad influence is likely due to
the fact that the organization was founded to bring the two parties together. As a
result, they are able to influence both Democrats and Republicans. The BPC model,
then, might be one that other groups who wish to incentivize bipartisan compromise
could follow (though as I show below, influencing members from both parties is not
the same as getting these members to speak to one another, or even speak the same
‘language’).
As a final note, it is important to not overstate the extent of partisanship in the
results presented thus far. While it is true that common partisan commitments are
predictive of tie formation – and that the most influential groups, on average, influence
members of their preferred party at higher rates – there are also some bipartisan
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patterns. This could, however, be an artifact of the data and methods used here.
It could be, for instance, that bipartisan influence ties tend to represent the spread
of shared language used by members of both parties, while influence ties formed in
a partisan fashion represent the spread of meaningful discourse and arguments. To
parse these alternative explanations, in the next section I turn to a qualitative analysis
of the overarching narratives that result from these influence ties.

4.5

Partisan Cap-and-Trade Narratives
While the analysis thus far relies on the overall spread of bigrams, what we are

really interested in here are the narratives that resulted from these two-word phrases.
Do the influence ties and patterns outlined above result in cohesive party narratives?
Were these narratives different, or even contradictory, across the two parties? And
does the apparent bipartisanship noted above represent meaningful dialogue or less
meaningful textual similarities?
To answer these questions, I qualitatively investigate the most important bigrams
– and the broader arguments they comprise – and identify the most salient talking
points in the discussion of cap-and-trade. Specifically, I focus on the most substantively meaningful discourse in the corpus, investigating if opposing partisans employed
this similar language in divergent ways, if co-partisans utilized common arguments,
and if formal party members adopted the discourse of highly influential groups in
their networks.
To begin, Table 4.3 depicts the ten most frequent bigrams used by all actors within
the sample. The results again reveal both partisan and bipartisan patterns. Certain
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Bigram

Total
(%)

Centrists
(%)

Democrats
(%)

Republicans
(%)

climat chang

61.8

85.7

69.6

47.8

clean energi

48.6

61.9

73.2

23.9

greenhous gas

48.6

57.1

55.4

40.3

gas emiss

47.2

57.1

51.8

40.3

renew energi

46.5

52.4

60.7

32.8

environment protect

45.1

57.1

44.6

41.8

carbon emiss

44.4

71.4

42.9

37.3

global warm

43.1

52.4

48.2

35.8

protect agenc

42.4

57.1

39.3

40.3

energi effici

40.3

61.9

57.1

19.4

Table 4.3: Ten most common bigrams in the cap-and-trade influence network. Totals
represent the percentage of all actors who used the phrase, while centrist, Democrat, and Republican statistics indicate the percentage of actors within each partisan
category that used the bigram.
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phrases – like “climat[e] chang[e],” “clean” or “renew[able] energ[y],” and “energ[y]
effici[ency]” – were employed at much higher rates by centrist and Democratic actors than by Republican actors. Others – like “greenhous[e] gas emiss[ions]” and
“environment[al] protect[ion] agenc[y]” – were used fairly consensually by all actors.
Were these actors employing these terms in similar ways? To gain leverage on
this question, Table 4.4 lists the ten terms most frequently used by centrists and by
members of the two party networks. Bolded terms in this table indicate that the
partisan grouping used the bigram at the highest rate. Again, we see that certain
phrases were used fairly regularly by all three groupings. These terms – which include “climat[e] chang[e],” “greenhous[e] gas emiss[ions],” and the “environment[al]
protect[ion] agenc[y]” – seem to represent the common language that is required to
discuss cap-and-trade regulations. Without broader context, it appears that these
terms were used – and spread – in fairly bipartisan ways, though the qualitative
analysis below suggests this was not the case.
To this point, we also see some stark differences between the phrases used by
the Democratic and Republican EPNs. In the Democratic network, the top terms
referenced the effects of “climat[e] chang[e],” “global warm[ing],” and “greenhous[e]
gas emiss[ions]” while also discussing, presumably favorably, the goals of “clean” or
“renew[able] energ[y]” and the “green job[s]” that would accompany them. Thus, the
Democratic network seemed to emphasize the environmental and economic benefits
of cap-and-trade regulations. Republican actors, on the other hand, also discussed
consensual topics like climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, but they were
far more likely than Democrats or centrists to discuss “nation[al] energ[y] tax[es],”
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Top Centrist Terms (%)

Top Democratic Terms (%)

Top Republican Terms (%)

climat chang (85.7%)

clean energi (73.2%)

energi tax (52.2%)

carbon emiss (71.4%)

climat chang (69.6%)

climat chang (47.8%)

clean energi (61.9%)

renew energi (60.7%)

energi cost (44.8%)

energi effici (61.9%)

energi effici (57.1%)

environment protect (41.8%)

fossil fuel (61.9%)

greenhous gas (55.4%)

greenhous gas (40.3%)

carbon tax (61.9%)

gas emiss (51.8%)

gas emiss (40.3%)

greenhous gas (57.1%)

global warm (48.2%)

protect agenc (40.3%)

gas emiss (57.1%)

fossil fuel (46.4%)

energi price (40.3%)

environment protect (57.1%)

environment protect (44.6%)

nation energi (38.8%)

protect agenc (57.1%)

green job (44.6%)

carbon emiss (37.3%)

Table 4.4: Ten most utilized bigrams in each partisan category. Bolded phrases
indicate that actors in that partisan grouping used the bigram at the highest rate,
compared to the two other categories.

“cost[s],” and “price[s].” Top Republican bigrams, then, were predominantly oriented
around a narrative of increased economic costs that would result from cap-and-trade
legislation.
Centrist groups mostly utilized bigrams that were employed by both Democrats
and Republicans, and they often employed these terms at the highest rates. The
phrases they employed also appear to be more technical and less political than concepts like green jobs and increased prices. For example, they discuss both “clean
energ[y]” and “fossil fuel.” Furthermore, their most used bigrams are not as consistently favorable or critical – in terms of the overarching narratives they might
comprise – as the top phrases employed by the two partisan networks. In general, the
bigrams employed by centrist groups appear to fall into three categories: those that
reference the problem of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions; those that
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discuss the impact of cap-and-trade regulations on energy production; and those that
discuss policy implementation through the Environmental Protection Agency.
While these findings provide some evidence that the two parties adopted contradictory policy narratives on this issue, the quantitative and qualitative evidence so
far is fairly abstract. In order to better understand the arguments employed in this
debate (and how they diffused across actors), I now move from a bigram-level analysis
to an analysis of the underlying policy texts they are embedded within. Specifically,
I investigate the narratives built around the most substantively meaningful bigrams
in Table 4.4, focusing first on early and influential group adopters of these bigrams
and then on formal party members’ later usage. This analysis reveals that influence
ties across party coalitions are most often representative of inter-group disagreements
that nevertheless employ common terms, while influence ties within each EPN tend to
represent the development and deployment of common narratives about the impact
of cap-and-trade regulations. In particular, three salient narratives emerge from the
data and neatly divide Democratic and Republican actors.

4.5.1

Policy Efficacy

The first narrative that emerges from the data concerns the efficacy of the proposed
regulations. These narratives discussed the potential impacts of cap-and-trade policy,
and they were built around bigrams like “greenhous[e] gas” and “green job[s],” in
the case of Democrats, and energy “tax[es],” “price[s],” and “cost[s]” in the case
of Republicans. Specifically, the Democratic narrative pointed almost exclusively
to the environmental benefits of cap-and-trade (as well as other advantages), while
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Republicans referenced the tremendous and unfair burdens of such regulations and
the notion that they would not achieve the desired environmental benefits.
Democratic talking points in particular tied together three related benefits – environmental, economic, and foreign policy – that were repeated by many actors over
time. For example, in 2007 the NRDC wrote that cap-and-trade regulations will “simultaneously put the nation on the emission reduction pathway needed to prevent
the worst global warming impacts, meet other objectives such as reducing our oil
dependence, and promote continued strong economic growth.” Strands of this narrative emerged in other publications and statements made by members of Congress.
In 2009, the Center for American Progress provided a list of the benefits of the proposed legislation that suggested it would “create jobs,” reduce global warming effects
that are “harming our health and the physical environment,” and “provide a host of
economic benefits.”
Importantly, this narrative found its way from liberal interest groups and think
tanks to Democratic Party members. For example, when the bill was being debated,
Democratic Representative Jay Inslee similarly stated that cap-and-trade would “jolt
our nascent economic recovery” and “forestall climate change.” Many legislators
discussed a similar list of benefits with their consistuents, frequently using the same
exact language as outside organizations. To give just one more example, in 2010
Representative Lois Capps wrote that the bill “will create clean energy jobs here in
America, protect consumers, reduce pollution and help free us from our dangerous
dependence on dirty fossil fuels.” Oftentimes, these legislators tailored the talking
points developed at outside organizations to their particular districts. For example,
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Ohio Representative John Boccieri argued that the bill would create “thousands of
jobs in Ohio that cannot be outsourced; producing clean, green energy; protecting our
national security; and moving away from our dependence on foreign energy, especially
oil.”
Thus, the Democratic EPN was largely unified on the positive effects of the capand-trade legislation – they argued it would forestall climate change, spur economic
growth, and reduce dependence on fossil fuels provided by foreign nations. The
Republican narrative, on the other hand, refuted every aspect of this Democratic
story. First, Republican groups argued that regulations would increase the prices
of energy and other consumer goods without appreciably addressing the problem of
global warming pollutants. The Heritage Foundation was especially prominent in
driving this narrative, with 74 percent of their documents discussing the prospect of
increased “energ[y] price[s]” (interestingly, several Democratic groups argued directly
against Heritage Foundation authors, suggesting instead that technological innovation and behavioral change would limit price increases). Other groups adopted the
cause of energy prices in their later documents – the Chamber of Commerce, for
instance, wrote in 2009 that cap-and-trade policies in other nations resulted in “energy shortages and high energy prices, which in turn means higher prices for just
about everything else... [T]o add insult to injury, by itself ACES will not affect global
greenhouse gas concentrations in any meaningful way.”
Other Republican groups, like the Manhattan Institute and the Reason Foundation, employed nearly identical narratives. In fact, the narrative of higher costs for
consumers was so prevalent within the Republican EPN that the Pacific Research
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Institute wrote, in 2009, that “nobody is defending Waxman-Markey on the basis of
cost/benefit analysis, because it can’t be done.” This statement is demonstrably false
– the Democratic narrative outlined above relies heavily on the notion of economic
benefits – but perhaps reflects the fact that the Pacific Research Institute was hearing
mainly from other conservative organizations that agreed with this sentiment.
Many Republican formal party members similarly adopted this narrative of economic costs and limited results, tailoring the message to their specific state economy.
For example, in 2010 Missouri Congressman Roy Blunt wrote to his constituents that
a “national energy tax, or cap and trade, would raise energy prices for every single
person I work for and cost more than 32,000 jobs in Missouri in its first year.” In
much the same way, Kentucky Congressman Geoff Davis wrote that “This legislation could cause more than 4,000 jobs to be lost in Kentucky’s Fourth District alone
and nearly 22,000 jobs throughout the Commonwealth.” Texas Congressman Mac
Thornberry wrote that the bill would “severely damage Texas’s energy industry and
energy-related jobs.” And in 2009, Minnesota Congresswoman Michele Bachmann
sent an e-mail with the simple subject line: “Cap and trade is Bad for Minnesota’s
Agriculture Economy.”
Much like the Democratic narrative, the Republican narrative also had a foreign policy component to it, with groups suggesting that these economic costs would
be disproportionately borne by people in the US. Whereas Democratic actors often
looked to European nations as exemplars in fighting climate change, Republican actors were more likely to point to developing nations like China and India and suggest
that these countries would gain unfair economic advantages should the US voluntar183

ily regulate its energy production. This narrative was especially prominent amongst
industry representatives like the Chamber, which argued against cap-and-trade regulations because they would not be adhered to by America’s economic competitors.
Think tanks were also prominent drivers of this narrative, with the Cato Institute
describing efforts to reduce emissions as “futile unless China and India also act.” In
direct refutation of this argument, Democratic groups like the Environmental Defense
Fund proposed that the US must act as a leader because “China and India will not
cap their greenhouse gas emissions unless the U.S. moves first.”
In fact, this type of cross-referencing was fairly common within EPNs and even
across them. In general, then, these narratives help to ground the quantitative analysis presented previously. The groups within the network were developing robust ties
to one another as they utilized common terms developed by other actors. What the
current analysis shows, however, is that these common terms (and cross-references to
the work of opposing partisans), in most cases, did not represent meaningful dialogue
amongst various actors. Instead, they led to two distinct and cohesive narratives,
with Democrats arguing that cap-and-trade would lead to environmental and economic recovery and Republicans highlighting the economic costs and inefficiency of
the plan.

4.5.2

Policy Implementation

Second, the two party coalitions developed competing narratives about the appropriate institutions to implement environmental protection reforms. This fact can
be seen clearly in the distinct ways that actors employed the “clean air” bigram –
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which most often referred to the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1990 – and their references
to the Environmental Protection Agency. Much of this discussion happened following
the failure of the ACES Act, when many Democrats – including President Obama –
sought to tackle environmental problems through regulations rather than legislation.
This was not an entirely new idea, though. Outside groups in the Democratic
network had brought up the possibility of using the CAA and/or the EPA – rather
than legislation – to institute cap-and-trade policies. While this possibility was widely
recognized by Democratic groups, even before the failed legislation, there was some
disagreement within the EPN regarding the efficacy of using the EPA to implement
cap-and-trade. One Center for American Progress researcher, for instance, acknowledged after the ACES failure that EPA regulations were an imperfect answer. Nevertheless, CAP argued that “if Congress cannot muster the votes to pass a decent
energy and climate bill, then the EPA can and indeed must act to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act” despite the fact that “it would face legal
assaults that would significantly delay implementation of any such reduction rules.”
The National Resources Defense Council, on the other hand, was one of the earliest Democratic actors to forcefully advocate expanding the reach of the Clean Air
Act (and thus the Environmental Protection Agency) to cover emissions associated
with global warming. In 2007, they wrote that working through existing institutions
“will simplify the legislative task, because it takes advantage of many tried-and-true
underlying components of the current Clean Air Act that do not have to be recreated
in a new statute... The EPA also has the most experience administering market-based
emissions regulation and emissions performance requirements.”
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Following the legislative failures of cap-and-trade measures, other Democratic
groups subsequently adopted similar arguments about the efficacy of regulating greenhouse gases through the EPA. In 2010, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change
used very similar language when it argued that “Climate legislation could be vastly
simplified by leaving more of the implementation decisions to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.” Some Democatic members of Congress similarly praised the
EPA – many, for example, sent e-mails on Earth Day extolling the benefits of the
agency – but were less likely to discuss the actual implementation of the policy with
their constituents.
Both Republican groups and members of Congress, on the other hand, were quick
to characterize the EPA as an expansive bureaucracy that must be stopped. They
also refuted the Democratic argument that the Clean Air Act would be an appropriate
vehicle for cap-and-trade regulations. It is worth noting that Republican opposition
to these particular implementation strategies is likely a reflection of their opposition
to the policy itself, not the agency that would be in charge of it. Still, in this case we
see Republicans confronting a Democratic narrative and arguing directly against it.
In April 2008, for instance, the Chamber of Commerce wrote directly to the Energy
and Commerce Committee and implored Congress to “acknowledge that the [Clean
Air Act] is simply not compatible with the regulation of greenhouse gases, and that
it should enact a legislative fix removing greenhouse gases from the purview of the
CAA.” The next year, the American Enterprise Institute wrote that “There has been
little notice of how an approach that is supposed to be an alternative to commandand-control regulation will involve a massive interagency bureaucracy to execute it,
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with undoubtedly substantial compliance costs for the private sector... [T]he bill
requires the EPA’s administrator to perform over six hundred tasks in connection
with the operation of the law. One wonders whether the EPA administrator will have
time for any other environmental issues.”
As noted, Republican members of Congress were far more likely than Democrats
to discuss the actual implementation of the cap-and-trade policies, most likely to
appeal to the low opinion of the EPA among Republican voters. Congressman Wally
Herger, for instance, reacted to President Obama’s attempt to include carbon dioxide
under the Clean Air Act by writing that regulating carbon dioxide – “a gas we emit
with each breath” – would represent “an unprecedented expansion of the Clean Air
Act far beyond anything intended by Congress.” Like the Chamber of Commerce,
then, Herger tied environmental regulations to government overreach by referencing
the Clean Air Act. Other Republican party members followed, with Kevin Brady
vowing, “I won’t stand by while unelected bureaucrats try to circumvent the will
of the people who strongly oppose this job-killing cap and trade scheme.” Using
incredibly similar language, Geoff Davis wrote that “Despite the absence of a final
decision from Congress, unelected bureaucrats have already finalized regulations that
represent a generational shift in environmental policy.” Indeed, most Republican
members who discussed the EPA referenced power grabs by “unelected bureaucrats”
and “backdoor attempts” to imeplement cap-and-trade. These same Republicans
framed the issue as a matter of Congressional prerogative and the EPA regulations
as an assault on representative democracy.
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Instead of top-down environmental regulations, most Republican actors preferred
a free (i.e. unregulated) market approach build around technological advancement
which, according to the Heritage Foundation, “offers the market to opportunity to
find the winners and losers in future alternative energy sources.” Heritage’s focus on
market-driven innovation was echoed by other groups within the Republican EPN,
most notably the Chamber of Commerce.

4.5.3

Policy Goals

Finally, the two EPNs developed contradictory narratives about the appropriate goals for environmental regulations. Democrats, unsurprisingly, argued that any
regulations should incentivize renewable energy production (and allocate significant
funds to do so), which they said would not only limit global warming effects but also
have a positive economic impact. This messaging became salient several years before
Congressional action. The National Wildlife Federation, for instance, wrote in 2008
that the “current dependency on oil and other fossil fuels is putting the squeeze on
American families” and that the “jobs that benefit from the clean energy industry
touch every aspect of America’s economy.” In 2009, the Center for American Progress
suggested that cap-and-trade regulations would “create thousands of jobs manufacturing steel for wind turbines and building energy-efficient buildings.” And, again in
2009, the Environmental Defense Fund wrote that “Shifting America’s entire energy
market toward clean, renewable energy” sources is necessary “to solve the climate
crisis” (emphasis added).
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Once the issue reached the governmental agenda, Democratic members of Congress
seemed to tailor this economic and environmental message to their constituents. To
give just one example, Representative Anna Eshoo wrote in 2010 that “The American
Clean Energy and Security Act guarantees an investment of $190 billion in new,
clean energy technologies and energy efficiency which will create jobs and spur new
industries.” Many others wrote about the specific investments that would be made in
their district should some form of cap-and-trade be passed. Lois Capps, for instance,
wrote that the legislation would “have the added benefit of creating quality local jobs
and stimulating local economic growth.” She continued by listing several examples
of local clean energy investments, including investments in “Ecomerit Technologies,
a local renewable-energy business” and “a local advanced-lighting company, Soraa,
[which] was awarded federal funds to develop high-efficiency lighting projects.” Even
one Democrat who opposed the ACES bill – Arizona Congressman Harry Mitchell
– said he did so because “instead of investing in carbon-neutral energies like solar,
the measure would have doubled down Americas reliance on coal,” revealing the
importance of incentivizing renewable energy production within the Democratic EPN.
Republicans, on the other hand, typically argued that incentivizing clean energy
production at the expense of traditional energy sectors would be economically disastrous and technological unfeasible. The Republican EPN developed a fairly unified
narrative about the economic costs of switching to renewable energy sources at a time
when the American economy was weak and the technological infrastructure needed
for large-scale renewable energy production was lacking. In 2009 the Manhattan Institute challenged the Democratic notion of green jobs resulting from renewable energy,
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writing, “Only in Congress could legislators propose to raise energy prices..., require
firms to use nonexistent technology, mandate greenhouse gas emissions back to 19th
century levels – and then describe the bill as an economic rescue package.”
Instead, these groups advocated for traditional energy sources, namely oil and
natural gas. The American Enterprise Institute embodied this view when it wrote,
in 2008, that “When people are hurting, and struggling to afford gasoline, food,
and other necessities, common sense requires that we draw upon America’s own vast
reserves of oil and natural gas.” When arguing this point, Republican affiliates consistently pointed to the same empirical evidence – the fact that roughly 85 percent
of the nation’s energy production comes from traditional energy sources – when arguing that the shift to renewables would be costly and impractical. In this talking
point we see a clear instance of co-partisans drawing on the same information: after
early adopters like the American Enterprise Institute published this figure, others like
the Heritage Foundation and several members of Congress subsequently referenced
the same research. (Interestingly, Democratic groups like the National Resource Defense Council also invoked this figure, framing it in terms of the negative impact of
traditional energy dominance on global warming pollution and foreign affairs.)
Republican politicians had slightly more variation in their views on clean vs. renewable energy, though they still largely adopted talking points and narrative structures that imitated their extended party network. Some, like Representative Glenn
Thompson, largely agreed with outside Republican groups, writing that “The purpose of the cap and trade legislation is to increase the cost of coal, oil and natural
gas to the point of forcing us to use renewables. The problem is that there are no
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renewables available that to any meaningful extent can take the place of coal, oil and
natural gas, which produce 85 percent of our energy. The result: Americans will pay
a penalty for their use of needed carbon-based fuels.”
Others, however, acknowledged increased renewable energy production as a legitimate goal but criticized the mechanisms for accomplishing this goal found in the
Democratic bills. For instance, Ohio Representative Steve Austria stated, “I support
an alternative plan that would promote new, clean and reliable sources of energy by
having less reliance on foreign oil and begin using domestic alternative energy such
as solar, wind and nuclear energy and continuing to expand new technologies such as
clean coal.” At the same time, he justified his opposition to the Democratic bills by
discussing their impact on his district and state, and he used a very similar argumentative structure as other Republicans. He wrote, “States, like Ohio, that produce and
use more carbon-based energy, such as coal, will be hit hardest with cap and trade,
while states such as California and New Jersey will receive more favorable treatment
under this bill. Nearly 90 percent of Ohio’s energy comes from coal... That is too
much to ask of our families during these difficult economic times with unemployment
at its highest level in years.”

4.5.4

Common Terms, Different Languages

In sum, the two major party networks developed contradictory narratives about
the efficacy of cap-and-trade regulations, the appropriate policy tools for regulating
the environment, and the relative value of switching from traditional to renewable
energy sources. These are frames and counter-frames that have been identified in
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other studies of cap-and-trade regulations (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013), but this
study has highlighted the fact that these narratives are developed by outside actors
and disseminated along predictable party lines. In other words, these narratives
were not only internally cohesive within each party coalition, but also flowed from
prominent actors to other groups and party members. Members of Congress often
tailored messages developed and disseminated by party groups to fit the particular
characteristics of their districts. These findings bolster the external validity of the
previous quantitative analysis and suggest that those within the same EPN drew on
the same broad narratives – developed by trusted and prominent co-partisan groups
– when discussing the issue of cap-and-trade regulations. Thus, even when members
utilized common terms in this policy debate, they were mostly speaking different
languages. In short, they were talking past one another, and often directly to the
outside groups that support them.

4.6

Cap-and-Trade Discourses: Boon or Boondoggle?
On the issue of cap-and-trade regulations, partisan dynamics provided structure to

the research and advocacy efforts of outside research institutions. As demonstrated by
discursive similarity and diffusion patterns, ideas and information predictably flowed
along mainly partisan channels. In nearly every instance, these informational ties
diffused from outside groups to formal party members or other organizations. Thus,
the influence of ideas developed by outside groups appears to be contingent on longterm reputations and thick ties with other actors within the same extended party
network.
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Indeed, the types of groups most likely to develop partisan ties and reputations –
Partisan-Political and, to a lesser extent, Partisan-Academic organizations – were especially prominent influencers on this topic. They were often the first groups (within
the timeframe) to advance salient talking points and ideas. In the aggregate, these
ideas comprised three related narratives regarding the efficacy, implementation, and
goals of cap-and-trade legislation. Importantly, the Democratic and Republican narratives were almost entirely contradictory, even when they relied on the same underlying terms.
Though I focus here on bigrams and relatively simple arguments, it is worth noting
that these narratives often emerged from very detailed and empirical policy reports.
Most often, the details of these reports did not filter down to formal party members’ narratives, but there are cases where members of Congress referenced specific,
empirical evidence found in group publications. In either case, actors are selectively
interpreting information in light of their partisan preferences (and the partisan commitments of the group providing it).
These results, then, provide further empirical evidence for partisan policymaking.
Across the two extended party networks, actors are largely receiving different information and, as a result, talking past one another rather than engaging in meaningful
dialogue. The methods employed here help to operationalize these networks and map
out the relevant actors within them. There are limits to this analysis, however. First,
these findings rely on a single case study, and so the generalizability of the results
is limited. Still, the case is one that previous theories are ill-equipped to explain,
and one that the theory of extended party policymaking explains quite well. Future
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research will aim to apply these methods and this theory to additional cases, including other salient and politicized issues (like the Affordable Care Act and efforts to
repeal it) as well as less salient and partisan topics (like, for example, federal flood
insurance reform). These additional cases will not only improve the generalizability
of these findings, but also highlight more nuanced dynamics of when, how, and why
influence ties form in these networks.
A second limitation concerns the methodology and data utilized here. I operationalize influence in terms of discursive similarity and the diffusion of these discourses
within a network, and I use quantitative and qualitative methods to ensure that these
influence ties represent real-world effects. As I note, this is one important form of influence over the policy process (and specifically the discourse used in policy debates),
but it is not the only type of influence worth studying. Future research will attempt
to assess the degree to which outside groups are able to institutionalize their preferences not only in party discourses and agendas, but also in actual policy designs. In
this analysis I have shown that groups are able to influence the arguments and ideas
used in policy debates – and thus impact policy outcomes in Congress – but have
not studied whether or not groups directly impact the provisions and structures of
legislation. If they are able to do so, this would represent a form of “hard power”
that outside groups wield, in addition to the “soft power” of ideas and information.
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CHAPTER 5
POLARIZED POLICYMAKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

The results presented in this dissertation point to one clear conclusion: partisan polarization provides structure throughout the policymaking process, from the
conduct of policy research at interest groups and think tanks to the spread of this
information across policy actors to the use of discourses and talking points in policy debates. And we know, based on extensive research, that these processes often
culminate in polarized roll call voting in Congress (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1984;
Theriault, 2008; Lee, 2009). In other words, partisan dynamics provide structure
to the entire process of research production and policy advocacy. This realization
moves us from relatively unstructured policy process theories and pluralistic theories
of competition to a partisan coalitional model that fits better with modern policy
dynamics.
When it comes to the policy process, formal party members in Congress are largely
responsible for the incentives and constraints placed on their extended party network.
Outside research producing organizations exist within a marketplace for ideas, information, and talking points, and the current market incentivizes resources that are
useful to partisan actors. This means that, in essence, the demand for policy research has shifted towards information that furthers partisan goals and narratives.
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The downstream effect of this altered demand has been a shift in the supply curve –
more (and more influential) organizations now consistently provide information that
supports the goals of a single political party (which themselves overlap with the goals
of the organizations producing this research).
In the most extreme case, Partisan-Political groups tend to produce partisan research and engage in direct advocacy efforts to further their goals. They are, for all
intents and purposes, members of the extended party network in the policy process.
These organizations are more than just traditional think tanks – they are more likely
interest groups, with multifaceted and long-lasting campaigns to influence political
outcomes and move policy in a particular ideological or partisan direction. They play
the game of partisan politics because their goals are fairly partisan (or ideological) and
because they rightly perceive that influence is contingent on engagement with the political system. And, even more academic or nonpartisan organizations have changed,
to a lesser degree, in response to increased partisan polarization. These groups increasingly recognize that partisan reputations matter when it comes to the willingness
of formal party members to accept ideas. While they have not embraced this fact
as readily as Partisan-Political organizations, some have become better sorted into
a single party as the two parties drift apart. Others have maintained a nonpartisan
approach but nevertheless are increasingly public-facing, or attentive to how their
research and ideas are received by the broader public.
Problematically, the groups that most consistently operate within a single partisan
network seem to have significant influence over policy debates, measured here in the
spread of discourse and ideas to members of Congress. These groups have invested in
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strategies that enhance their ties with and reputations within partisan networks, and
as such they enhance their influence over policy discourse within their preferred party.
Certain moderate and/or academic organizations are still influential, but to the degree
that they have fewer ties with those in positions of power – and to the degree that
institutional credibility, in partisan battles, becomes increasingly irrelevant – these
types of organizations are likely to be marginalized further as partisan polarization
accelerates. In the process, Partisan-Political groups are in a prime position to inject
their information and ideas into party policy positions and, therefore, bias policy
towards their preferences.
Thus, the overall result of this changing marketplace is that many members of
Congress are now enmeshed in entirely different informational environments. They
receive different inputs and signals, and it is therefore unsurprising that bipartisan
agreement is increasingly rare. As formal party members are exposed to very different
(and often contradictory) talking points, they are increasingly likely to “talk past”
one another in policy debates. The groups providing these ideas, on the other hand,
are in a privileged position to influence party policy positions and, potentially, public
policy outcomes.

5.1

The Political Effects of Polarized Policymaking
These facts have important implications for key topics in American politics, in-

cluding political polarization, governance, and democratic representation. I elaborate
on these implications in the following sections, highlighting the largely negative effects
of extended party policy networks on American democracy. However, the continued
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presence (and, in some cases, influence) of groups that are not strongly embedded
within these networks provides some hope. I end this chapter with a discussion of
realistic reform options that might enhance the influence of more moderate and academic organizations and, as a result, limit some of the most detrimental effects of
partisan policymaking.

5.1.1

Partisan Polarization

Increased partisan polarization is, first and foremost, a cause of the dynamics outlined here. The fact that modern members of Congress are highly divided along party
lines means that the demand for policy research is similarly polarized. Democrats
demand information that supports their particularistic and ideological goals, and Republicans do the same. Recent research has suggested that some of the same groups
investigated here are responsible for helping to elect such polarized candidates (e.g.
Bawn et al., 2012; Desmarais, La Raja and Kowal, 2015) but, when it comes to policymaking, the research activities of groups do not appear to be the original cause of
increased polarization. These groups are, to varying degrees, responding to changes
in the demand for particular types of research. They have, however, enabled polarization to continue and perhaps accelerate. This is less a case of linear causality,
then, and more a case of spiraling causality, where increased polarization incentivizes
partisan research and this research, in turn, sustains and potentially furthers this
polarization. This is a feedback loop that is inherently difficult to break out of.
Indeed, certain outside groups have engaged with and advanced polarization through
their research products and partisan advocacy strategies. The Heritage Foundation
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is perhaps the best example of this fact: the organization edits research products
for their fit with overall messaging and political goals, establishes strong connections
to other groups and formal party members, and engages in direct advocacy efforts
through their 501(c)4 to promote their ideas. The aggregate effect of these strategies, across organizations, is the creation of two partisan networks of researchers,
advocates, and policymakers. There are relatively few meaningful, cross-cutting ties
connecting these networks, and as a result members are able (and even encouraged)
to “talk past” one another in policy debates. In such an environment, opportunities
for bipartisan compromise or even dialogue are limited.
Thus, to reiterate, it is not merely Congressional voting that is polarized; it is also
the actual process of policymaking. This seems a more difficult problem to tackle.
But we know that, in both voting and policy development, members of Congress are
the main cause of polarization. In fact, these problems are intricately related – as
bipartisan compromise has become increasingly rare, demand for moderate research
has decreased, foreclosing the possibility for compromise on salient issues in the future.
Thus, efforts to reduce polarization and reform the policy process might focus on
the same root cause: polarized party members. As I outline below, simply electing
more moderate and experienced legislators would help, but this solution requires
confronting long-term socio-economic and political trends. A more immediate solution
might seek to alter or augment the decision-making calculus of sitting members so
that the relative incentives for polarized research are reduced. This would be an
uphill battle given the institutionalization of groups that produce such research within
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partisan networks, but it is worthwhile to consider in an effort to reduce polarization
and improve governance and representation.

5.1.2

Governance

Polarized policymaking also has implications for governance, namely legislative
productivity and the design and long-term viability of public policies. There is some
evidence that polarization leads to legislative gridlock (Binder, 1999; McCarty, 2007),
fewer opportunities for new legislation and a severe status-quo bias (Barber and McCarty, 2013). The underlying logic behind these trends has been explained by theories
of “partisan teamsmanship” (Lee, 2016) and “pivotal-politics” (Krehbiel, 1998), but
this project highlights one of the main factors prohibiting compromise: polarized policy information. As members of Congress receive very different policy information
from their extended networks, opportunities for bargaining and compromise – which
require at least some common ground amongst participants – are undermined. The
fact that party leaders exercise considerable control over the flow of information in
Congress (Curry, 2015) further erodes the possibility for legislators to “meet in the
middle” and pass consensus policy. In a pluralistic system with many veto points,
such compromise is frequently necessary to overcome gridlock.
Furthermore, if we assume that academic organizations produce more accurate
policy information – and we should assume this – then it follows that modern day
policymaking is less informed than it once was. The exercise of developing public
policy in the modern era does not seem to meet the ideal of moderate minds and
independent experts meeting to design legislation. Rather, it seems to be a process
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defined by party leaders (and, to a lesser extent, rank-and-file) in conversation with
a select set of outside actors who share with them particular partisan or ideological
goals. As noted above, there are few influential organizations that bridge the gap
between the two parties, and even if they are able to do so, the two parties translate their research into contradictory and distorted narratives that serve to further
polarization.
The long-term impact of these developments on governance has likely been ‘leapfrog
legislating’1 , or the pursuit of one party’s distinct policies when they control government and another distinct partisan agenda when control of government switches.
The Affordable Care Act, for example, was a relatively moderate proposal but also
an entirely partisan one passed by unified Democratic government and without buy-in
from Republicans. Once these Republicans took partial control of government they
immediately set about undermining the policy, and when they gained unified control of government they attempted to overturn the ACA completely. Presumably, if
Democrats gain unified control again, they will work to either shore up the ACA or
replace it with a more liberal alternative. Many outside groups are more than willing
to take advantage of these opportunities to interject their own ideas about which type
of policy should be passed. And again, with fewer bridging organizations between
1
I borrow the concept of “leapfrogging” from Bafumi and Herron (2010), who show that, when
extremists from one party are replaced, they are not replaced by moderates but instead by extremists
from the opposite party. This means that the median voter is “leapfrogged” and never well represented. In much the same way, policies under partisan polarization tend to jump from one extreme
to the next when control of government changes, with few opportunities for moderate lawmaking.
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the two parties, the “jumps” from one party’s policies to the other’s are likely to be
large and, potentially, poorly informed.
In the process of leapfrog legislating, it is the average voter who loses. When
there are real problems with existing legislation, leapfrog legislating means that the
two parties are not seriously considering moderate adjustments or fixes. They are,
quite simply, receiving few informational inputs that favor such an approach. Instead,
they are pursuing a partisan and ideological agenda that is not reflective of the average voter, but increasingly reflective of the preferences of their extended networks.
The recent and unpopular Republican tax reforms are an example of this fact, and
many Democratic presidential hopefuls have similarly advanced policy ideas that are
relatively extreme compared to the preferences of the median voter.

5.1.3

Representation

The problems of polarization, gridlock, and leapfrog representation suggest that
the activities of outside research producing organizations have implications for democratic representation. Polarization itself leads to poorer representation, as relatively
extreme members pursue policies that are not representative of their average constituent (Bafumi and Herron, 2010). Instead, EPN theory suggests that members
pursue policies reflective of their extended support coalition – the interest groups,
media outlets, and activists that helped elect them (Bawn et al., 2012). This dissertation highlights one of the mechanisms, other than elections, through which these
actors can institutionalize their preferences: the provision of policy resources. By
susidizing information that furthers their shared goals, outside groups aid party allies
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in the legislating process. Aside from contributing to an interest group or think tank,
average citizens have no comparable way to influence the informational environment
of party members. And, because these groups tend to have unrepresentative material
or ideological preferences – and because average citizens have a “policy blind spot”
where they cannot distinguish between alternative proposals (Bawn et al., 2012) –
the result is typically a partisan agenda that best reflects the preferences of the most
active and extreme partisans.
Thus, outside groups are often able to end run the preferences of the average
citizen. By frequently collaborating and aligning with a single party, they are able
to institutionalize their particular preferences and ideas. By playing on the biases
and cognitive limitations of politicians, they are granted power, in the long run, in
the policymaking process. They have become, to quote Matt Grossmann (2012), the
“go-to” representatives of their preferred party. To the degree that these groups are
not representative of the average party voter, systematic bias is the result.

5.2

Some Hope for Reformers?
These implications are fairly pessimistic – they add a modern twist to decades

of research that has identified profound biases in the American political system. I
remain more hopeful than I would have imagined, however, when I began this project.
As noted throughout, academic research institutions are alive and, for the most part,
well. They do not appear to be thriving in the same way that more partisan organizations have, but they have mostly retained a place for themselves in the modern
policymaking world. This is in spite of a change in the balance of power, deriving
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from natural responses to the marketplace for ideas, that favors groups that play the
game of partisan politics.
As a market response, potential reforms should take aim at the marketplace for
ideas, the decision-making calculus of actors therein, and the incentives and constraints placed on market actors. This is easier said than done, as the dominant
force in this marketplace – partisan polarization – is the result of long-term sociodemographic (e.g. Polsby, 2005), economic (e.g. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006),
and political trends (e.g. Lee, 2016). The best solution to these problems, then, would
be to simply elect more moderate and experienced legislators who value academic research and have the skills to sort through informational inputs. Scholars have posited
a variety of means to accomplish this goal, and I defer to them on this topic. Instead, I present here several solutions that would address more proximate problems,
namely Congressional capacity and the pluralistic institutions that have allowed for
coalitional warfare.
The overall goal of reform should be to enhance the role of nonpartisan and nuanced research in the policy process (and therefore reduce the importance of partisan
and political ideas). This measn that reforms should seek to adjust the relative influence of various actors in the policy process and the decision-making calculus of
members of Congress. First, reforms that increase Congress’ capacity to address policy problems and craft responsible legislation could reduce the importance of partisan
groups. Their current influence derives, in part, from decades of disinvestment in Congressional and committee staff (e.g. Lewallen, Theriault and Jones, 2016). If funds
were devoted to attract and hire qualified staffers in the legislature, these staffers
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could act as an alternative source of information for time-strapped legislators. They
could help sort through informational inputs and – if they have been selected for their
policy expertise rather than political experience – weed out suspect research.
Of course, members have significant latitude over hiring decisions, and even if they
were somehow incentivized to hire policy experts on their staff, this is no guarantee
that politicians would be able to overcome their cognitive limitations and biases (e.g.
confirmation bias) when processing information. Perhaps a better solution would
be to develop robust formal institutions that provide generally accepted information
and, therefore, some common ground – or at least a common language – for members
to agree on. One major problem with the current state of affairs is that members
increasingly view information in light of the partisan background of the group producing it, so that philosophical and policy disputes often devolve into disputes over
sources and evidence. Augmenting the resources of nonpartisan research organizations – like the CRS or CBO – could help mitigate this fact. As the legitimacy of
outside research producing organizations is increasingly questioned, along party lines,
these Congressional institutions might have wider buy-in amongst members and be
able to gain bipartisan credibility in a way that few outside groups can.
Still, it seems unlikely that Congress would be willing to devote the resources
necessary to allow internal institutions to challenge the power of outside organizations.
Furthermore, these outside groups add real value to policy debates – they are often
closer to the actors and interests affected by policy change and represent an important
avenue for citizens to influence government. Perhaps what is needed, then, is a system
that integrates outside research institutions but prioritizes well-respected, academic
205

groups. This would be politically difficult – the parties would certainly disagree over
what constitutes a “well-respected” or “academic” organization, and accusations of
bias would probably abound.
Still, there are examples in European democracies that suggest some sort of institutionalized or “corporatist” system – where a stable set of actors have access to
the process of policy development – could be successful. These arrangements could
occur within parties or within legislatures. The National Democratic Institute (2011)
finds that many European parties, for example, are moving towards stable and inclusive decision-making processes. The actual designs of these arrangements differ,
with some parties designating the actors that can be involved in discussions, others
establishing a general sequence for this process, and some even assigning specific roles
to each actor. These internal procedures, the NDI finds, “make stronger political parties, more capable of dealing with negotiation, debate, and coalition-building” (9).
Importantly, they also find that “Stronger policy development structures mean that
a party is more likely to deliver better policy” (10).
In the United States, party-led participatory systems would almost certainly result
in the same type of biased policy inputs we observe in this study. Instead, the US
might develop formal legislative forums where agreed-upon actors have input over
policy designs. These institutionalized policymaking arrangements are often called
“corporatist” systems, where key stakeholders from capital, labor, and government
are invited to bargain over policy outcomes (see, e.g., Cawson, 1986). The benefit of
such a system in the US would be that formal party members are actually exposed to
alternative ideas, have a forum for discussing and interpreting common information,
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and generally are in conversation with one another and members of the opposing
party’s extended network. This type of conversation is severely lacking in the current
system.
Regardless of the particular solution, the goal for reformers should be to get
policymakers to speak the same language, so that real and informed policy debates
can take place. In short, we need to break up the strictures on dialogue, bargaining,
and compromise that result from partisan polarization.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX: SAMPLE OF POLICY ACTORS

Identifying a representative sample of relevant interest groups, think tanks, and
members of Congress is a difficult task. This problem is compounded by the fact that
the universe of American think tanks and interest groups has grown substantially in
recent years (Rich, 2004; Berry and Wilcox, 2018). For these reasons, I rely on two
respected and comprehensive sources to identify the sample.
First, Project Vote Smart’s National Special Interest Groups database lists all
organizations that publish issue positions or endorse candidates during elections. I
use this list to identify interest groups categorized as liberal or conservative by Project
Vote Smart. I also include groups that operate in an issue area (or areas) related to
cap-ad-trade (see Chapter 4). Specifically, I include groups operating in the sectors of
Agriculture and Food, Animals and Wildlife, Business and Consumers, Economy and
Fiscal, Energy, Environment, Food Processing and Sales, Government Budget and
Spending, Infrastructure, Labor Unions, National Resources and Energy, Oil and Gas,
Science, Taxes, Technology and Communication, Trade, and Transportation. Each
of these issue areas is theoretically related to the topic of environmental regulations.
Many interest groups are listed under multiple issue areas. Many others are now
inactive, do not have websites that can be searched for policy texts, or did not publish
any relevant texts in this issue area. These groups are excluded from the analysis
208

and are not listed below. Table A.1 lists this sample of interest groups along with
information on their ideologies. Altogether, 32 interest groups were analyzed in this
study.
To identify the sample of think tanks, I turned to the University of Pennsylvania
Think Tank and Civil Societies Program’s annual Think Tank Index Reports from
2008 to 2014. These reports list influential think tanks based on rankings from scholars, public and private donors, policymakers, and journalists. The sample includes
all think tanks listed amongst the most influential American think tanks in at least
one of these reports, excluding think tanks whose primary focus is on international
or foreign policy issues. The final sample of think tanks includes 47 organizations,
which can be seen in Table A.2. Finally, the sample of formal party members – operationalized here as member of Congress – was defined inductively from the universe of
e-mails containing issue-specific keywords. In total, 82 unique members of Congress
are included (72 from the House of Representatives and 10 from the Senate). All
members of Congress are listed in Table A.3.
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Group
60 Plus Association
American Conservative Union
American Energy Alliance
American Farm Bureau Federation
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
American Forest and Paper Association
Americans for Democratic Action
Americans For Prosperity
Associated General Contractors of America
Audubon Society
Bipartisan Policy Center
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions
Chamber of Commerce
Citizens for Global Solutions
Clean Water Action
Competitive Enterprise Institute
Consumer Alliance for Energy Security
Defenders of Wildlife
Eagle Forum
Environment America
Environmental Defense Fund
Independent Petroleum Association of America
League of Conservation Voters
National Association of Manufacturers
National Farmers Union
National Parks Conservation Association
National Taxpayer Union
National Wildlife Federation
Natural Resources Defense Council
Nature Conservancy
People for the American Way
Sierra Club

Table A.1: Interest group sample.
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Ideology
Republican
Republican
Centrist
Centrist
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Centrist
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Centrist
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Centrist
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat

Group
Acton Institute
American Enterprise Institute
Aspen Institute
Atlantic Council of the United States
Baker Institute
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Brookings Institute
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Cato Institute
Center for American Progress
Center for Global Development
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
Council on Foreign Relations
Demos US
Earth Institute
Economic Policy Institute
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Harvard Center for International Development
Heritage Foundation
Hoover Institute
Independent Institute
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
Institute for Policy Studies
International Food Policy Research Institute
Levy Institute
Mackinac Center
Manhattan Institute
Mercatus Center
National Center for Policy Analysis
New America Foundation
Pacific Research Institute
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Pew Center on Global Climate Change
Pew Research Center
RAND Corporation
Reason Foundation
Resources for the Future
Roosevelt Institute
Stimson Center
Tax Foundation
Technology, Entertainment, and Design
Urban Institute
Wilson Center
World Resources Institute
Worldwatch Institute

Table A.2: Think tank sample.
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Ideology
Republican
Republican
Centrist
Centrist
Centrist
Democrat
Democrat
Centrist
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Centrist
Democrat
Centrist
Democrat
Democrat
Centrist
Centrist
Centrist
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Centrist
Democrat
Democrat
Centrist
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Centrist
Republican
Centrist
Democrat
Centrist
Democrat
Republican
Centrist
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Centrist
Centrist
Centrist
Democrat
Democrat

Member of Congress
Rep. Alexander
Rep. Austria
Rep. Bachmann
Rep. Bachus
Rep. Biggert
Rep. Blackburn
Rep. Blunt
Rep. Boccieri
Rep. Boehner
Rep. Boustany
Rep. K. Brady
Rep. R. Brady
Rep. Cantor
Rep. Capito
Rep. Capps
Rep. Christensen
Rep. Crapo
Rep. Culberson
Rep. Davis
Rep. DeGette
Rep. Dingell
Rep. Donnelly
Rep. Engel
Rep. Eshoo
Rep. Flores
Rep. Forbes
Rep. Granger
Rep. Graves
Rep. Griffith
Rep. Hall
Rep. Herger
Rep. Himes
Rep. Hirono
Rep. Honda
Rep. Hurt
Rep. Inslee
Rep. Issa
Rep. Jenkins
Rep. Klein
Rep. Lucas
Rep. Manzullo
Rep. Marchant
Rep. McCaul
Rep. McCotter
Rep. McMahon
Rep. Mitchell
Rep. Moore
Rep. Moran
Rep. S. Murphy
Rep. T. Murphy
Rep. Myrick
Rep. Neugebauer
Rep. Olsen

Party
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
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Rep. Pelosi
Rep. Perriello
Rep. Petri
Rep. Pitts
Rep. Polis
Rep. Rehberg
Rep. Rogers
Rep. Rose
Rep. Sablan
Rep. Sensenbrenner
Rep. Simpson
Rep. Thompson
Rep. Thornberry
Rep. Upton
Rep. Visclosky
Rep. Walberg
Rep. Westmoreland
Rep. Whitfield
Rep. Wilson
Sen. Collins
Sen. Dorgan
Sen. Isakson
Sen. Johanns
Sen. Lincoln
Sen. Nelson
Sen. Roberts
Sen. Thune
Sen. Vitter
Sen. Wicker

Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican

Table A.3: Formal party member sample.

A.1

Notes on Partisan Classifications

To operationalize membership in an EPN, I use ideological classifications, campaign finance data, and mission statements to identify the ideology and policy positions of interest groups and think tanks. First, when possible, I utilize Project Vote
Smart’s ideological classification of interest groups. The organization classifies many
groups as either Liberal, Conservative, Socially Liberal (or Conservative), and Fiscally Liberal (or Conservative). I consider liberal groups of all kinds to be members of
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the Democratic EPN and conservative groups to be members of the Republican EPN.
For groups that have not been ideologically classified by Project Vote Smart, I examine campaign contributions since 2010 to assess partisan preference. I consider any
group that contributes at least 60 percent of their funds, in each year since 2010, to
be a member of that party’s EPN, and all other groups to be political moderates and
ideological centrists. For the small number of remaining unclassified interest groups,
research assistants looked at their mission statements and identified their “ideological
content.”
I similarly had research assistants examine the ideological content of all think tank
mission statements to operationalize their ideology and partisanship. For both types
of organizations, students adopted Andrew Rich’s (2004) coding scheme. Liberal
groups are those that have mission statements that express a desire to use government
programs to overcome economic, social, or gender inequalities; express concerns for
group-based social justice; seek environmental protections and sustainability; and/or
advocate for lower defense spending and limited military intervention. Conservative groups’ missions statements advocate for free market solutions; promote limited
government; express concern for individual liberties; seek to protect traditional family values or religious freedom; and/or aim to protect national interests through a
strong military. Finally, centrist think tanks are those groups without a discernible
ideological approach and whose mission statement does not fit either the liberal or
conservative coding scheme.
As noted in the main text, I categorize groups with with Democratic or liberal
preferences as Democratic affiliates, those with Republican preferences or conservative
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ideologies as Republican affiliates, and all others as non-partisan organizations. This
decision approximates the concept of partisanship postulated in EPN theory, which
says that actors are part of the extended party network if they have overlapping
or orthogonal goals with that party and typically work with and through them to
accomplish these objectives.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX: NOTES ON DATA AND METHODS

B.1

Interviews

One important source of data in this study were elite interviews with fourteen
policy practitioners, group executives, and issue advocates in Washington, D.C. These
interviews took place between June and July of 2018, mostly in person. (While in
D.C. I also attended several think tank events, which I reference in Chapter 3.) Four
of these interviews were conducted virtually, either via phone or video-chat software.
In compliance with the UMass Institutional Review Board, I do not reveal the names
of these subjects. Some general descriptive data on this sample, however, suggests
that it is fairly representative of large, prominent research producing organizations
and has variation across relevant variables. Specifically, the sample included:
• 7 think tank and 5 interest group employees or executives, 1 industry lobbyist,
and 1 employee at the Congressional Research Service
• 7 representatives from conservative groups, 4 representatives from liberal groups,
and 3 representatives from moderate organizations
• 5 subjects who had previously worked at another interest group or think tank,
and 1 who worked at both a liberal and conservative think tank
• 4 think tank or interest group employees who previously worked as Congressional staffers
These subjects were employed, when they were interviewed, at the American Association of Retired Persons, Bipartisan Policy Center, Brookings Institution, Cato
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Institute, Chamber of Commerce, Congressional Research Service, Heritage Foundation, National Rifle Association, New Democrat Network, and the New York Life
Insurance Company.

B.2

Text Cleaning and Processing

The corpus of documents collected for the cap-and-trade case study initially contained a great deal of “noise,” or words and symbols lacking substantive content.
In order to trace the flow of meaningful discourse across actors, I employed several
common text cleaning techniques. First, I removed from the corpus all numbers and
punctuation, general “stop words” (or words that are substantively insignificant, like
“a” and “please”), and corpus-specific stop words (or words – like “American Clean
Energy” – that all actors are likely to use). Second, I “stemmed” words to their base
or root form (e.g. “debate,” “debating,” and “debated” are all transformed to their
root, “debat*”), ensuring that words that differ in tense but not in substance are
comparable. Third, in the analysis of these documents I focus on bigrams (two-word
phrases), rather than single words, as the unit of analysis. This decision focuses attention on more substantively meaningful concepts and helps further eliminate noise
in the documents.
Finally, I weighted the remaining bigrams in the corpus to focus attention on the
most substantively significant terms, or those terms that are relatively rare but still
appear in an analytically significant number of publications. Specifically, I rely on
the term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) statistic to weight bigrams
according to their relative importance in the overall corpus (see Rajaraman and Ull-
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man (2011) for more on this type of weighting). Practically, this means that each
bigram in the corpus is weighted so that extremely common and extremely rare words
are both discounted, giving greater weight instead to those terms that substantively
distinguish different documents from similar documents.
The result of this text processing is a document-term matrix with rows corresponding to each bigram, columns corresponding to each actor in the corpus, and
cells containing the first date on which the actor used that term. Because the average
actor did not use most terms, the matrix is quite sparse. To account for this sparsity – and to further focus on analytically meaningful discourse in this study – the
weights for each bigram were averaged across all actors and only those bigrams in the
top 5 percent of the distribution were retained. Robustness checks using the top 10
percent and top 20 percent of the bigrams indicate that the ERGM results are not
sensitive to this decision. In these two additional models, the direction of coefficients
and their statistical significance are the same as the coefficients in the model used
in this analysis, with the exception of the Mutual x Both Democrats term (which is
statistically significant at pă0.05 in the 10 percent and 20 percent models) and the
Both Republicans term (which is not statistically significant in the 20 percent model).
These models are not shown but are available upon request.

B.3

Network Analysis and Exponential Random Graph Models

Exponential random graph models are powerful statistical tools when there is
reason to believe that the probability of a tie forming between two actors in a network
is dependent upon both the structure of the overall network and actor or dyadic
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attributes (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2016). Theory leads us to expect that both
of these conditions are met in the case of inter-actor discursive influence. However,
ERGMs are only useful if they are not degenerative (i.e. if they converge). Degeneracy
in these models arises from a lack of fit due to both poor model specification as well
the nature of the observed data (Morris and Li, 2015).
There are several ways to test for model convergence and to ensure that the model
is a good representation of the observed network. One is to compare the sample
statistics used by the MCMC sampler to the statistics in the observed network. With
a good model, the sample statistics should be roughly normal and vary randomly
around the observed values. In the figures presented below, the lefthand image for
each term is a trace plot of the observed statistics (black line) and the simulated
sample statistics at each step in the MCMC sampler (blue lines). For each network
statistic, the simulated values should fluctuate evenly around the observed value,
indicating that the model has converged and is not degenerate. The righthand image
for each coefficient presents this information in a slightly different way, plotting the
distribution of the difference between the observed statistic and the simulated values.
This distribution should be roughly normally distributed for each term and in each
model. Figure B.1 shows that the cap-and-trade ERGM model did in fact converge.
For each statistic in the network, the simulated values fluctuate evenly and randomly
around the observed value (left-hand images) and the distribution of the differences
between the observed and simulated values is normal and centered near 0 (right-hand
images). Together, these diagnostic plots suggest that the model converged (or is not
degenerate) around the observed network values.
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Figure B.1: MCMC diagnostic statistics for ERGM terms in the cap-and-trade model.
For each coefficient, the left-hand figure is a trace plot with the solid black line
representing the observed statistic for the term and the blue data points representing
the MCMC simulated sample statistics at each step.The right-hand figures depict the
distribution of the difference between the observed and simulated values.
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A second test is used to assess the “fit” of the model, or whether the distributions
of statistics simulated by the model match the means of the observed network terms.
This information is presented in Figure B.2, with the observed means for network
statistics plotted as data points on the black line and the distributions of simulated
model statistics represented by boxplots. If a model has good fit with the observed
data, the black line should roughly track the median simulated value for each statistic,
represented by the horizontal black line in each boxplot. Indeed, this is the case, to
varying degrees. The distributions for simulated statistics are perfectly distributed
around the observed median for the Both Environmental, Both Think Tanks, and
Mutual x Both Republican terms. The medians for other terms (e.g. Edges, Both
Interest Groups) are slightly off from the observed value. The distributions for the
Edgewise Shared Partners and Mutual x Both Democratic terms are somewhat more
skewed, but even for these statistics the true value falls well within the interquartile
range (or between the 2nd and 3rd quartiles) of the simulated values. Taken together,
Figure B.2 suggests that the model is, overall, a good fit for the data.
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Figure B.2: ERGM goodness-of-fit for cap-and-trade model statistics. Data points
on the black line represent the observed means for each statistic, while the boxplots
depict the distribution of simulated statistics from the model. Models with good fit
have observed statistics close to the simulated median (the horizontal black line in
each boxplot).
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